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This dissertation consists of three distinct essays. They are not closely related
to each other, and, as such represent the breadth of my interests and the freedom
granted to me by my committee, for which I am grateful. All three essays may
broadly be characterized as public economics, and all three demonstrate my interest
in applying economic reasoning to the design and evaluation of public policy. While
each essay studies a different topic and uses distinct methods, all three commonly
address how public policy can have unexpected consequences and how the design of
policy and research should take this into account.
The first essay is an empirical examination of how tax subsidies for hybrid vehicles
influenced the market price for those vehicles. As such, it represents a traditional tax
incidence analysis. In addition to the substantive investigation, the essay makes a
methodological contribution by demonstrating how partial identification (bounding)
techniques can be employed to assess the effects of a subsidy when economic agents
are able to manipulate whether or not they receive the subsidy. The empirical
evidence suggests that consumers received the vast majority of the tax subsidy, which
stands in contrast to the predictions of standard economic theory. The essay goes
on to describe an economic model in which this result is possible and to analyze the
1
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implications for the economics of taxation.
The second essay, written with Rebecca M. Blank and Kerwin Kofi Charles, is an
empirical examination of how individuals responded to state laws governing the min-
imum age at marriage. Our principle finding is that a substantial number of young
people wishing to marry were able to avoid restrictive laws by traveling to a nearby
state to marry or simply by misrepresenting their age to a government official. This
has an important implication for administrative data, which is based on marriage
certificates collected from local governments. We conclude that retrospective survey
data collected decades later provides a better record of actual marriage behavior
than contemporaneous administrative records. We argue that our findings can serve
as a broad cautionary tale for empirical researchers who may otherwise assume that
administrative data is the best source.
The third essay, written with Alexandra M. Resch and Paul N. Courant, is a theo-
retical examination of how government should provide higher education. The goal of
the paper is to provide an intuitive model of the optimal provision of resources and
allocation of students within a system of higher education. In contrast to previous
research, our model is driven entirely by an assumption about the complementarity
between resources and student ability. The essay provides a straightforward model
with intuitive implications about optimal provision rules that we believe will prove
useful for empirical researchers and policy-makers.
CHAPTER II
The Incidence of Tax Incentives for Hybrid Vehicles
2.1 Introduction
Federal and state governments in the United States have responded to rising con-
cerns about the consequences of oil consumption in part by introducing tax subsidies
for new vehicles that feature fuel-efficient technologies, including gas-electric hybrids.
These policies aim to reduce oil consumption in the personal transportation sector,
which accounts for 40% of gasoline consumption and 20% of greenhouse gas emissions
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). At the federal level, the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 introduced a substantial personal income tax credit for hybrids. At the
state level, thirteen states have passed tax incentives for hybrids, and many others
have considered similar actions. In this paper, I determine who benefits from tax
incentives for hybrids using transaction level microdata to estimate the incidence of
existing subsidies for the Toyota Prius.
I find that consumers capture nearly all of the benefits of tax subsidies. Transac-
tion prices for the Prius did not change following changes of up to $2,650 in the value
of the subsidy. Since consumers receive the subsidy directly from the government
after their purchase, constant transaction prices imply that consumers capture the
benefits of government intervention. This finding has implications for the evaluation
3
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of existing and future policies. It also has broader implications for the study of tax
incidence because the result, when combined with additional facts about the market
for the Prius, is difficult to explain in standard models and may therefore point to
phenomena that influence tax incidence but are typically ignored in research.
This paper makes several contributions to public economics. First, the case of the
Prius poses a challenge to standard incidence models. Through much of the sample
period, the Prius was in excess demand, and consumers had to wait in a queue for
several weeks to make a purchase. Given these wait lists, it is difficult to construct
a conventional model that allows for a situation in which consumers capture the
whole benefit from a tax subsidy. I argue that the most compelling explanation
is that Toyota believed that charging higher prices while the subsidy was in place
would reduce demand for hybrids in the future, even though higher prices would
not change the quantity sold. I construct a stylized model in which a temporary
tax has no effect on price when the producer is capacity constrained and current
prices influence future demand. Current prices may influence future demand if car
shopping is a costly search process and consumers use past prices to form beliefs
about the prices they will be offered in the future. Alternatively, current prices may
influence future demand for “behavioral” reasons, including a concern for fairness.
Under either interpretation, the modeling exercise suggests that familiar features of
taxation, such as the equivalence of incidence regardless of who remits a tax, may
not hold in this environment. Such considerations are most likely to influence tax
incidence in markets for new products or “green” products and in markets in which
final prices are negotiated.
Second, the paper proposes a method for establishing bounds on the incidence
of a tax when tax changes are anticipated. The federal tax credit introduced sharp
5
changes in the value of the subsidy, and the date of these changes was known in
advance. This induced a timing response among consumers, who moved their pur-
chases into the more favorable tax windows. If consumers who adjust their timing
in response to a tax change differ systematically from those who do not, then a
comparison of prices before and after the tax change will give a biased estimate of
tax incidence. To account for this, I employ a novel procedure to estimate an upper
bound on price changes. The estimator developed here is similar to the bounding
estimator of Lee (2005) in that it provides worst-case bounds to account for missing
information, but Lee (2005) addresses a situation with a randomly assigned treat-
ment and missing outcome data, whereas the estimator developed here applies to
situations with complete outcome data and selection into the treated category. An-
ticipated tax changes are a common feature of policy; examples include changes to
the capital gains tax rates in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax holiday on repa-
triated corporate earnings included in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, and
subsidies for energy saving home improvements in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Economists have noted the importance of timing responses and the challenge they
pose to estimation of permanent responses (Slemrod, 1992); the bounding method
used in this paper may be useful to future research that analyzes tax policies, or
other policies, with this structure.
Third, this paper is one of the first to analyze hybrid vehicles from an economic
perspective. While hybrid vehicles remain a small part of the new car market (about
1.5% of all new cars sold in 2006 were hybrids), their market share has grown nearly
100% per year since 2001. Despite their growing importance to environmental policy,
almost no economic research exists on hybrids. The exceptions are a pair of papers
that document the correlation between Prius ownership and Green Party registration
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and other signals of environmental preferences (Kahn, 2007a,b) and a paper that
correlates state tax incentives with sales volumes (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2007).
Finally, this research fills a gap in policy evaluation. Through the third quarter of
2007, the hybrid vehicle tax credit cost the federal government about $785 million,
with $394 million going to Priuses.1 Knowing who benefited from these subsidies is
necessary not only to evaluate the current policy, but also to inform future legislative
action.2 Many politicians have called for an increase in the federal credit or for a
removal of its phase-out provision.3 Hybrid tax incentives also remain an active
policy consideration at the state level.4 Moreover, future subsidies for other advanced
technologies are likely to take a similar form.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes important
features of the automobile market, with specific attention to the case of the Prius.
Section 2.3 details the federal tax incentives, and section 2.4 describes the data
used. Section 2.5 includes the principal analysis. Estimates provided in this section
demonstrate that there was a clear timing response, indicating that agents were
aware of the tax laws, but there was little or no price response, indicating that
consumers captured the subsidy. Section 2.6 considers the possibility that there
was heterogeneity among those responding on the timing margin and provides tax
estimates that account for this. Overall, these results confirm that the subsidy
primarily benefitted consumers. In section 2.7 a different empirical methodology is
1Author’s calculations, based on sales data from Automotive News, assuming an 85% take-up rate. Hybrids
produced by General Motors are not included because they report only aggregated numbers that include both
hybrids and conventional models. This should have little impact on the estimate, however, because General Motors
has sold very few hybrids.
2A full policy evaluation should consider not only incidence, but also the effect on total units sold. I return briefly
to this issue in the conclusion.
3President Bush publicly supports the removal of the cap (Associated Press, 2006). In 2005, Rahm Emmanuel
(D-IL) introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to increase the credit for domestic hybrids; Evan Bayh (D-
IN), Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced a senate bill in 2006 to remove the phase-out
provision from the existing credit; and a 2007 bill introduced in the House would give a $4,000 tax credit to plug-in
hybrids (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2007).
4The list of states that have introduced a hybrid tax incentive bill in 2007 alone includes, but is not limited to,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2007).
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used to estimate the incidence of state tax incentives. This yields a very similar
estimate of incidence. In section 2.8 I describe why these results pose a challenge to
standard models of tax incidence and outline an alternative model, in which current
prices are assumed to influence future demand, that could explain the result. Section
2.9 concludes.
2.2 Some Facts About the New Vehicle Market and the Prius
The objective of this paper is to estimate how prices respond to changes in a
tax subsidy. This requires accurate measurement of the relevant prices. In the new
vehicle market, there are several different prices — the suggested retail price, the
dealer invoice price and the final transaction price. In this section, I define these
prices and describe how they vary across vehicles and over time. Knowing how these
prices typically change is important for constructing counterfactual prices that would
be expected in the absence of tax change. I also describe the history of the Prius,
which is unusual in that it was in excess demand for several years. This excess
demand is key to the final interpretation of the empirical estimates.
The price posted on the sticker of a vehicle is known as the Manufacturer’s Sug-
gested Retail Price (MSRP). The manufacturer sets the MSRP and rarely changes
this during the model year. The MSRP also does not typically vary across locali-
ties, except through differences in destination charges (shipping fees). The MSRP
must, by federal law, be posted on all vehicles.5 Furthermore, a car may not be sold
for more than the MSRP unless the dealer attaches a new sticker that includes an
additional cost, called an “additional dealer markup” or “additional dealer profit.”
Dealers can and occasionally do post additional markups on vehicles in high demand.
5As part of the Dealer’s Day in Court Act of 1956, sticker prices were made mandatory in order to curb a practice
called “price-packing,” in which customers were offered a high price on their trade-in. The trade-in premium was
packaged into the price of the new car, for which the consumer had no reference price (Time Magazine, 1958).
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The posting requirement, however, makes it difficult for an individual salesperson to
negotiate a price above MSRP if management prefers not to add a markup. The
posting requirement also makes it transparent to consumers that the markup is a
price increase that is not a reflection of dealer cost.
The manufacturer charges dealers what is known as the dealer invoice price for
each vehicle. Franchise law dictates that dealers be charged the same price for
identical goods, with concession to cost differences, including local advertising fees
or delivery fees.6 As a result, the dealer invoice price for a specific vehicle varies
little across dealerships. The dealer invoice price is also constant over the model
year cycle, in most cases. Dealerships pay the invoice price for a vehicle when it is
shipped to them. This means that dealers have already paid for all of the vehicles in
inventory. Instead of changing the invoice price, manufacturers offer cash incentives
to dealerships when they want to lower the effective price. This allows manufacturers
to change the price of all vehicles in inventory, which have already been sold to
dealers.
The true, economic transaction price to a consumer of a vehicle depends on not
just the final price that appears on the contract, but also on manufacturer incentives
and the trade-in allowance. Manufacturers do not change the MSRP within a model
year, but they directly influence the transaction price by offering cash rebates and
low interest financing to consumers. Furthermore, two identical cars sold at the same
contract price can represent two different real outcomes, if the consumers receive dif-
ferent trade-in allowances for a given trade-in. The trade-in over or under allowance
is the difference between the amount listed for the trade-in on the contract and the
dealer’s actual estimated cash value, which is used for entering the vehicle into their
6Manufacturers do create some price dispersion through the use of bonuses and rewards for meeting certain
benchmarks and through variation in advertising fees across localities.
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own inventory. To accurately measure the price of a new vehicle, one must account
for cash rebates, the value of low-interest financing and the trade-in allowance. For-
tunately, the data described in the next section allow me to account for all of these
things at the level of the individual transaction.
At any point in time, final transactions prices vary across vehicles because idiosyn-
cratic bargaining outcomes cause the dealer’s margin to vary from vehicle to vehicle
and from customer to customer. Over time, some movements in the average transac-
tion price are regular and predictable. When a new vintage of a model is introduced,
typically in the early fall, it begins selling at a relatively high price. In most cases,
the price declines steadily over the model year, with prices falling at a 9.2% annual
rate, on average (Copeland, Dunn and Hall, 2005).7 Automobile sales also follow
a pronounced weekly and monthly cycle. Friday and Saturday see the most sales;
Monday and Thursday sales are higher than sales on Tuesday and Wednesday; and
very few cars are sold on Sundays. There are also more cars sold at the end of the
month, as manufacturers seek to hit sales volume targets. These selling cycles trans-
late to less dramatic price cycles, with small price discounts measured on weekends
and at the end of the month.8 The data used in this paper include the exact date of
each transaction, which enables me to control for these regular price movements.
Macroeconomic shocks also influence vehicle prices, and they may influence differ-
ent vehicles in different ways. For example, the price of gasoline has different effects
on vehicle demand according to fuel economy. Previous research has shown that ve-
hicles with different fuel economy have different responses to gasoline price changes
in both sales volume (Linn and Klier, 2007; West, 2007) and price (McManus, 2007).
Research has also shown that gasoline prices affect used vehicle prices differently by
7The run of a vintage is known as the model year. It typically begins in the fall and ends after about 18 months.
8Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) report a weekend price discount of $28 and an end of month discount
of $56 in their main regressions.
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fuel economy class (Kahn, 1986). It is therefore important to account for time period
effects and the price of gasoline in estimation.
The Toyota Prius
The Toyota Prius is a parallel gas-electric hybrid car. A gas-electric hybrid vehicle
has both a gasoline engine and an on-board electric power supply. In a parallel hybrid,
both the electric motor and the gas engine are capable of supplying power directly to
the wheels. Hybrid technology increases fuel economy by using the electric motor to
power the vehicle at low speeds and by recharging the battery with energy generated
in the braking process (Alson, Ellies and Ganss, 2005). The Prius is not plugged
into an electrical outlet, and it is fueled by conventional gasoline.
The Prius was introduced on a small scale in the United States in model year 2001.
The second generation Prius, which introduced the current, distinctive body style,
debuted in model year 2004. Shortly after its introduction, the second generation
Prius was in excess demand. This lasted until the 2007 model year became available,
which was produced on a greater scale. Toyota originally planned to sell 20,000
Priuses per year in the United States. Through the first three quarters of 2007, they
were on pace to sell 170,000.
Excess demand led to wait lists, which will turn out to be an important part of
the story of how taxes influenced Prius prices. The microdata used in the remainder
of this paper do not have a measure of wait times, but they do include a measure of
the “days to turn” — the number of days that a vehicle was in the dealer’s possession
before being sold. Average days to turn should be inversely related to wait lists: the
more common are wait lists the faster vehicles will turn over.
The median days to turn for all vehicles in the market is close to 60 days. Figure
2.1 shows the mean and median days to turn of the Prius for the 2003 to 2007 model
11
years. The break between the first and second generation Priuses is apparent in the
data. At the end of its run, the first generation Prius sold very slowly. The second
generation Prius sold at a remarkable rate for several years. Between the end of 2003
and the fourth quarter of 2006, the Prius turned over around every 4 or 5 days. The
2007 model year began at this same low rate, and rose, starting in November 2006.
This may indicate the end of wait lists in many locations. Average days to turn rose
further through the new year, and then fell, stabilizing at a new rate of 10 days.
The rate of turnover for the second generation Prius at its highest point was only
one-third the market average.
This suggests that wait lists appeared at the end of 2003 and faded in late 2006.
Two other sources of evidence corroborate the notion that the wait lists began to
recede in November 2006. First, media reports declaring the end of wait lists began
appearing in November 2006 (e.g., Woodyard (2006)). According to these reports,
industry data indicated a rise in the days to turn of Priuses, and analysts inferred
from this a reduction in wait lists; and, Toyota executives reported that, with the
2007 model year line, they had enough vehicles to meet demand.
Second, a small sample of data is available from HybridCars.com, which invited
hybrid buyers to report their date of purchase, wait times and transaction prices in
a public forum. Between April 2005 and August 2007, 253 Prius buyers reported
their wait times. Figure 2.2 shows the weekly average reported wait times for this
sample. The average wait time in this sample fell to about 2 weeks in September and
October 2006, and then went to zero starting in November. Thus, this small sample
of wait time data supports the conclusions from the more comprehensive turnover
data.
There are several reasons to analyze the Prius in order to understand the hybrid
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market and the effect of tax incentives. First, the Prius, by itself, represents more
than half of the entire hybrid market. Second, the Prius is the most distinct and
well-known hybrid vehicle. Third, the market for the Prius is more mature than
other hybrids, since it has been through several model year cycles. Finally, unlike
most other hybrids, the Prius experienced three policy shifts in the sample period.
I move now to a discussion of these policy changes.
2.3 Tax Incentives for Hybrid Vehicles
The federal government has subsidized hybrids through the individual income
tax system for several years. Before 2006, the clean fuel vehicle deduction allowed
consumers to deduct the “incremental cost” of a clean technology, including hybrids,
from their income. This was an “above the line” deduction that could be claimed even
if the taxpayer was not using itemized deductions. The incremental cost was capped
at $2,000, and all available hybrids qualified for this maximum amount.9 The Energy
Policy Act of 2005, passed in August 2005, eliminated the deduction completely for
tax year 2006, and replaced it with the more generous hybrid vehicle tax credit. The
new law allowed a tax credit of up to $3,400, based not on incremental costs, but
on estimated fuel savings. The value of the credit is based on two components: a
fuel economy credit and a conservation credit. The fuel economy credit is worth up
to $2,400 and is determined by the percentage gain of the hybrid in city rated fuel
economy over a model year 2002 benchmark. The conservation credit is worth up to
$1,000 and is based on the total number of gallons of gasoline saved over a 120,000
mile vehicle lifetime, as compared to the same benchmark. To qualify for the credit,
hybrids also must meet stricter emissions standards. Manufacturers are required to
9The IRS received many questions about how to calculate incremental cost. In October 2002, the IRS decided to
allow filers to use incremental cost estimates provided by the auto manufacturers (Internal Revenue Service, 2002).
The result was that all hybrid vehicles qualified for the full $2,000 maximum.
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send applications for each model year to the IRS, and the IRS then sets the exact
benefit.10
Not every person who purchases a hybrid is eligible to receive the benefit. The
credit does not offset tax obligations for those paying the Alternative Minimum
Tax. Furthermore, the credit is non-refundable. (Note that these same restrictions
effectively applied to the clean fuel vehicle deduction in earlier years.) If a vehicle is
leased, the lessor may claim the credit, not the lessee. The seller may claim the credit
if the buyer is a tax-exempt entity. The credit is available to business purchasers.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 also included a phase-out provision. The provi-
sion is triggered when a manufacturer sells 60,000 eligible vehicles. The credit is
unchanged in the quarter in which the 60,000th vehicle is sold and in the next quar-
ter. After that, the credit falls to 50% of its original value for the next 2 quarters,
then 25% for another half year, and then expires completely.
The phase-out was allegedly designed to prevent foreign automakers from bene-
fiting more than domestic automakers over the life of the program (Lazzari, 2006;
Leonhardt, 2006). Toyota hit the 60,000 mark in the second quarter of 2006, trig-
gering a cut in credit amounts that began on October 1, 2006. The benefit fell again
on April 1, 2007, and it expired completely on October 1, 2007. Honda’s phase-out
began on January 1, 2008. No domestic automaker has reached the cap.
The sharp date changes provide a natural experiment for the analysis of the influ-
ence of the tax policy on the hybrid market. A Prius purchased on or before December
31, 2005 was eligible for a $2,000 deduction (worth at least $500 for households in a
middle income bracket and up to $720 for the highest income individuals in 2000).
A Prius purchased between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2006 was eligible for
10The certification process has created information lags, which are described in greater detail in section 2.8.
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a $3,150 credit. A new Prius purchased between October 1, 2006 and March 31,
2007 was eligible for $1,575. A Prius sold between April 1, 2007 and October 1, 2007
garnered a credit of only $787.50. Table 2.1 summarizes the variation in the federal
policy. I use this variation in subsidy size over time to identify the incidence of the
federal income tax credit. A number of states have also legislated a state income
tax credit or a sales tax exemption for hybrids. These policies are described in more
detail in section 2.7.
2.4 A Description of the Data
This paper uses data from J.D. Power & Associates’ Power Information Network
(henceforth PIN).11 J.D. Power collects transaction details directly from a large sam-
ple of dealers in all major markets in the United States. The sample includes about
15% of all new car sales to final consumers. PIN data include the price of each vehi-
cle sold, the exact date of the sale, financing details, cash rebates and the truncated
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). The data also include age, sex and state of
residence of purchasers.12 The version of the PIN data released to me suppresses the
personal identifying information of consumers and the dealer information that would
allow identification of specific dealerships, to preserve confidentiality. I restrict the
sample to purchased (not leased) vehicles with complete price information.13 The
sample excludes fleet sales. The final sample begins in the fall of 2002 and ends in
May 2007.
The VIN of the new vehicle identifies the make, model, model year, and a vari-
11Standard data sources that include vehicle purchases and demographic detail will generally have too few hybrids
for analysis. There are roughly 100 million households in the United States, and about 16 million new vehicles are
sold annually. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) has about 100,000 consumer units per year. Since the
Prius comprises about 1% of the market, one expects roughly 160 Priuses per year in the CEX. In addition, standard
data sets have a substantial lag. The most recent CEX is from 2005, and the most recent National Household Travel
Survey is from 2001.
12Sex is imputed from first names, and ambiguous first names are thus missing.
13Less than 3.5% of Priuses in the sample were leased.
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ety of other characteristics. The VIN includes information on engine displacement,
cylinders, transmission, doors, body type and trim level, but it does not detail all
available options (e.g., sun roofs or stereo systems). All factory and dealer installed
options, advertising fees and delivery fees, are reflected in a measure called the dealer
cost, which is essential for allowing price comparisons of similarly equipped vehicles.
Note that dealer cost is not identical to dealer invoice (see the appendix for details).
The data include a number of additional variables. These include the trade-in
vintage and odometer. Also important is the “days to turn” — the number of days
that a vehicle was on the dealer’s lot before being sold. Transaction details also
include information on service contracts, interest rates and other loan details.
Two additional pieces of information come from other sources. I merge official fuel
economy ratings from the Environmental Protection Agency’s fuel economy guide
according to make, model, model year, cylinders, displacement, transmission and
trim level. I also use weekly tax inclusive national retail gasoline prices provided by
the Energy Information Administration.
As described in section 2.2, the final transaction price of a new car must account
for several things. To construct the necessary measure, I begin with the transaction
price inclusive of factory installed options but exclusive of taxes, fees, service con-
tracts and after-market options. The excluded items do not generally influence the
resale value of the vehicle, and service contracts and after-market options are often
negotiated after the final price of the vehicle is determined. I adjust the transac-
tion price inclusive of factory installed options to account for the trade-in allowance,
manufacturer’s direct to customer cash rebates, and financing incentives. To con-
struct the value of the financing incentive, I assume a 4% annual nominal discount
rate and estimate the difference in the present discounted value of the loan actually
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observed in the data (given the loan amount, interest rate and term) to that same
value using the Federal Reserve’s 48-month car loan interest rate series.14 I call this
the “incentive adjusted price,” or just “price”.
This measure of price will vary with the set of options installed on a vehicle,
creating significant price variation. For example, the 2007 Prius has a base MSRP
of $22,175, but the premium options package adds $6,350 to the retail sticker price.
If the number of Priuses that have this options package changes from week to week,
average prices will change, even if the prices of identical vehicles do not.
To construct a measure that accounts for the value of options, I also use a mea-
sure which subtracts dealer cost from the incentive adjusted price. I call this the
“incentive adjusted markup,” or just “markup”. Note that this is a level amount,
not a percentage. Note also that this markup does not distinguish between revenue
collected by the dealer and the manufacturer. For example, a dealer’s gross profit
could rise when the markup falls, if the manufacturer offered a direct to consumer
incentive that lowered the final price by less than the full incentive amount.
Table 2.2 shows the sample size, price and markup for the final sample of 64,706
Priuses by model year. The 2007 model year features a premium trim level “Touring”
package, which is listed separately in table 2.2. The last column in each panel shows
totals for the entire model year. For example, the sample contains 2,381 model year
2003 Priuses. They sold for an average price of $21,068, which was $611 above the
average dealer cost.
The main estimates in this paper focus on transactions that occurred within two
weeks on either side of each federal tax change. Table 2.2 breaks down the number
of observations, average prices and average markups in each of these windows by
14This price adjustment methodology follows Corrado, Dunn and Otoo (2006).
17
model year and trim level. The first two tax changes are close to changes in model
years. The 2006 model year Prius began selling in November 2005, and the 2007
vintage began selling in September 2006. The latter is evidenced in table 2.2 by the
sharp drop in 2006 model year Priuses between the end of September and beginning
of October.
Since it is critical to compare identical vehicles before and after each tax change,
I estimate the effect of the first tax change using only 2006 model year Priuses, and
I estimate the effect of the other two changes using only 2007 Priuses with the base
trim level. These samples are indicated by shading in table 2.2. Thus, for example,
there are 513 Priuses in the sample in the last two weeks of December 2005 and
1,007 in the first two weeks of January 2006, but I use only 433 from December and
925 from January in the principal analysis, to restrict comparisons to a single model
year. Except where noted, analysis of all the model years and trim levels together
does not change any result significantly. Having described the market, the policy
variation and the data, I now proceed to a description of how consumers responded
to tax incentives.
2.5 Responses to Changes in the Federal Tax Credit
Transactions surrounding each of the three changes in the federal tax credit reveal
two key facts. First, there was a clear shifting of transactions into the tax preferred
time period in each case. Second, Priuses purchased in the higher subsidy period,
near a tax change, were sold for about as much as Priuses purchased in the lower
subsidy window near that change. Since consumers later receive a tax break from the
government, constant transaction prices imply that net of tax consumer prices move
by the full amount of the subsidy. Together, these two facts suggest that agents were
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aware of the tax policy and that consumers capture most of the benefit.
Agents Shifted Transactions Into High Subsidy Time Periods
The sales distributions surrounding the policy changes reveal strategic shifting.
Shifting is limited, however, to the two weeks before and after each tax change.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of sales over the 62 days in December 2005 and
January 2006 for both the Prius and for non-hybrid Toyota sedans.15 Priuses pur-
chased in December were eligible for the deduction (worth up to $720), and January
purchases were eligible for the credit (worth up to $3150). Relative to Toyota sedans,
the Prius was sold more heavily at the beginning of January than at the end of De-
cember, suggesting that transactions were shifted into January, where the subsidy
was greater.16
To ensure that the extra January Prius sales are a result of the tax and not a
regular time pattern specific to the Prius, we can examine the sales distribution over
the same dates in a year with no tax change. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of
sales of the Prius versus non-hybrid Toyotas for December 2004 and January 2005,
where there was no change in tax incentives. These data do not show a similar spike
in January sales.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the corresponding distributions for September and Oc-
tober. As expected, Prius sales were abnormally high in September 2006, just before
the tax credit phased out. In this instance, Prius transactions were moved to an ear-
lier date, whereas the December and January picture shows that Prius transactions
were moved to a later date. This symmetry of response bolsters the conclusion that
differences between sales patterns of the Prius and non-hybrid Toyota sedans were
15Results are very similar if the entire sedan market is used instead of Toyota sedans.
16January 1, 2006 was a Sunday, accounting for the low sales. The selling cycle described in section 2.2 is evident
in these figures.
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driven by tax changes. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 provide the same information for March
and April 2007, and lead to the same conclusion.
Table 2.3 quantifies the shift in purchase timing. Relative to the monthly sales
volume, the shift is large — about 15% of monthly sales are shifted on average over
the three events. In addition, the relative shift is larger for the largest tax change and
smallest for the smallest tax change. Furthermore, the sales distribution occurred
entirely with the two-week window around each change. The distributions are very
similar at the beginning and end of the two-month windows. Given the significant
amount of money at stake, it is perhaps surprising that more shifting did not occur.
Average Prices Were Non-Responsive: Descriptive Evidence
Figures 2.9 through 2.11 show seven-day moving averages of prices and markups
in the two months surrounding each tax change.17 The samples in these figures are
restricted to a single model year and trim level to avoid introducing price changes
that are due to model year seams. Overall, these pictures provide no evidence that
prices moved in the anticipated direction in response to tax changes, but there are
important differences between prices and markups. Before discussing the graphical
evidence, I discuss the interpretation of a discrepancy between price and markup.
Price versus Markup
If average prices and markups fail to move together, it must be because (a) the
average value of installed options changed or (b) Toyota changed the dealer invoice
(the price it charged dealers) for identically equipped vehicles. Around the first two
tax changes, dealer invoice did not change, which means that differences between
prices and markups are driven by options packages and that the preferred measure
17The moving average is symmetric, using three days on either side of the date. To avoid smoothing a discontinuity,
the moving average does not include values from both tax regimes at any point.
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for incidence analysis is the markup. Ultimately, the same is true of the third tax
event, but price changes in that case are more complicated, as explained below.
Recall from section 2.2 that dealer invoice prices rarely change during the model
year, except through dealer cash incentives. Industry sources that report weekly
on these incentives indicate that no dealer incentives were in place for the Prius
during any of the tax windows.18 The Toyota dealers that I spoke with indicated
that they have never received dealer cash incentives on the Prius. In addition, the
distributions of costs in the sample show evidence of changes in the proportion of
different options packages, but generally support the notion that Priuses with the
same options package cost the same around each of the first two tax windows (see
Appendix for details).
Dealer cost did, however, change around the third tax date. In February and
March of 2007, Toyota introduced low-interest financing for the Prius. These incen-
tives were eliminated on April 2, 2007, just as the tax credit dropped from $1575 to
$787.50.19 Toyota simultaneously announced an “economic savings bonus” for the
Toyota Prius which took effect on April 2. This “economic savings bonus” lowered
the price of each options package by as little as $600 or as much as $2000. The dealer
invoice for each options package was also changed as part of this program.
To determine whether consumers paid more or less for similarly equipped vehicles
in April 2007, as compared to March, we need to know how much each April Prius
would have cost dealers had it been sold in March, before the price change. To
18Specifically, I examined the “Dealer Incentives” table in relevant issues of Automotive News, which indicate
no dealer incentives for the Prius in December 2005, January 2006, September 2006, October 2006 or March 2007
(Automotive News, 2005 - 2007). Automotive News does report an incentive in April 2007, but this may have
indicated either the “economic savings bonus” or a reimbursement for the costs of using a Prius as a loaner vehicle if
the customer later bought a Prius (Rechtin, 2007), in which case the incentive would have influenced a tiny fraction
of vehicles. In a personal correspondence, an Automotive News employee has indicated to me that they believe no
dealer cash incentive existed in April 2007, though they were unable to explain what was reported in the magazine
at that time.
19April 1, 2007 was a Sunday.
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do this, I use dealer invoice prices for each options package from Edmunds.com to
identify which options package each vehicle most likely had. I then adjust for the
change in invoice price so that a Prius with the same options package in March
2007 and April 2007 have the same dealer cost. Details of this procedure are in
the Appendix. Costs adjusted for the invoice price change are used throughout the
remainder of the paper.
Graphical Results
With the distinction between prices and markups in mind, I move now to a de-
scription of the price response to tax changes. Figure 2.9 shows prices and profits for
December 2005 (when the deduction was worth up to $720) and January 2006 (when
the credit was worth up to $3150). If sellers captured part of the benefit, transac-
tion prices should rise after the vertical bar in Figure 2.9. Instead, a small jump
downward is evident in the price series, and the markup is unchanged. Since dealer
cost was constant, this means that the tax subsidy was captured by consumers. The
drop in the price series was due to a fall in the average value of installed options.
Figure 2.10 shows prices and markups for September 2006 (when the credit was
worth up to $3150) and October 2006 (when the credit was worth up to $1575).
There is no evidence of a price or markup jump around this tax change. Within a
few weeks of the tax date, the markup is quite steady. Note that the series do not
start at the beginning of September in figure 2.10. This is due to the model year
seam. Toyota began selling the 2007 Prius in the middle of September. While there
are not very many days available before the tax change, there are about 500 Priuses
in the sample, as shown in table 2.2. Many 2006 Priuses were also sold in September,
but only about 100 were sold in October, limiting the potential for analysis of the
2006 vehicles.
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Figure 2.11 shows prices and markups, using the cost adjusted for the “economic
savings bonus,” for March 2007 (when the credit was worth $1575) and April 2007
(when the credit was worth $787.50). In this case, there is evidence of a price increase
when the tax credit is reduced — in contrast to our expectation that a decrease in
tax credits would lead to a fall in price. This is due to the fact that the financing
incentives in place in March were worth more than the “economic savings bonus.”
Two explanations for this unexpected price change are possible. First, I may have
miscalculated the value of financing incentives, which require an assumption about
the discount rate and the use of a counterfactual interest rate. In the econometric
results below, I recalculate incidence estimates using a variety of assumptions. When
a 6% or 8% discount rate is used, there is no significant jump in the markup.
Alternatively, consumers may have miscalculated the value of financing incentives.
Average prices that do not account for financing incentives fall through this tax
change. The price increase evident in Figure 2.11 is entirely driven by the elimination
of low-interest financing. Thus, it is possible that consumers mistakenly perceived
the “economic savings bonus,” which was a visible change in price posted on the
sticker of the vehicle, as a price cut that offset the change in tax credit, but failed to
properly take into account the price increase embedded in the financing rates.
Other research bolsters the plausibility of consumer miscalculation. Busse, Simester
and Zettelmeyer (2007) find striking evidence of consumer misunderstanding sur-
rounding the employee pricing discount promotions of domestic vehicle manufac-
turers in 2005. They show that, in response to announced promotions in which
all consumer were eligible to purchase cars at the employee discounted price, sales
surged dramatically (though temporarily), but prices rose on average. This was be-
cause the manufacturer’s incentives in place prior to the promotion were so large
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that they provided a bigger discount than employee pricing in many cases. The
authors point to experimental research that shows that the announcement of a sale
can sometimes have an effect on demand, even if prices are not, in fact, discounted
(Inman, McAlister and Hoyer, 1990).
In sum, there is considerable graphical evidence that consumers captured the full
tax subsidy because markups did not jump in response to tax changes. There are also
interesting differences between prices and markups, which indicate the importance
of accounting for options packages. The only evidence of a change in markups is
around the third tax event, at which point prices moved in the “wrong” direction.
This may be the result of imperfect calculation of the value of financing incentives
by consumers, which were changed on the same day that the tax changed.
Average Prices Were Non-Responsive: Regression Evidence
In this section, the conclusions drawn from the graphical evidence described above
are confirmed via linear regression. These regressions show no evidence of a statisti-
cally significant, positive relationship between prices and the value of the federal tax
subsidy. It is thus impossible to reject the hypothesis that consumers captured the
entire credit.




H1 + γ1W1 +
α2
∆2
H2 + γ2W2 +
α3
∆3
H3 + γ3W3 + Xijβ + µj + εij,
where i indexes an individual and j a model year and trim level interaction, the
other subscripts denote the three tax changes (1=December 2005 and January 2006;
2=September 2006 and October 2006; 3=March 2007 and April 2007), ∆ is the dollar
amount of the tax change in each case, H is a dummy equal to 1 if the transaction is
for the analyzed model year (see table 2.2) and occurs in the high tax side within two
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weeks of a change, W is a dummy equal to 1 if the transaction occurs on either side
within two weeks of the change, X is a vector of controls, µ is a vector of dummies
for each model year and trim level, and ε is an error term.20 Thus, for example, H1
is coded as 1 if and only if the transaction is for a model year 2006 Prius sold in the
first two weeks of January 2006. W1 is coded as 1 if and only if the transaction is for
a model year 2006 Prius sold in either the last two weeks of December 2005 or the
first two weeks of January 2006. The dependent variable is the incentive adjusted
price paid by consumers.
The sample includes all model year 2003 to 2007 Priuses (N=64,706). The Priuses
not in the treatment windows add precision to the estimation of the coefficients on
the control variables. The vector of controls includes vehicle cost, day of the week
dummies, a dummy for the last five days in a month, state dummies, the retail
price of gasoline and a quadratic trend in the length of time that type of Prius was
available on the market.
The α/∆’s are the coefficients of interest. Since the α/∆’s are coefficients on the
high subsidy time period dummies, if there is a price change in the expected direction,
the α/∆ coefficients will all be positive. Furthermore, since the high subsidy period
dummies are divided by the dollar amount of the tax change, the estimates may
be interpreted as the change in price per dollar of tax change. The standard tax
incidence model thus predicts that 0 ≤ α/∆ ≤ 1. In calculating the size of each tax
change, I use the maximum credit amount ($3150, $1575 and $787.50) and I assume
a 25% marginal tax rate for the deduction, meaning it is assumed to have been worth
$500.21
20Here, and elsewhere, the i and j subscripts on the H and W dummies are suppressed to avoid clutter.
21The 25% tax rate fits the most appropriate income range. For example, married couples filing jointly with
adjusted gross income between $59,400 and $119,950 have a marginal tax rate of 25%. This range includes the mean
self-reported income of Prius buyers in 2005 ($87,500) from marketing research data (CNW Research, 2007). In
2005, 21% of all tax filers had a marginal tax rate of 25%, and only 6.4% had a marginal rate above this (see Table
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Table 2.4 reports the α/∆ coefficients for several specifications. The first column
contains only the model year and trim level dummies as controls. It is, therefore,
simply the difference in means of vehicle prices in the 2 weeks with a higher subsidy
value and the 2 weeks with a lower subsidy value, adjacent to each tax change, scaled
by the change in subsidy value. The second column adjusts for options package
composition by including the dealer’s cost of the vehicle as a regressor. The third
column includes vehicle cost, and adds all of the other controls.
As an example of how to interpret the coefficients, consider the estimate in the
first row and second column: controlling for dealer cost, prices fell by 3.7 cents for
every increased dollar of subsidy when the tax credit was introduced in January
2006. Given the standard error of 2.4 cents, this is not statistically distinguishable
from zero. Since dealer cost was constant in the tax windows (argued above), the
specifications that control for dealer cost (columns 2 and 3) are preferred. In these
specifications, the price effects for the first two changes are statistically indistinguish-
able from zero, and are tightly estimated. The third tax change has a statistically
significant sign in the unexpected direction. As noted below, the statistical signifi-
cance of this coefficient’s difference from zero is sensitive to alternative definitions of
financing subsidies.
In sum, regression evidence indicates that the subsidies did not generate any
statistically significant upward price movement in the price that consumers paid, so
that one cannot reject the hypothesis that consumers captured the entire subsidy.
The possibility that these estimates are biased downwards because “savvier” car
buyers were more likely to move their transaction into the higher subsidy tax window
is explored in the next section.
3.4, Internal Revenue Service (2007a)). The top marginal rate in 2005 was 35%, which would raise the value of the
subsidy to $700.
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2.6 Accounting for Heterogeneity in Strategic Timing
The incidence estimates of the previous section are based on a comparison of
transactions before and after each tax change. Such a procedure could lead to biased
estimates if consumers who reacted to tax changes by moving their date of purchase
differ systematically from those who did not. In this section, I provide evidence that
there was a difference between consumers who purchased in the high and low tax
windows, discuss a procedure for establishing an upper bound on the price effect of
taxes when this type of heterogeneity is present, and generate estimates of this upper
bound in the case of the Prius. For the first two tax changes, these upper bounds
are fairly tight, which confirms that consumers captured a significant majority of the
tax benefits.
Evidence of Heterogeneity in Strategic Timing
Even though the data contain relatively few buyer demographic variables, the
transaction details are sufficiently rich to reveal differences between consumers who
purchased in the high subsidy window and the low subsidy window. Table 2.5 shows
mean characteristics of transactions that occurred within two weeks on either side
of each tax change. The table also reports an estimate of the difference in mean
characteristics of high subsidy and low subsidy transactions taken from a regression
of the following form:
Characteristicij = βH + γ1W1 + γ2W2 + γ3W3 + εij,
where i indexes individual consumers and j model year and trim level interactions, H
is a dummy equal to one if the Prius is the model year analyzed and the transaction
is within two weeks of a tax change on the high subsidy side, and W are dummies
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equal to one if the vehicle is the model year analyzed and the transaction is within
two weeks on either side of each of the three tax events.22
Table 2.5 shows that high subsidy consumers were less likely to trade in a vehicle,
required a smaller down payment, were less likely to buy a service contract, generated
less service contract income for dealers, paid lower total expenses on after-market
options, taxes and fees, and were less likely to accept an interest rate that exceeded
the buy rate – as compared to low subsidy consumers.23 High and low subsidy
transactions are statistically indistinguishable from each other in age, sex, trade-in
vintage, trade-in value, amount financed and whether or not the transaction included
life insurance.24
Thus, high subsidy car buyers differ from their counterparts in ways that suggest
they are better negotiators. Intuitively, consumers with excellent knowledge of the
car market are probably less likely to agree to a transaction that allows dealerships to
generate income through service contracts, interest rate markups and after-market
options. In addition, previous research has found that consumers who trade in a
vehicle pay more for their new car (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso, 2001).
Thus, table 2.5 demonstrates not only that a difference exists between high and low
subsidy buyers, but also that consumers who purchase in the high tax window are
likely to be better negotiators, which means that they will pay less for an identical
car than their counterparts. If true, then the estimates in table 2.4 underestimate
the true tax effect, since high subsidy buyers (a) likely pay less on average than low
subsidy buyers within any given tax regime and (b) are more likely to buy a car in
22All results are very similar if (a) the high and low transactions are all grouped together without separate dummies,
(b) Prius transactions from a previous year with no tax change are used to construct a difference-in-differences
estimate, or (c) non-hybrid Toyota sedans are used as a comparison group to construct a difference-in-differences
estimate.
23The buy rate is the rate that the financing agency quotes to the dealership. Dealers sometimes sign a contract
for a higher rate than the buy rate, allowing them to make income on the difference.
24Dealerships offer life insurance that offsets debt on a car loan in the event of death.
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the high tax benefit period.
Bounding Estimates of the Price Effect of the Tax Credit
To understand the implications of heterogeneous shifting for the estimation of tax
incidence, consider the following model. Suppose that there are two types of Prius
buyers, “movers” and “stayers”. Each individual has an exogenously assigned ideal
date of purchase drawn from a distribution common to both movers and stayers. If
a mover has an ideal date of purchase near a tax change, that individual will move
their transaction into the high subsidy time period. In contrast, a stayer makes their
purchase on the ideal date, regardless of pending tax changes. Suppose also that,
consistent with the evidence in table 2.5, movers are better negotiators, on average.
Under this assumption, a comparison of transactions on either side of a tax change
would result in a biased estimate of the tax effect because it compares buyers with
different average bargaining abilities.
The estimate obtained by comparing transactions on either side of a tax change
can be written and decomposed as follows. Let m denote movers and s stayers, and
let τH denote the high tax subsidy time period and τL the low subsidy time period.
Denoting the price as p, the standard estimate is:
E[p|τH ]− E[p|τL] = ρE[p|τH ,m] + (1− ρ)E[p|τH , s]− E[p|τL, s]
= ρ(E[p|τH , s]− ζ) + (1− ρ)E[p|τH , s]− E[p|τL, s]
= θ − ρζ,
where E is the expectations operator, ρ is the percentage of those in the high subsidy
period that are movers, θ ≡ E[p|τH , s]−E[p|τL, s] is the treatment effect of the tax
on stayers and ζ ≡ E[p|τH , s] − E[p|τH ,m] is the difference in mean price paid
between stayers and movers in the high subsidy period. If movers are, on average,
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better negotiators than stayers, then ζ > 0 and the observed effect is a downwards
biased estimate of θ.
This simple model demonstrates three important things. First, the parameter
that could potentially be uncovered is the treatment effect on stayers (θ). Since
movers are, by definition, observed in only one period, one cannot hope to directly
recover the tax effect on movers, without auxiliary assumptions. Second, if ζ > 0,
then the standard before/after comparison (as in table 2.4) is an underestimate of
the tax effect on stayers. Third, two pieces of information are required to recover θ:
the percentage of movers in the high subsidy period (ρ) and the premium paid by
stayers (ζ).
Even if a defensible estimate of ζ is not available, however, one can still bound θ
under the following assumptions. First, suppose that the lowest price obtained by a
stayer is higher than the highest price paid by a mover. This is stated in assumption
1:
Assumption 1. min[p|τH , s] ≥ max[p|τH ,m].
Under this assumption, one can identify all the stayers in the high subsidy period,
given information about how many stayers and movers are present in the period,
because they will be those with the highest prices. This is an extreme assumption,
since it supposes that all movers are better negotiators than all stayers.
Also required is an estimate of the proportion of stayers present in the high subsidy
period (ρ). A plausible estimate of the number of stayers in the high tax period is
the number of stayers in the low tax period. This would be true if stayers purchase
vehicles at a constant rate within four weeks of each tax change. This is stated in
assumption 2 as:
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Assumption 2. nHs = n
L
s ,
where n is used to denote the size of the sample in each period.
Combining assumptions 1 and 2, we can identify the prices paid by stayers in
each high tax period — they are simply the nLs highest prices. Given the extrem-
ity of assumption 1, the mean of the nLs highest prices in the high subsidy period
should overestimate the mean price of stayers in the high subsidy period. Combining
this overestimate with the underestimate from the standard before/after comparison
provides a set of bounds on the true tax effect on stayers.
This methodology is an example of partial identification in the presence of cor-
rupted data, which is analyzed by Horowitz and Manski (1995) and extended by
Horowitz and Manski (1997). The corrupted data model supposes that the observed
data are a mixture of true data and noise. Given information about the probability
of noise, Horowitz and Manski (1995) show how to construct bounds on various pa-
rameters. In the present case, prices observed in a tax-favored window are a mixture
of true data (prices paid by stayers) and noise (prices paid by movers). Assumption
2 is necessary to provide an estimate of the probability of noise. This methodology
has not been previously applied to the literature on tax incidence, and, more gen-
erally, has rarely been applied (an important exception is Hotz, Mullin and Sanders
(1997)).
The estimator employed here is also related to the bounding technique developed
in Lee (2005), which can also be cast as a corrupted data problem. Lee (2005) ad-
dresses a situation where the effect of a randomly assigned treatment is only partially
identified because some outcome data are missing. In contrast, the approach devel-
oped here addresses a situation where selection into the treatment group may occur
on unobservable characteristics, but all outcomes are observed.
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Next, if the tax effect on stayers is the same as the tax effect on movers, then we
have identified the full parameter of interest. This is stated in assumption 3:
Assumption 3. E[p|τH ,m]− E[p|τL,m] = E[p|τH , s]− E[p|τL, s].
An individual consumer need not be aware of or responsive to the tax credit in order
for it to influence their final price. This is the essence of an incidence model — any
individual’s price depends not on their own reaction to the tax, but rather on the
reactions of others. One way to think about assumption 3 is the following. Overall
supply and demand (which is influenced by the tax regime) determine some reference
price in each period. Those with high bargaining ability pay some amount less than
this reference price, and those with low bargaining ability pay some amount more.
In such a case assumption 3 is natural; people at all bargaining abilities experience
a shift in the reference price, due to the shift in demand.
Table 2.6 shows results from this exercise, with varying controls. The first three
columns match the control specifications in table 2.4. Thus, the lower bound reported
in these columns is the corresponding point estimate in table 2.4. The fourth column
contains a variety of additional controls that may indicate individual bargaining
ability: sex, age, total after-market options, a dummy for an APR above the buy
rate, a dummy for life insurance, a dummy for the presence of a trade-in, trade-in
actual value, trade-in vintage, and a dummy for a service contract. The reported
standard error on the lower bound is a standard estimate from a regression. The
standard error on the upper bound is obtained via nonparametric bootstrap, with
5,000 repetitions.
The upper bound is constructed by collecting the n highest residuals from the
high subsidy period from the regression that generates the lower bound, where n is
the number of observations in the corresponding low subsidy window. The mean of
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these residuals is scaled by the size of the tax change and added to the lower bound
to generate the upper bound. Given the scaling, both the lower and upper bound
may be interpreted as dollar price changes per dollar of tax change.
Table 2.6 demonstrates that, even under the extreme assumption regarding het-
erogeneous shifting, large price responses to the tax change can be ruled out in the
first two tax changes, whenever options are controlled (columns 2, 3 and 4). Accord-
ing to column 3, the upper bound estimates for the first two tax changes indicate
that consumers got at least 73% of the gains around the first tax change and 92% of
the gains around the second.
The estimated bounds for the third tax event, however, have little bite. Mechan-
ically, this is due to the larger price variation observed in April 2007. This larger
variation is partly due to the financing incentives: as long as some consumers pay
cash, the presence of low-interest financing will increase price variation. Economic
explanations, which revolve around waiting lists, of the varying results across tax
changes are explored in detail below. To preview, a likely explanation is that there
were wait lists for the Prius during the first and second tax change, which meant that
prices were inflexible. Wait lists had disappeared by the third tax change, making
price movements possible, which induced greater variation and potentially a larger
tax effect.
In sum, analysis of the response to the federal tax credit suggests that subsidies
had very little effect on prices paid by consumers to dealers. Thus the subsidy, during
the first two tax changes, almost exclusively benefitted consumers. Before moving to
an analysis of state tax incentives, I provide some robustness checks on these results.
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Robustness
The bounding estimates in table 2.6 use only one model year and trim level to
analyze each tax change, employ a particular definition of financing incentives and
do not account for aggregate shocks to the market directly, other than controlling
for the price of gasoline. In this subsection, I briefly address each of these issues and
discuss how they influence the range of possible estimates of tax incidence.
Accounting for Other Model Years
The first two tax changes occur near seams in the model year. In the estimation
above, I use only one model year and trim level in the estimation in order to avoid
conflating tax effects with price changes due to the model year seam. This will
influence an upper bound estimate if it influences the relative number of observations
in the high and low tax period.
To understand how the upper bound estimator is sensitive to relative sample sizes,
consider the following extremes. Suppose that there was only one Prius purchased
in the low subsidy window around a tax change. In that case, the upper bound
estimate would be the highest priced Prius in the high subsidy window minus the
price of the lone Prius from the low subsidy period. Alternatively, suppose that
there were exactly as many Priuses in the low subsidy window as the high subsidy
window. In this case, the upper bound estimate would be identical to the lower
bound estimate, since the relative sample sizes indicate that no shifting took place.
The choice to use only a single model year, therefore, has consequences for upper
bound estimates to the extent that using only a single model year changes the relative
sample sizes in the tax windows.
Rather than just lumping all of the Priuses together to address this concern,
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which might conflate compositional changes with tax effects, I adjust the upper
bound estimate to account for the proportion of Priuses sold in each window. For
example, in the second tax change, the upper bound estimate in table 2.2 uses the
383 highest prices from late September (high subsidy) to form an estimate of the
September price for stayers, because there were 383 Priuses in the October (low
subsidy) window. Instead of using that number, I use the proportion of Priuses
of all model years that were sold in September to determine how many September
sales represent stayers. Since 495 Priuses of all vintages were sold in October and
1,203 were sold in September, the October sales were 41% as many as the September
sales. Using that proportion, the number of stayers estimated to be in the September
sample is 189. This will mechanically raise the estimated September price of stayers.
Table 2.7 replicates the bounding results with this alternative methodology. As ex-
pected, the upper bound on the second tax event rises noticeably. Even so, however,
it is an informative upper bound, which says that, even under the most conservative
assumptions, consumers captured at least half of the tax subsidy. As is evident from
a comparison of 2.6 and 2.7, this procedure actually tightens the bound on the first
tax change, and it has a minimal influence on the third tax change.
Calculation of Financing Incentives
The measurement of financing incentives necessarily involves assumptions about
the discount rate and the counterfactual interest rate. In the case of the first two tax
changes, these assumptions are unlikely to exert much influence on estimation, since
there was no significant change in financing incentives near the tax date. In the third
instance, however, financing incentives changed, making the estimates more sensitive
to the assumptions used.
Recall that financing incentives are estimated by comparing the APR that a person
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receives on their vehicle loan from the lending agency with a prevailing market APR,
based on the Federal Reserve’s survey of commercial lenders. I calculate the monthly
payments, given the amount of the loan and the term, using both interest rates, and
then compute the present discounted value of the difference in these monthly payment
streams using a discount rate of 4%. In the robustness checks, I vary this discount
rate, and recompute the bounding estimates using a discount rate of 2%, 4%, 6%
and 8%.
The Federal Reserve’s benchmark interest rate is a market wide average. It may
not be an excellent counterfactual for any given individual, but it should be accurate
for the average car buyer. If Prius buyers, however, are different on average than
other car buyers in terms of credit, then this market average will be a biased estimate
for the average Prius buyer. To account for this possibility, I calculate the difference
between the average APR of all Prius buyers and the market rate, during the wait
list time period, at which time one expects that Toyota was not subsidizing loans.
For the 2004, 2005 and 2006 model years, Prius buyers received an average APR
that was one-half point below the market rate, suggesting that they have better
credit than the average new car buyer. I construct a modified counterfactual market
interest rate by subtracting this premium from the Federal Reserve’s survey rate.
One other approach is suggested by Corrado et al. (2006). They use data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate the determinants of the interest rate
obtained on new car loans. They report that each year of age is associated with
a .05 point reduction in the interest rate, and use this to adjust the counterfactual
interest rate so that a person at the mean age receives the unadjusted rate, and those
above or below receive a modified rate. I construct a modified counterfactual market
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interest rate by following their procedure.25
Table 2.8 reports a series of bounding estimates that vary the discount rate and
use the original measure of financing incentives, the measure that adjusts for the
Prius premium and the age adjusted measure. The table reports bounding estimates
from a specification with control variables, which matches the third column in table
2.6. The estimates in bold face are identical to the estimates from that table.
As expected, the bounds on the first and second tax change are affected very little
by the discount rate or the interest rate measure used. The upper bound does rise
somewhat when the age adjusted measure is used. This is not surprising, since the
upper bound will rise whenever variance increases, and the adjustment procedure
will increase variation by modifying significantly the counterfactual interest rate at
very high or low ages. The statistically significant negative sign of the lower bound
on the third tax change is eliminated at higher discount rates, but it is affected
relatively little by the choice of interest rate measure. Thus, it is possible that the
significant, negative sign is the result of the choice of discount rate. The high upper
bound, however, is qualitatively unaffected.
Time Period Effects
The estimates above are based on prices observed in different time periods. By
using a narrow window around each tax change, the estimates mitigate the proba-
bility that macroeconomic shocks caused Prius price movements. The tax changes,
however, are each on the first day of a new quarter. Automobile manufacturers are
sometimes willing to cut prices at the end of a quarter in order to meet sales targets,
so it is worth investigating whether or not other models showed significant prices
changes around these dates.
25I assign observations with missing age the unadjusted Federal Reserve interest rate.
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Table 2.9 replicates the before / after comparison of column 3 from table 2.4
using several samples of non-hybrid vehicles, in order to estimate whether or not
there were unusual price movements in the car market as a whole. The samples
include non-hybrid Toyota sedans (6 models), the set of best-selling sedans in the
same vehicle class from each nameplate (28 models, including all 6 Toyotas), and
a subset who have an EPA rated combined fuel economy above 29 miles per gallon
(8 models). The coefficients are not scaled by tax changes, so they are interpreted
as dollar changes around the tax date. For example, the first column says that, on
average, among all non-hybrid Toyota sedans, prices fell by $50 from late December
2005 to early January 2006.
Overall, table 2.9 gives little reason to believe that time effects significantly influ-
ence the tax estimates for the Prius. Only three of nine coefficients are statistically
significantly different from zero, and all are small in magnitude. Adjusting the tax
estimates for the Prius according to even the largest of these estimates would have
no impact on the main conclusions of this paper.
Another way to look for time period effects is to look at each model individually.
Table 2.10 shows the estimated time period effects from the same specification for
every vehicle manufactured by Toyota, including vehicles sold under the Lexus and
Scion brands. Several of the Lexus models sell for more than twice the amount of the
Prius. Given this variance across models, table 2.10 uses estimates on log price to
make coefficients more comparable. Statistically significant time effect estimates are
labeled with an asterisk. There is no overall pattern in table 2.9 that would suggest
a caution for the Prius estimates. While there are some statistically significant,
small price movements, there is little action among sedans, and many of the price
movements in any given window are of opposing sign.
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In sum, the principal conclusions of the bounding estimates in table 2.6 are robust
to concerns regarding the use of a single model year, assumptions made in the con-
struction of financing incentives, and time period effects in the broader new vehicle
market. The only potentially important deviation from the baseline estimates is that
the alternative methodology for estimating the number of stayers present in the high
tax window does raise the upper bound on the estimate for the second tax change.
Having established that consumers captured the majority of the gains of federal
subsidies, at least around the first two tax changes, I move now to analysis of the
incidence of state tax incentives. The analysis of state tax incentives necessarily
involves a different research design, but it leads to the same conclusion. Consumers
captured the vast majority of state tax incentives as well.
2.7 Estimation of the Effect of State Incentives
In several states, federal tax subsidies for hybrid vehicles were supplemented by
state policies. In this section, I use a state panel research design to estimate the
incidence of state tax incentives for the Prius. I find that, as in the case of the federal
tax credit, consumers captured nearly all of the benefits from state tax incentives.26
State policies do not lend themselves to narrow analysis of transactions around tax
changes because sample sizes for all but the largest states are too small. Since state
laws change at different times, however, a state panel research design is possible. This
design has two significant advantages that complement the federal analysis. First,
the estimating equation can include general time period effects, which alleviates any
potential concern about macroeconomic shocks. Second, given credible time period
controls, it becomes more palatable to use observations further away from the tax
26Note that, if the law of one price prevails across states, then the effect of a state tax incentive might be different
than a federal tax incentive. States demonstrate significant differences in prices, however, suggesting that prices are
not smoothed completely across borders.
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change. Thus, in the state panel regressions below, I use data from the entire life of
each tax program, not just transactions immediately around a policy change.
Table 2.11 lists the states with tax incentives, along with the type of incentive,
the amount and the effective dates. Twelve states have passed tax incentives that
subsidize the Prius. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Maine, New
Mexico, and New York had or have a full or partial sales tax exemption. Colorado,
Louisiana, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia had
or have a state income tax credit.27 Colorado and West Virginia had the largest
incentives, which were worth more than the maximum federal credit for some model
years. Sales tax exemptions in Connecticut and the District of Columbia, as well as
the credits in Oregon and New York were also worth more than a thousand dollars
for most Priuses.28
Table 2.12 reports regressions of the form:
Priceist = λτst + Xistβ + γt + δs + µj + εist
where i indexes an individual, s a state and t a time period, Price is the incentive
adjusted price, τ is the state tax incentive, X is a vector of controls, γ are week
dummies, δ are state dummies, µ are model year cross trim level dummies, and ε is
the error term. The parameter of interest is λ. The controls include dealer’s cost,
day of the week dummies, a dummy for the five days at the end of a month and a
quadratic trend in time on the market.29 The regressions are run on the same sample
27Utah had a credit for which the Prius did not qualify because it does not have a non-hybrid version.
28Some states also passed laws that allow hybrids to use car pool (High Occupancy Vehicle) lanes, regardless of
the number of passengers. Estimating the effect of these incentives on Prius prices directly is challenging, because
such a policy should affect prices as soon as it is expected to be effective and the effective dates for most states is
imprecise. In most cases, a bill was in process for some time in the legislature. In several cases, after the bill became
law, uncertainty remained about the policy because states required a waiver from the federal government to allow
vehicle access on federal interstate highways. The states with HOV policies were not the same as the states with
tax incentives, so HOV policies pose a problem only to the extent that they introduce bias into the estimation of
time effects. The most concerning case is California, which is large enough to impact regression estimates. Results
reported below are robust to including separate dummies for California for when the HOV policy was active and
when it was not.
29Note that a variable indicating the value of the federal tax credit would be perfectly collinear with time period
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of Priuses used above.
In these regressions, the coefficient on the tax variable is identified by states
that experience a policy change in the sample period. Of the twelve states with
tax incentives for the Prius, only eight experienced a change in the sample period:
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina and West Virginia. The final two columns of table 2.11 show how
many Priuses are in the sample when the state policy was in effect and when it was
not.30
Table 2.12 reports the results. The point estimate in column one says that, for a
one dollar increase in a state tax incentive, the price of a Prius rises by five cents.
Whether or not the cost of the Prius is included as a regressor, the point estimate is
indistinguishable from zero. The upper bound on the 95% confidence interval is .21.
These results are robust to the exclusion of any of the states with tax incentives,
ensuring that the result is not driven by a single state with a large sample or a big
tax change.
These estimates do not explicitly control for the heterogeneous shifting behavior
addressed in the bounding exercise in section 2.6. Any concerns about this hetero-
geneity, however, are greatly mitigated by the fact that the state panel estimates do
not just use transactions very close to tax changes. If heterogeneous shifting takes
place only close to changes, then shifting will be too small to play a significant role in
these estimates. In the case of the federal policy, table 2.3 showed that extra Priuses
were sold only within two weeks of each tax change. It is quite likely, therefore,
that only a small number of transactions were shifted by state incentives, where less
money was at stake, relative to the total number of Priuses sold in those states.
dummies, since the federal credit only varies over time.
30New Mexico’s policy changed in the time window, but there are no New Mexico Priuses in the sample before the
change.
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The point estimates in table 2.12 are small enough that a zero effect cannot
be ruled out, but precise enough to rule out large price movements. Thus, these
results corroborate the conclusions drawn from the federal policy: consumers capture
the vast majority of tax credits for the Prius. Having established that consumers
captured all, or nearly all, of both state and federal tax incentives for the Prius, I
move now to an interpretation of this empirical result.
2.8 Why Did Prius Prices Not Respond to Tax Changes?
The empirical estimates in this paper show that the price paid to dealers for
the Prius was not responsive to changes in tax subsidies. In this section, I offer an
interpretation of this result. In the standard static, competitive tax incidence model,
this result indicates that supply is quite elastic, relative to demand. I argue that
this interpretation is inconsistent with other facts about the market, particularly the
existence of wait lists. Moreover, in any standard model, if Toyota was capacity
constrained, they should be expected to appropriate the gains from a subsidy. The
empirical result, which indicates precisely the opposite, is therefore puzzling.
One possible explanation is that Toyota believed that future demand for hybrids
would be diminished if they charged market clearing prices for the Prius during the
period of capacity constraints. If so, then an increase in demand due to a temporary
tax credit may have no effect on price, even if the seller is capacity constrained. I
outline a two period model that assumes that first period prices shift the second
period demand curve. I show how a tax subsidy in the first period can be captured
by consumers, even if the seller faces a binding production constraint. I then dis-
cuss market characteristics that could give rise to such a demand system, including
directed search and a concern for fairness. The section concludes by drawing lessons
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for the analysis of tax incidence in other markets.
Standard Models are Inconsistent with the Case of the Prius
In incidence analysis, the default procedure is to translate a price change into a
statement about relative elasticities of supply and demand. The most basic, text-
book model of incidence is a static, partial equilibrium model of a competitive market.
Analyzing this case is important because it underlies the default interpretation of
empirical estimates. The derivation of incidence begins with definitions of the elas-
ticity of supply and demand and the market clearing condition. Log-linearized, this
leads to the familiar system
Q̂D = ηD(p̂+ τ̂)
Q̂S = ηS p̂
Q̂S = Q̂D,
where I have assumed that the consumer remits the tax and used the notation of
Fullerton and Metcalf (2002): x̂ = ∂x
x
, η is the own price elasticity, Q is quantity, p








In this simple model, a zero price effect (p̂ = 0 for τ̂ 6= 0) can result from two
extreme cases: (a) perfectly inelastic demand (ηD = 0), or (b) perfectly elastic
supply (ηS =∞).
Neither of these cases is a plausible explanation for the Prius, given additional
facts about the market. First, it is unlikely that demand is extremely inelastic in such
a narrow market. The subsidy in question applies only to hybrid vehicles, for which
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conventional vehicles are generally a close substitute. Furthermore, since Toyota is
a monopoly seller of the Prius, if ηD = 0 at the chosen quantity, Toyota could raise
the price of all Priuses without reducing quantity sold.
Second, the existence of wait lists makes elastic supply implausible. If supply were
perfectly elastic, then a tax subsidy would cause a sharp increase in the quantity sold.
Since Toyota in fact had a capacity constraint, supply must have been inelastic.31
The existence of wait lists indicates that Toyota did not simply increase production
to satisfy increased demand at a constant price. Moreover, in such a simple static
model, a capacity constraint would imply a perfectly inelastic supply curve. This
would imply that suppliers would capture the entire subsidy, which is precisely the
opposite of the empirical facts.
Relaxing Competitive and Dynamic Assumptions Does Not Explain the Result
The incidence expression discussed above is based on a static, competitive mar-
ket and a permanent tax change. This is a useful benchmark, but the assumptions
involved are poor approximations of the vehicle market. Relaxing restrictive assump-
tions, however, will not explain all of the facts of the Prius case unless the model can
explain wait lists. In general, adding market power and dynamic considerations can
create additional conditions under which consumers will capture the entire benefit
of a tax credit. These results, however, will not hold if there is a wait list, so that
sellers can raise prices without lowering quantity sold.
The non-response of Prius transaction prices to tax changes is therefore a puzzle.
If Toyota faced a capacity constraint, why were they unable to appropriate all of
the gains from an increase in demand? I argue below that prices did not respond to
31Toyota never issued a general press release citing a supply shortage, but there was a known shortage of hybrid
batteries reported in early 2005 (Truett, 2005), and media reports have quoted Toyota spokespeople claiming that
the shortage of Priuses was due to production and supply constraints (e.g., Benton (2005); Bailey (2007)).
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the introduction of the tax credit because Toyota had a vested interest in keeping
consumer prices below the market clearing level, in order to increase demand for
hybrids in future periods. Before analyzing this possibility, I provide evidence that
the pricing puzzle is not due to widespread ignorance or ineligibility.
Awareness and Eligibility Do Not Explain the Result
One would not expect to observe price changes in response to an income tax
credit if consumers were unaware of the credit or if they were ineligible to receive the
benefits. In this section, I argue that awareness and eligibility may have had some
effect on the magnitude of tax responses, but that the effect was likely to have been
small.
Tax provisions are often complicated and obscure. As a result, individuals may
not respond to a tax incentive because they are ignorant of it or are confused by its
implications.32 If consumers did not know about the hybrid vehicle tax credit, or
misunderstood the phase-out schedule, one might expect constant transaction prices.
Moreover, slow information dissemination by the Internal Revenue Service may have
contributed to confusion regarding the hybrid vehicle tax credit. The tax credit took
effect on January 1, 2006, but the IRS did not officially certify the Toyota Prius
or announce the size of the credit until April 7, 2006 (Internal Revenue Service,
2006a). The first phase-out of the credit began on October 1, 2006, but the official
IRS statement that the phase-out would begin was not issued until September 20
(Internal Revenue Service, 2006b).
In spite of the slow dissemination of official information, accurate details about
32Confusion may prevail even when the stakes are large. For example, Romich and Weisner (2000) and Smeeding,
Ross and O’Connor (2000) find that a large percentage of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) recipients cannot
distinguish between refunds due to over-withholding and EITC payments. And, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) argue
that tax reforms in Italy had no discernible effect on the mortgage market because people did not understand how
the changes influenced the implicit subsidy of mortgages.
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the credit were available on the Internet and in other media. The American Council
for an Energy-Efficient Economy released a report estimating eligibility and credit
amounts in the fall of 2005 (American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
2005). Other media cited this report, which provided very accurate predictions
regarding credit amounts. In terms of the phase-out, Toyota sold over 42,000 hybrids
in the first quarter of 2006. Thus, they were certain to reach 60,000 hybrids in the
second quarter. The phase-out implications were well understood by the media
and correctly reported long before the IRS pronouncement. This information was
further disseminated by individuals in Internet chat rooms, which frequently included
discussions of the tax credit.33 In addition, evidence from the Internet shows that
consumers sought this information. Figure 2.12 shows the relative density of searches
on Google for the term “hybrid tax credit,” which reveals search spikes prior to the
credit’s introduction and phase-out, and at other logical times.
All of this suggests that many consumers were informed about the credit, but
it does not imply that all consumers were informed. One reason to believe that
nearly all consumers were informed is that dealers had an incentive to inform them.
All automakers have a system for transmitting information to dealerships about
incentives and policies. Dealerships then inform salespeople during regular meetings.
The Toyota dealers I spoke with confirmed that Toyota distributed information about
the tax credit several weeks prior to each change, which ensures that dealers were
informed. In order for dealers to potentially capture part of the tax subsidy, they
would have to make sure that customers knew they would later receive a benefit on
their tax returns.
Even if consumers were well informed, the tax credit may not have influenced
33Two relevant examples are PriusChat.com and the town hall section of Edmunds.com, http://townhall-
talk.edmunds.com/direct/view/.f0a4a16.
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prices if very few were eligible to receive the benefit. Recall that taxpayers subject
to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) and those with no tax obligation will not
benefit from the credit. To determine what percentage of consumers were eligible for
benefits, one would ideally like to compare take-up rates in tax return data to the
total sales of hybrids. Unfortunately, the Statistics of Income (the division of the
IRS that reports this type of data) has no available data on vehicle credits from 2006
tax returns at this time. Furthermore, they have no data on the tax deduction from
earlier years, because the deduction was added as a miscellaneous item in a line on
the form 1040, and the coding of the data did not disaggregate hybrid deductions
from several other items.34
In the absence of data from the IRS, one might attempt to estimate the proportion
of Prius buyers who were not eligible by estimating the tax situation from detailed
income information, but the data to do this with precision are not available.35 CNW
Research, a marketing research firm in the auto industry, does report the mean self-
reported income and home ownership rates of Prius owners. In 2006, they report
the mean income of Prius buyers to be $88,750, compared to $60,750 for new car
buyers across the whole vehicle market. In 2006, 77.1% of Prius buyers reported
owning a home, compared to 57.9% for the whole market (CNW Research, 2007).
Given these numbers and the fact that the Prius costs around $25,000, it seems
unlikely that very many Prius buyers have too little tax obligation to gain from the
non-refundable credit.
Despite the fact that Prius owners are relatively wealthy and relatively likely to
own a home, the limitations imposed by the AMT probably did not affect many
34I have been told by people at the Treasury Department that no one has calculated the revenue expenditures
from the clean-fuel tax deduction using actual tax return data.
35As mentioned above, publicly available data like the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the National Household
Travel Survey are not recent enough and contain too small a sample to be useful.
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Prius buyers because the AMT applied to a low percentage of tax returns. In 2005,
the most recent year for which official AMT data is available, in only five states were
more than 5% of returns affected by the AMT (Internal Revenue Service, 2007b).
The highest rate was New Jersey, where 6.8% of all filers were affected by the AMT.
Thus, even if Prius buyers were twice as likely to be influenced by the AMT as the
rate in the highest state, 86% would be unaffected.
Furthermore, many AMT payers are uncertain of their AMT status before filing.
In addition, it appears that many consumers affected by the AMT were surprised to
find that they could not benefit from the credit. The discussions at PriusChat.com
and Edmunds.com on the Prius include a number of references to the AMT. Most
posters who were affected by the AMT seemed surprised that they did not receive
the full benefit. Thus, the most likely form of misinformation actually works in favor
of creating a price and sales response, because many ineligible consumers apparently
expected to receive the credit.
In sum, there are several reasons to believe that awareness and eligibility could
only have played a small role in creating a zero price response for the Prius. The
data indicated that many consumers understood the policy, and it is reasonable
to believe that nearly all consumers would have been informed by dealers. The
vast majority of Prius buyers were likely eligible for the credit, and the most likely
type of confusion, regarding eligibility and the AMT, probably made many ineligible
consumers believe that they were eligible, which would have amplified the price
response. Since awareness and eligibility do not explain the price result, the puzzle
remains. I move now to a stylized model that describes conditions that could give
rise to a zero price response.
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An Explanation, and a Stylized Model that Encapsulates It
Standard models cannot explain all of the facts of the Prius market unless they
can explain the presence of wait lists. The conventional explanation among industry
watchers for wait lists is the following. Toyota was surprised by the strength of
demand for the second generation Prius, which led to shortages beginning in 2003.
They did not want prices to rise sufficiently to clear the market because they had a
long-term interest in establishing hybrids as an affordable, cost efficient technology
in the eyes of consumers. As the symbol of hybrid technology, they did not want the
Prius to be perceived as a vehicle available only to the wealthy. In addition, they
wanted the Prius to be perceived as a car comparable in cost to midsize sedans like
the Camry and Accord, because they believed that, over time, that is where they
would price the Prius. In other words, Toyota believed that if prices rose to clear the
market during the period of excess demand, then demand for hybrids in the future
would be lower.
Toyota could not meet the higher than expected demand by increasing production
because they faced capacity constraints. In the automobile industry, there are very
large fixed costs to production, and there are potential bottlenecks in parts suppliers,
especially if a vehicle needs an uncommon part like a hybrid battery which is pro-
duced by only one supplier. Prior to the 2007 model year, all Priuses were assembled
at one plant, the Tsutsumi Plant in Toyota City, Japan. When Toyota ramped up
production significantly for 2007, it required the opening of a new assembly line in a
different plant. This suggests that there were indeed large capital investments that
could not be quickly changed to accommodate greater than forecasted demand.
Toyota is heavily invested in hybrid technologies. Toyota sold its one millionth
hybrid in June 2007, and it announced that it expects to sell one million a year by
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2010, making hybrids 10% of Toyota’s global sales (Healey, 2007). Hybrids already
represent 10% of Toyota sales in the United States, as of 2007. In 2003, Toyota
pledged to introduce a hybrid version of all of their vehicles. They have backed
away from this recently, but still plan to double the number of models available and
make a hybrid version available in every market segment within a few years (Healey,
2007). Toyota currently holds over 1,000 patents on hybrid related technologies, and
Nissan, Ford and Fuji Heavy Industries have agreements to use Toyota’s techniques
(Rowley, 2006). This suggests that, if Toyota did believe that higher Prius prices in
2005 would jeopardize hybrid demand in later years, then they had a lot at stake.
Model
To understand how such a concern could influence tax incidence, I develop a
simple two period example in which a monopolistic seller faces a first period capacity
constraint and first period price is assumed to influence second period demand. I
show that a first period tax credit may have no influence on the price. This example
highlights several key issues, including the distinction between tax exclusive and
inclusive prices, which I return to in the discussion.
For ease of exposition, I assume a linear functional form for demand. I posit a
multiplicative relationship between first period prices and second period demand.
The benefit of analyzing this case is that closed-form optimal values take very simple
functional forms, and comparative statics are then immediately transparent. Let D
denote demand, p price, τ the tax subsidy, and denote second period variables with
a prime (′). Then
D = α(A− (p− τ))
D′ = (α′ − .5βp2)(A− (p′ − τ ′)),
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where A, A′, α, and α′ are positive scalars. We can interpret A, A′, α, and α′ as
shifters of the size of the market in each period. β is a scalar that describes how first
period price influences second period demand. If β is zero, then the model collapses
to a standard case. If β is positive, then high first period prices shrink future demand.
The setup assumes that consumers remit the tax and that second period demand is
influenced by the subsidy exclusive price. The latter assumption is substantive, as
will be noted below. As a regularity condition, assume that α′ − .5βp2 > 0 for the
optimal p.
The firm produces Q units at constant marginal cost c in both periods, but it
faces a capacity constraint in the first period, at which time it can produce only up
to N units.36 Thus, it maximizes profits (π) by solving the following problem:37
max
p,p′
π = (p− c)Q+ (p′ − c)(α′ − .5βp2)(A− (p′ − τ ′))
where Q =
 α(A− (p− τ)) if α(A− (p− τ)) ≤ NN if α(A− (p− τ)) > N.
Consider first the case where the capacity constraint is not binding, so that
Q = D = α(A − (p − τ)). The first-order conditions produce a system of two
equations. Substitution yields the optimal values — labeled ∗ for optimality and u
for unconstrained:
p∗u =








A′ + τ ′ + c
2
.
If β = 0, which means that first period price has no effect on second period demand,
as would be true in a standard model, then p∗u =
A+τ+c
2
, which is the monopolist’s
36The capacity constraint is exogenous in this example. It can be thought of as arising from a choice made in a
prior period, in which the producer must pay fixed costs to build capacity but is uncertain of demand.
37A discount factor could be added without changing the results, or, equivalently, α′ and β can be interpreted as
including the discount factor.
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price in a static one period model and is symmetric to the second period price. If β
is positive, then the second term in the denominator is also positive. As one would
expect, the larger is the second period effect on demand (β), the lower is the optimal
first period price. Note that, because the scale effect on the market is multiplicative,
the optimal second period price is unchanged by first period prices.
In the constrained case, the monopolist’s optimal price is below the price that
creates N units of demand. Because the monopolist is capacity constrained, it will
sell N units at the optimal price, but the market will not clear. There will be excess
demand. In this case, the optimal prices may be written as follows, with N denoting









A′ + τ ′ + c
2
.
As expected, given the independence of second period price from scale effects, the
capacity constraint has no effect on second period prices, so that p′∗N = p
′∗
u . The first
period price changes, however, so that all first period terms no longer influence first
period price. The parameters of the first period demand curve are no longer relevant
because the seller has chosen a price / quantity bundle that is not on the demand
curve.
The main point of this exercise is that, in the capacity constrained case, a shift
in the first period demand curve caused by a tax credit does not have an effect on
the price charged by a monopolist, unless it causes the monopolist to shift from the
constrained quantity to an unconstrained one. The relevant comparative statics from
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The first period tax subsidy has a positive effect on first period price whenever the
producer is unconstrained, but it has no effect on price in the constrained case.
Second period prices rise 50 cents on the the dollar in response to second period tax
subsidy changes. Note that this is identical to the comparative static that would arise
in the first period if β = 0, so that there was no price effect on second period demand.
Thus, the effect of first period price on second period demand mutes the tax response
in the first period. We see also that an increase in the second period subsidy will
decrease first period price. The reason is that an increase in the second period subsidy
represents a shift in the second period demand curve that makes that market more
profitable, and the value of expanding that market through low first period prices
expands. Finally, note that the first period tax effect in the unconstrained case gets
smaller as β and A′ rise, because a larger β indicates a bigger effect on second period
market size and A′ indicates a more profitable second period market. Moreover, as




→ 0; i.e., as the second period market gets sufficiently large, the first
period tax effect will shrink to zero.
This modeling exercise suggests a set of conditions under which a temporary tax
credit for the Toyota Prius might not influence the current price charged by Toyota.
This would be true if (a) Toyota was capacity constrained when the subsidy was
available and (b) by raising price while the tax credit was available, Toyota would
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hurt the market for their product in the future. Even if they were not capacity
constrained, if the size of the future market is sufficiently large, the tax effect in the
first period may approach zero.
The key assumption made here is that first period, subsidy exclusive prices have
an influence on demand in the second period. If second period demand is influenced
by the tax inclusive price, then the tax pass through would be different. In the
constrained case, the pass through would be 1, not 0. The intuition is simple; in the
constrained case, the firm has chosen the optimal scaling factor for the second period
market, and it wants to keep this same optimal factor after a change in the subsidy.
To do so, it must completely offset the subsidy increase. Thus, which price influences
future demand is an important distinction to keep in mind for the discussion of what
behavior might give rise to such a stylized model. I move now to a discussion of
factors that could give rise to the demand system analyzed in this example.
Directed Search May Generate Such a Result
In this and the next subsection, I describe two different approaches to explaining
why current subsidy exclusive prices might influence future demand. In this section,
I describe how costly search can create this link. In the next section, I discuss the
economic literature on fairness. The description in this section can be thought of as
rational in the neoclassical sense, whereas the next section relies on what might be
called behavioral considerations.
Consider the following description of the car buying process. Consumers do not
know the final transaction price of a vehicle or how much they like a particular
model until they invest time researching, test driving, obtaining a price quote from
a dealer, or even bargaining over price. Consumers do not know the exact price or
how much they will like a particular model before incurring these time costs, but
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they have beliefs about how these outcomes are distributed. Given these beliefs,
they choose a model to research, test drive and price and thus receive a draw from
the distribution. They can either accept this draw and buy the vehicle or obtain
another draw by searching again — over the same model or a different model. At
some point, the consumer will choose to end the search process, and will purchase
the vehicle that represents the best option from the set of draws.
The model of Weitzman (1979) describes a search problem with all of these fea-
tures.38 In his model, an agent faces a set of alternatives, which each have a unique
search cost and a distribution of possible outcomes. After searching among several
alternatives, the agent chooses the best option. The optimal search algorithm de-
scribes the order in which the options are searched and the optimal stopping rule.
Weitzman (1979) shows that all of the alternatives can be described by their “reser-
vation value”, which is a relatively simple function of the payoff distribution and
costs. Agents search the option with the highest reservation value, and they stop
when a realized value of one of the searched options exceeds the reservation value of
all remaining options.39
Consumer beliefs about the price distribution of a model, therefore, may influence
final demand for that model because it influences the model’s reservation value.
Higher expected prices will lower the reservation value of a vehicle, which will move
it further down the search queue. Since consumers who achieve a good realization
from an early search will stop searching and purchase a vehicle, fewer consumers will
search over a vehicle when it is moved down the queue. As a result, demand will fall.
38I am not the first to suggest that the Weitzman model is a good model of the car buying process, see Moorthy,
Ratchford and Talukdar (1997).
39Weitzman uses the term “reservation price,” which I have modified to “reservation value” to avoid confusing it
with transaction prices. One of the key points of this model is that reservation values are not the same as expected
values, even with risk neutral agents. An option that has a higher expected value than another may nevertheless
have a lower reservation value.
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Note that, even if the actual distribution of prices is constant, a change in consumer
beliefs will shift the demand curve inward.
Such a characterization of the car buying process only makes sense if final transac-
tion prices are not costlessly observable. Final transaction prices are not immediately
observable in the new vehicle market. List prices are obtainable at minimal cost, but
final transaction prices vary significantly across geography, over time and according
to idiosyncratic factors, like trade-ins and credit ratings.
Surveys indicate that consumers, on average, consider only about three models
before making a new vehicle purchase (Ratchford and Srinivasan, 1993; Moorthy et
al., 1997; Ratchford, Lee and Talukdar, 2003). As a result, search order will have a
very large impact on demand, which in turn implies that automobile manufacturers
should be very concerned with factors that determine consumer’s “shopping lists,”
including past transaction prices.
Past transaction prices will influence future demand for a particular model if
past transaction prices are known to consumers and used to form their beliefs about
the distribution of prices. Past transaction prices are collected by consumer services
agencies, like Edmunds.com and Consumer Reports, and reported to consumers. Past
transaction prices are also posted on Internet websites, and they are transmitted via
word of mouth within social networks. Thus, it is likely that past prices are used in
forming beliefs about future prices.
In terms of the stylized model, this implies that β > 0, so that higher current
prices reduce the number of consumers who search a particular model, and thus
reduces future demand. When a new product, like a hybrid vehicle, is introduced on
the market, consumers will be uncertain of its price. If early transaction prices are
very high, consumers may expect future prices to be high, and this will shift inward
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the future demand curve.40 Thus, an automaker who makes a capital investment that
limits the production of a model and then finds that demand is higher than expected
faces a choice. If they plan to make a bigger capital investment in the future, so that
future sales will rise and the market clearing price will fall, should they let prices
rise to clear the market in the short run? If so, demand for the vehicle in the future
may fall, if consumers interpret high prices as indicative of future prices.
Might consumers be able to infer that high early prices are an overestimate of
future prices? If consumers knew that high early prices were the result of a capacity
constraint, or if they understood the true cost of hybrid components, then they
might not interpret high early prices as a signal of high future prices in equilibrium.
Consumers are unlikely to be informed about production constraints and technology
costs in the automobile industry, because much of this information is considered
proprietary and is held secret. None of the industry analysts I spoke with claimed
to know with any precision how much hybrid components cost Toyota. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that consumers are able to estimate future hybrid costs based
on fundamentals. Instead, they probably use current and past prices to form beliefs
about future hybrid prices.
Tax Equivalence: Which Price Influences Future Demand?
Directed search explains the tax incidence of the Prius only if consumer beliefs
are influenced by subsidy exclusive past prices. In the stylized model, this means
that second period demand was shifted by p, not p − τ . Evidence presented above
suggests that hybrid buyers knew of the tax credit and understood its implications.
This does not, however, imply that potential future buyers know anything about
it. Even if those who purchased while the credit was in effect were perfectly well
40Note that high prices could also be interpreted in some cases as a signal of quality. I abstract from such concerns
in the present discussion, but this could be built into a more formal model.
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informed, the price transmitted to future buyers may be the subsidy exclusive price.
Prices posted on internet chat rooms, Edmunds.com, Consumer Reports and other
such sites are almost always tax exclusive prices. Individuals sometimes report “out
the door” prices which include taxes and fees, but, since sales taxes vary across
localities, reporting agencies typically report tax exclusive prices. In the case of
the hybrid tax credit, these agencies did not subtract out the credit when reporting
transaction prices.
Note also that, if Toyota is concerned with how the subsidy exclusive price in-
fluences future demand, then a subsidy paid directly to Toyota might have had a
different incidence. This is in contrast to standard models, but it is a natural conse-
quence of the stylized example, given the assumption that the relevant signal is tax
exclusive.
If consumers do know about the tax credit and attempt to adjust their forecast of
future prices accordingly, they will have to have a method for distinguishing between
a higher price due to taxes and a change to Toyota’s long term projected costs. The
costs of a new technology are uncertain, even to the manufacturer. Automakers are
continually updating their beliefs about the long run costs and viability of varying
hybrid systems. If Toyota adjusted upward their long run cost projections, this
may look just like an increase due to a temporary tax credit to consumers. Given
this ambiguity, it may be profit-maximizing to ration quantities in early periods.
A temporary increase in demand due to a tax credit may therefore have no effect
on price because the manufacturer wishes to signal a particular future price to the
market.
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The Role of Dealerships
Once Toyota sells a vehicle to a dealer, the dealer owns it, and Toyota is prohibited
from dictating the retail price. Even if Toyota wanted to keep prices below market
clearing levels, why would dealers not raise prices? The most obvious answer is that,
while Toyota is legally prohibited from setting retail prices, they nevertheless have
enormous leverage over dealerships and can punish dealerships who do not comply
with their sales strategy. According to Toyota dealers that I spoke with, Priuses
were allocated based on how fast they were sold by dealerships. Thus, if a dealership
raised the price of a Prius, so that it cleared the local market, eliminated the wait
list, and Priuses took longer to sell, then that dealership would see the arrival rate
of future Priuses decline. This would have been quite costly, since the Prius, even
if it sold at sticker price with no markup, was grossing far more than any similarly
priced vehicle. Thus, even if dealers had no independent reason to hold prices below
market clearing levels, Toyota was probably able to incentivize them to comply with
their pricing scheme.
Concerns for Fairness May Generate Such a Result
A starkly different interpretation of the stylized model is based on behavioral
considerations, including a concern for fairness. If consumers are willing to punish
firms that are perceived as unfair, then prices may not respond to a tax subsidy if
such a price change is deemed unfair. While this is unnatural in a neoclassical model,
there is a substantial body of research that documents concerns for fairness and a
willingness to punish. In terms of the example above, a firm violating fairness in the
first period will shift the demand curve downward in the second period (i.e., β > 0).
Behavioral considerations may also explain the case of the Prius if consumers
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are subject to framing biases, in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In
the car market, vehicles are commonly classified into segments (sedans, compact
cars, midsize SUVs, etc.) and price levels (economy, luxury, etc.). Vehicles are
frequently compared to other vehicles in their “class” in terms of their reliability and
performance. If framing matters, consumers may rate a car differently depending on
the quality of other vehicles in its class.
The Prius is typically classified as a compact sedan, but it is the most expensive
compact sedan, and is more expensive than many midsize sedans. If prices had
risen during the wait list period, the Prius would have approached the price of some
luxury sedans, which tend to have significantly better performance and features.
Consumers may have deemed the Prius to be of inferior quality if they compared
it to these luxury sedans, and this reputation may have influenced future demand.
If so, then Toyota may have wished to hold prices below market clearing levels to
maintain a comparison with compact sedans. An increase in demand due to the tax
credit might therefore not have influenced price.
Behavioral concerns may also explain why dealers did not raise prices to clear the
market. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) asked consumers whether or not it
was fair for an automobile retailer to raise prices by $200 in response to a shortage
for a popular model. In one version, respondents were told that the dealer had been
selling the car at the list price; the increase would therefore require charging more
than the sticker price. In a second version, respondents were told that the dealer
had been selling the car at $200 below list price; the increase would therefore lead
to a new price equal to the list price. In the first case, 71% of respondents said the
price increase was unfair, but only 42% thought the price increase was unfair in the
second case. (The difference is statistically significant.)
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This is direct evidence that the sticker price is a salient reference point. Dealers
may have felt that charging above the sticker price would be perceived as unfair. Car
dealers may be especially concerned about such reputations because many consumers
distrust them. If dealerships experience a discrete reputation cost when charging
above the sticker price, a marginal increase in demand due to a temporary tax credit
may induce no transaction price response. Note also that this means that the sticker
price is a way for Toyota to influence retail prices, if the sticker price acts as a ceiling
on the retail price.
More generally, consumers appear to rate the fairness of a price change differ-
ently, depending on the perceived cause of the change. Kahneman et al. (1986) ask
several questions that demonstrate the difference in perceived fairness between price
increases due to temporary shortages versus changes in cost. In one example, they
ask respondents whether or not it is fair for a hardware store to increase the price of
snow shovels the day after a snowstorm; 82% say that this is unfair. Frey and Pom-
merehne (1993) follow a similar method and find that 80% of respondents believe
that price increases made to clear markets with short-run excess demand are unfair.
Toyota may be especially concerned about fairness perceptions in regards to the
Prius because the Prius has generated public goodwill for Toyota. For many, the
Prius is a metonym for Toyota, while the Hummer is a metonym for General Motors.
For those concerned with the automobile industry’s role in carbon emissions, this
reflects positively on Toyota and negatively on GM. It may be partly because of this
gap in perception that there was no outcry when Toyota passed GM in global sales
in the first quarter of 2007. This marked the first time in 80 years that GM was
surpassed, but there appeared to be more celebration of Toyota’s leadership in fuel
economy than nostalgia for the American company’s age of dominance in the public
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discourse. In other circumstances, it is easy to imagine Toyota’s ascension as a spark
for policy intervention to aid the domestic industry. This is not directly a reason
why Toyota would not charge more for a Prius, but it is a reason why Toyota has a
significant investment in the goodwill afforded by the Prius. If sharp price changes in
response to taxes jeopardized that goodwill, Toyota might be better served to forgo
the revenue from a higher price.
Tax Equivalence and Fairness
A concern for fairness may also break tax equivalence, if consumers view a subsidy
rebated to them differently than a subsidy rebated to a seller. This line of reasoning
suggests an interpretation of the results in Busse et al. (2006), who find that con-
sumers capture roughly all of a customer cash rebate, but less than half of a dealer
cash incentive. They attribute this result to information asymmetry, but it is also
consistent with consumers feeling some “ownership” over a rebate given directly to
them. If consumers feel entitled to a cash rebate or tax credit “given to them,” then
incidence may depend on which side of the market remits the tax.
Willingness to Punish is Key
We should expect firms to respond to fairness criteria only if future demand re-
sponds to violations of fairness norms. Some evidence regarding consumer willingness
to punish firms that offend fairness norms comes from similar survey questions (Kah-
neman et al., 1986; Campbell, 1999). A willingness to punish has also been shown
in experiments (see Fehr and Gächter (2000) for a discussion of the evidence).
Another piece of evidence regarding the value of fairness perceptions to a firm
comes from a recent episode in the mobile phone market. In July 2007, Apple
introduced the iPhone, a high priced mobile phone. The 8-gigabyte iPhone debuted
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at a price of $599, and people queued for days to buy one on the release date.
Only two months later, in September, Apple dropped the retail price by a third to
$399. Consumers who had purchased the identical phone in the first two months
were outraged. The public relations pressure was sufficient to move Apple CEO
Steve Jobs to post an open letter apologizing to customers and to provide all early
purchasers with a $100 store credit. This rebate was essentially a $75 million check
written to consumers to recover goodwill.41
In sum, a link between current prices and future demand can explain the tax
incidence observed in the data. This link could be forged by imperfect information,
which forces consumers to use past prices as a signal of future prices. Or, it could be
created by behavioral considerations, including fairness perceptions. I next present
additional evidence from the data that links the incidence result to the wait lists,
and then conclude with lessons for future research on tax incidence.
Evidence in Support of the Importance of Wait Lists
The modeling exercise suggests that incidence may depend on whether or not a
product is in excess demand. Several pieces of evidence from the hybrid market are
consistent with this. First, in the case of the Prius, the difference between the first
two and the final tax change is consistent with incidence differing in the presence of
wait lists. Second, Prius prices were more sensitive to other price determinants when
there was not a wait list, which supports the notion that prices were inflexible during
the 2004 to 2006 model years. Third, evidence from other hybrid models confirms
the case of the Prius — those vehicles that had wait lists look similar to the Prius
in their response to taxation.
The bounding exercise produced a much tighter bound on the first two tax events
41In early September, Apple claimed to have sold its millionth iPhone. As a conservative estimate, if Apple had
to rebate $100 on only 750,000 units, that would work out to be $75 million.
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than the second (see table 2.6). Thus, it may be the case that the pass through effect
of the final tax change, at which time there was no wait list, was larger than the
first two events. Toyota’s introduction of the economic savings bonus program is also
suggestive of a response to taxation, even though the price influence of this program
was offset by the change in low interest financing. Recall again the argument that
consumers may have perceived a price cut that offset the tax change, even if this was
not true, as suggested by (Busse et al., 2007).42
In addition, the price of the Prius was more sensitive to other factors during the
wait list period. Table 2.13 shows regression results from a model of Prius prices in
which the end of the month dummy, the price of gasoline and weeks that the model
has been available are interacted with a wait list dummy. For this specification, I
assume that all 2004, 2005 and 2006 model year Priuses were on a wait list, and
2002 and 2007 models were not. All three interactions are statistically significant,
demonstrating that the Prius was more sensitive to these factors when there was
no wait list in place. This corroborates the notion that the price of the Prius was
inflexible during wait list periods, which explains why tax changes would not influence
prices.
Finally, bounds estimated for the price effect of tax changes on other hybrids
are broadly consistent with zero effects for vehicles on wait lists, and not for other
models. Only two non-Toyota models were present in reasonable numbers before
the tax policy was initially introduced. These are the Ford Escape and the Honda
Civic. The Ford Escape did not sell at an especially fast turnover at any point in
its history. The Honda Civic, however, looks much like the Prius at the end of 2005
and beginning of 2006, when the tax credit was introduced. The 2006 Honda Civic
42Note that the estimates from the state tax changes are almost entirely based on the wait list period. Thus, the
state variation is not helpful in directly comparing the wait list period to the non-wait list period, but it does confirm
that the low pass through result is due to variation in the wait list period.
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debuted a fully redesigned body style, and both the conventional and hybrid versions
of the Civic sold at a very rapid rate, making them look much like the Prius during
the tax change.
There are two other Toyota vehicles with sufficient available data, the Highlander
and the Camry. The Highlander Hybrid has sold like a normal vehicle for its entire
history. The Camry was introduced shortly before the first tax phase-out, and was
in excess demand at that time. It was still selling at a very fast rate, and was
unavailable on lots in many locations, at the second phase-out.
Table 2.14 reports the incidence bounds for these other vehicles using the same
specification as column three in table 2.6, which is reported again for comparison.
The Escape and Highlander, which did not experience excess demand, show higher
upper bounds. In two out of three cases for the Highlander and in the case of the
Escape the lower bound estimate is also positive, unlike the Prius. These estimates
are, however, far less precise than the Prius estimates. The Civic and Camry, which
were in excess demand at the tax changes, both have negative lower bounds, with
varying tightness on the upper bound, just like the Prius.
Overall, this evidence indicates that Prius prices were inflexible during the wait
list period, and that this inflexibility led to no change in transaction prices in the face
of tax changes. Thus, as an empirical matter, the incidence of a tax may be quite
different when a product is in excess demand. This is consistent with the stylized
example described above. Several other lessons for the economics of tax incidence
are suggested in the next section.
Lessons for the Economics of Tax Incidence
The model above demonstrates that, when current prices influence future demand,
a model of tax incidence may generate predictions that deviate significantly from
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standard models. In general, if future demand is inversely related to current tax
exclusive prices, then consumers will bear more of the burden of a temporary tax (or
gain more of the benefit of a subsidy) than would otherwise be the case.
In addition, the incidence of a tax introduced when a product is experiencing
a shortage may be different than the same tax placed on the same product at a
different point in time. Temporary and permanent taxes may also be expected to
have different effects in the presence of a binding capacity constraint.
Furthermore, if the current tax exclusive price is the price that determines future
demand, then the model suggests that a subsidy to consumers may have a differ-
ent incidence than a subsidy to producers. The economics of taxation has recently
shown renewed interest in cases under which various tax equivalence theorems fail
to hold. Slemrod (2007) analyzes a partial equilibrium model that characterizes
conditions under which tax incidence varies, according to who remits a tax. This
is closely related to the labor supply model of Slemrod (2001). The driving force
behind incidence asymmetry in these models is tax avoidance, compliance and en-
forcement, which depend on the system of remittances. This line of reasoning is
pursued in both Slemrod (2007) and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) as an explanation
for the real world discrepancies between theoretically equivalent retail sales taxes
and value-added taxes. A recent paper by Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007) explores
a different failure of tax equivalence. In a field experiment, they find that demand
falls for groceries that are posted with tax inclusive prices. They interpret this result
in a bounded rationality framework, in which consumers incur cognitive costs when
calculating tax-inclusive prices. In the car market, Busse et al. (2006) argue that
information asymmetry generates differences in the incidence of manufacturer incen-
tives — which act like a subsidy — depending on whether incentives are rebated
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to consumers or dealers. The case of the Prius highlights conditions under which
remittance matters, not because of avoidance, bounded rationality or information
asymmetry, but instead because tax exclusive prices influence future demand.
The case of the Prius highlights several conditions that increase the likelihood that
current prices will influence future demand. First, the Prius was a new product and
the manufacturer was uncertain about consumer demand. This led to a conservative
capital investment, which led to a binding capacity constraint. It also meant that
consumers were unsure of the price. Second, the Prius generated goodwill among
consumers towards Toyota. Toyota may have been especially reluctant to raise prices
temporarily, if it might jeopardize goodwill. Third, it is costly to learn about prices
in the car market. As a result, past prices, which are reported on the Internet and in
consumer buying guides, hold considerable value in informing car buyers on how to
direct their search for a new vehicle. Future research that determines which of these
conditions is pivotal, and that distinguishes between “rational” and “behavioral”
explanations, could shed considerable light on how taxes affect behavior in a variety
of markets.
Many “green” products are likely to feature these conditions. Many firms now
feature products that are environmentally friendly for marketing and public relations
reasons. And, many “green” products are new products, for which the overall market
demand is uncertain. As government agencies seek to encourage environmentally
friendly practices through the tax system, the potential for incidence asymmetry
and the incidence results for the Prius should be kept in mind.
Immediate examples of similar products are other advanced technology vehicles,
such as plug-in hybrids, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, clean diesels and solar or electric
powered cars. Many of these advanced technology vehicles are already subsidized
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by state and federal policies, and they are likely to receive further subsidies in the
future. A reasonable expectation for any of these products, if they become popular,
is that early adopters would get a windfall gain from government subsidies. For
example, a new line of electric sports cars, made by a firm called Tesla Motors, will
go on sale during the 2008 model year. The first year’s entire production line has
already been sold ahead of time. The vehicles will likely qualify for preexisting tax
incentives, but this will not affect the price paid by consumers to Tesla.
2.9 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This paper uses transaction level data on new vehicle purchases to assemble several
pieces of evidence which indicate that consumers captured the significant majority
of the benefits from tax subsidies for the Toyota Prius. The federal tax credit for
hybrids, which was introduced by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, created three
sharp changes in the value of federal tax subsidies. Incidence estimates based on
comparing transaction prices just before and just after each tax change show that
subsidy exclusive transaction prices moved very little, if at all, which implies that
consumers captured the bulk of the subsidy.
Many transactions were shifted across time in order to maximize tax benefits. This
implies that consumers were aware of the tax policy, and it raises the possibility that
consumers who purchase just before or just after a tax change differ systematically
from each other, because some choose to move their transaction to gain the higher
tax subsidy but others do not. The paper develops a method of bounding the effect of
the tax in the presence of this type of heterogeneity, which may be useful to incidence
analysis whenever tax changes are anticipated. This methodology yields informative
upper bounds on the first two tax changes and verifies the conclusion that consumers
68
captured the majority of the subsidy.
An analysis of the incidence of state tax incentives corroborates this result. The
paper uses a state panel research design and finds that consumers capture all, or
nearly all, of state tax benefits. The empirical finding that consumers capture the
bulk of state and federal tax benefits has important implications for policy and for
future research on tax incidence.
The federal government spent approximately $400 million on the tax credit for
the Prius. The incidence estimate in this paper implies that this money went directly
to Prius owners, not to Toyota or to dealers. A full evaluation of the policy would
include not only an incidence estimate, but also an estimate of the effect of the
credit on the total number of Priuses sold. A full analysis of the latter question
requires a structural approach, but institutional facts give reason to doubt that the
production response was significant. Given that there were wait lists prior to the
2006 model year, Toyota probably did not produce any “extra” Priuses as a result
of the policy, since they appear to have been capacity constrained before the law
was passed. Toyota made a major capital investment prior to the 2007 model year,
but this investment was made with the knowledge that the tax credit was already
scheduled to phase-out. Thus, the credit probably had little impact on the capacity
expansion.
As mentioned in the introduction, Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) find that state
sales volumes rose in response to tax credits and other incentives. One cannot readily
interpret their estimates as a production response, however, since their reduced form
methodology does not distinguish total sales effects from timing effects or geographic
reallocation. Toyota’s response to a state tax policy may be to divert Priuses that
would have been sent to a different state into the state with the incentive. Future
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research that estimates a production response to the federal credit or untangles
geographic shifts in sales from the overall production response would be an important
complement to the price analysis performed in this paper.
The finding that consumers captured a significant majority of tax incentives is
important beyond the scope of immediate policy analysis because the result is dif-
ficult to explain in standard models of tax incidence. The paper argues that Prius
buyers captured the benefits of tax incentives because Toyota believe that raising
prices would jeopardize future demand for hybrids. The paper provides a theoreti-
cal example in which future demand depends on current prices, which might make
a seller with a capacity constraint willing to hold prices below the market clearing
level, in order to increase future demand.
In such a model, the standard result that who remits a tax does not influence
incidence may not hold. There is growing interest in public economics regarding
such deviations from traditional tax theory, which may be guided by the case of the
Prius. The characteristics of the Prius market that likely contributed to this situation
were that it was a new product, that learning new vehicle prices involves costly
search, and that consumer good-will toward the company was tied to the product.
Many “green” products are new and are used by firms to generate goodwill for a
brand, and many such products are likely to be subsidized by governments aiming
to combat rising environmental and security concerns raised by the consumption of
oil. Such policies should be designed with potential incidence asymmetry in mind.
In addition, future research should consider such policies a fruitful area for finding
deviations from traditional tax theory which may deepen our understanding of how
non-standard considerations determine how taxes affect real world behavior.
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2.10 Appendix
This appendix provides details about the measure of dealer cost used throughout
the paper, analyzes the stability of this measure and documents the adjustment
made to account for the price change instituted by Toyota in April 2007. The results
presented in the paper above are sensitive to whether or not dealer cost is controlled.
Thus, it is important to determine whether or not dealer cost varies over time because
Toyota charges dealers a different amount for identical cars, or because the percentage
of cars with more expensive options fluctuates. Toyota also made a change to invoice
and sticker prices in April 2007, which it called an “economic savings bonus.” The
base price of the vehicle did not change, but the invoice and sticker price of each
options package did. Thus, to compare identical vehicles before and after the tax
change, it is necessary to adjust dealer cost for cars sold in April, which requires
knowing which options package each vehicle had. Since their is no indicator for
options packages in the data, I develop a method for assigning options packages to
each car by examining the dealer cost data.
In the case of the Prius, the vast majority of the variation in dealer cost comes from
the factory-installed options package. The 2006 Prius had eight options packages,
and the 2007 Prius had six. Each vehicle is shipped from the factory with one of
these options packages installed, adding up to $6,000 to dealer cost. If the data
included an indicator for each options package, one could simply see if Priuses with
any particular options package cost the same amount before and after each tax
change. Even without this, if the dealer cost variable in the data was influenced
only by the options package, then the dealer cost measure could easily be matched
to outside information on the invoice price of each package. There are other factors
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that influence the dealer cost, however, which introduce noise into this procedure.
Dealer invoice of the base model and each options package is readily available
from online sources, which acquire this information and provide it to consumers for
purposes of price negotiation. The challenge is to match this precisely to the measure
of dealer cost in the data. The measure of dealer cost available in the data includes
factory installed options, dealer installed “hard add” options, advertising fees and
the delivery charge. It does not include what is known as the holdback.
Factory-installed options include not only the options package, but also small
additional features, like floor mats, a cargo net or a satellite radio. Thus, two Priuses
with the same options package may differ in price because one includes a cargo net,
and the other does not. Dealer cost will also reflect “hard adds,” features that add
to the resale value of the car, such as a roof rack or upgraded tires. It is impossible
to determine from cost data alone which of these features is present in a vehicle, and
these factors therefore introduce noise into the process.
Recall from section 2.2 that dealer invoice prices for identical items do not vary
across localities, in accordance with franchise law, but geographic variation does arise
in small measure through fees. Toyota adds $55 to the delivery fee for Alabama,
Georgia, Florida, North Carolina and South Carolina. Since the delivery charge is a
known function of state, I can easily account for this in the calculations. There may
also be some geographic variation in document preparation fees, however, which will
introduce a small amount of noise. More substantial variation may come through
advertising fees, which are typically between 1% and 3% of the base MSRP for a
vehicle, depending on the cost of advertising in the local market. There is no reliable
source of information that indicates the variation across geography in advertising
fees. My accumulation of anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that most Priuses
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were charged very close to 2% of base MSRP.
The final important discrepancy between dealer invoice and dealer cost is what
is known as the holdback. The holdback is a rebate that the dealer receives from
the manufacturer after a car is sold. In the case of Toyota, the dealer holdback is
known to be 2% of the base MSRP. Thus, dealer invoice prices quoted in consumer
resource guides are 2% higher than the actual final cost to the dealer. Since the
measure of cost in the data nets out holdback, it is necessary to subtract holdback
from the invoice price to make them comparable. Since the cost measure includes
advertising fees, however, which are estimated to also be roughly 2% of base MSRP,
I let these two omissions cancel each other out. This will be correct on average, but
it will induce variation, to the extent that advertising fees are above or below 2% in
a particular location.
Thus, several considerations create small amounts of variation in the dealer cost
measure. This variation makes it impossible to match exactly each vehicle to an
appropriate invoice price and thereby infer the options package. Fortunately, the
noise appears to be small enough that the imputation is meaningful. In figure 2.13,
I show a kernel smoothed density of the dealer cost of all 2007 Priuses in the sample
between September 2006 and March 2007. The dealer cost variable is adjusted for
the $55 surcharge on deliveries in the relevant states. The vertical bars are at invoice
prices, estimated from Edmunds.com data as follows: I sum the base price, options
package price and delivery fee for each vehicle. Based on my reading of numerous
consumer accounts, I add the dealer invoice price of floor mats to all but the least
expensive options package, since all consumers report floor mats being included on
all Priuses with options package 2 or greater in these years. Overall, figure 2.13 shows
remarkable consistency between high points in the density, and the invoice prices. If
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advertising fees are on average 2% (and thereby offsetting the holdback on average),
we would expect modal prices to be somewhat to the right of each line, since small
additional options would add weight to the distribution asymmetrically.
Now, I move specifically to a discussion of how cost may vary around each tax
change. Recall from section 2.2 that the dealer’s invoice price of a vehicle rarely
changes during the model year cycle. When these prices do change, this is usually
a part of a public campaign, as in the case of the “economic savings bonus” for the
Prius in April 2007. Instead, the manufacturer typically manipulates price by offering
cash incentives to dealers. Automotive News reports on these types of incentives for
all models weekly, and it reports no such dealer cash incentives for the Prius at any
point, with the exception of a cash incentive that appears to have affected a very
small proportion of vehicles (see section 2.2 for details and citations). Thus, we are
looking for confirmation that there were no other cost changes.
Figures 2.14 to 2.16 show kernel density plots of vehicle cost for the two months
surrounding each tax change. Looking at the first two tax changes, it is apparent
that there was a composition shift. There were clearly more richly equipped Priuses
sold in December 2005 than January 2006; and there were clearly fewer sparsely
equipped Priuses sold in September 2006 than October 2006. In addition, there
appear to be spikes in prices that line up at nearly identical values in each case. This
suggests that, for these two experiments, there was a noticeable composition change,
but that identically optioned cars cost dealers the same amount before and after the
tax changes.
As expected, figure 2.16 tells a different story. In this case, there appears to be
both a shift in composition and a dramatic shift downward in cost from March to
April 2007. This coincides with the introduction of Toyota’s sale. Since the composi-
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tion does not appear stable, it is important to compare cost adjusted consumer prices
to estimate a tax effect. To do so, I assign an options package value to each vehicle
from April 2007 and then use the cost measure that would have been in effect for
that vehicle, had it been sold in March. Note that this procedure will blur dealer’s
gross profit and confuse the allocation of benefits between Toyota and dealers, but,
if the assignment is correct, it will accurately reflect consumer prices.
Table 2.15 shows the MSRP and dealer invoice prices for each options package
before and after the price change, according to Edmunds.com. I assign each Prius an
options package as follows. I add the base price, the delivery charge ($660), and the
cost of floor mats ($141) to each options package according to April prices. Because
locations with lower than average advertising fees will have costs below this number,
I assign cut-off values at $100 below this number. Any Prius with a price greater
than this number, but less than the next highest cut-off is assigned to that options
package. Having assigned options packages, I then add the cost difference back into
dealer cost. If the vehicles were correctly assigned, then the dealer cost will now be
identical to the dealer cost in March for the same vehicle.
Figure 2.17 shows the adjusted April cost distribution against the March distri-
bution. These now look remarkably similar in the location of peaks. This highlights
again that there was a composition change, with more expensive options packages
being sold in April. Overall, this similarity of the March and April distributions sug-
gests that the adjustment procedure did a good job assigning options values based
on cost.
Figures 2.14 to 2.17 provide visual evidence to support the industry reports that
suggest costs were stable through the tax windows, once one has accounted for the
April price cut. A statistical test of this proposition can be performed as follows.
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First, I use the same procedure as described above to assign options packages to each
vehicle based on cost to assign all 2006 and 2007 Priuses an options package. Then,
I run a regression of the form:
Costij = αH + ψj + εij
separately for each four week period surrounding a tax change, where H is a dummy
for the high tax portion of that window and ψ are options package fixed effects. The
regressions exclude a small number of vehicles that lie below the estimated minimum
invoice price and vehicles more than $1,000 above the maximum. Table 2.16 reports
the coefficients and standard errors on α. Sensitivity analysis showed that some
results are sensitive to the size of the downward adjustment for minimum prices in
a tier. I thus report a variety of values.
Overall, this table confirms the industry reports and visual evidence. Dealer cost
did not change within the tax windows, except for the known sale in April. Column
1 shows that, in only 1 of 6 cases is the difference in January and December costs
statistically significant. In no case is the September to October difference significant.
In the March versus adjusted April comparison (column 3), 3 of 6 cases yield a
significant difference. This may be due to imperfections in the cost adjustment, or
it may be a statistical anomaly. As expected, if this procedure is used to compare
the March and the unadjusted April numbers, there is a vast difference in costs.
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2.11 Figures and Tables














































































































Vertical bars indicate dates 
of federal subsidy changes.
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Vertical bars indicate dates of federal subsidy changes.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Sales in December 2005 and January 2006,






































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Credit Worth $3150Tax Deduction Worth 
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate





Figure 2.4: Distribution of Sales in December 2004 and January 2005,






































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Deduction Worth 
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate
(worth up to $700)
Tax Deduction Worth 
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate
(worth up to $700)
No Tax Change
1/1/05
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Sales in September 2006 and October 2006,





































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Credit Worth $1575Tax Credit Worth $3150
Tax Credit Phases Out
for the First Time
10/1/06
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Sales in September 2005 and October 2005,





































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Deduction Worth
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate
(worth up to $700)
Tax Deduction Worth
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate
(worth up to $700)
No Tax Change
10/1/05
Figure 2.7: Distribution of Sales in March 2007 and April 2007,

































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Credit Worth $787.50Tax Credit Worth $1575
Tax Credit Phases Out
for the Second Time
4/1/07
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Sales in March 2006 and April 2006,

































































































Prius Non-Hybrid Toyota Sedans
Tax Credit Worth $3150Tax Credit Worth $3150
No Tax Change
4/1/06
Figure 2.9: Mean Prius Prices, December 2005 and January 2006Tax Deduction = $700
Tax Deduction = $700
Credit = $3150
































































Figure 2.10: Mean Prius Prices, September and October 2006Tax Credit = $3150
Tax Credit = $3150
1575































































Figure 2.11: Mean Prius Prices, March and April 2007Tax Credit = $1575
Tax Credit = $1575
78 .50






































































































D al r Cost
Dealer Cost
V tical bars indicate estimated minimum invoice prices for each options package.
Vertical bars indicate estimated minimum invoice prices for each options package.
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Table 2.1: Variation in Federal Tax Incentives for the Toyota Prius
Date Effective Tax Incentive
Jan 1 2001 to Dec 31 2005 $2,000 deduction (up to $700 value in 2005)
Jan 1 2006 to Sep 30 2006 $3,150 credit
Oct 1 2006 to Mar 31 2007 $1,575 credit
Apr 1 2007 to Sep 30 2007 $787.50 credit
Oct 1 2007 forward no credit
Source: Internal Revenue Service

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Evidence of Heterogeneous Timing Response,
Mean Consumer and Transaction Characteristics Surrounding Each Tax Change
Demographics
High Subsidy Prius 
Buyers within 14 
Days of Change
Low Subsidy Prius 
Buyers within 14 





Sept - Oct 37.2% 36.6%
Mar - Apr 36.0% 35.7%
Age (Years)
Jan-Dec 44.7 44.7
Sept - Oct 45.3 43.1




Sept - Oct 22.2% 30.0%
Mar - Apr 37.5% 43.9%
Trade-In Vintage (Year)
Jan-Dec 2000.2 1999.9
Sept - Oct 2001.2 2000.9
Mar - Apr 2000.6 2001.1
Trade-In Actual Cash Value ($)
Jan-Dec 2,677 2,683
Sept - Oct 2,217 3,065




Sept - Oct 6,070 5,843
Mar - Apr 4,511 4,988
Amount Financed ($)
Jan-Dec 24,387 24,379
Sept - Oct 24,400 24,565
Mar - Apr 23,347 23,299
Percent Purchased Service Contract
Jan-Dec 37.7% 45.0%
Sept - Oct 42.4% 48.6%
Mar - Apr 45.9% 49.0%
Service Contract Profit for Dealers ($)
Jan-Dec 586 738
Sept - Oct 771 871
Mar - Apr 779 838
Percent Purchased Life Insurance
Jan-Dec 0.54% 0.23%
Sept - Oct 0.00% 0.26%
Mar - Apr 0.45% 0.55%
Total Cost of After-Market Options 
and Fees($)
Jan-Dec 2,816 3,177
Sept - Oct 3,592 3,455
Mar - Apr 3,067 3,160
Percent with Buy Rate < APR
Jan-Dec 13.6% 14.5%
Sept - Oct 13.7% 17.5%










The difference estimate is a coefficient on a dummy equal to one if the transaction is within 2 weeks of a tax change, on the high subsidy side, 
from a regression with dummy variables for each 4 week window. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Estimated Log Price Premium For Toyota Models in High Tax Subsidy Window






Avalon 0.0026 (0.0026) -0.0065 (0.0025) * 0.0026 (0.0030)
Camry -0.0014 (0.0021) 0.0014 (0.0017) 0.0043 (0.0018) *
Camry Solara -0.0056 (0.0062) -0.0003 (0.0056) 0.0022 (0.0052)
Corolla -0.0083 (0.0024) * -0.0011 (0.0023) 0.0019 (0.0022)
Matrix 0.0013 (0.0057) -0.0036 (0.0051) 0.0031 (0.0053)
Yaris 0.0015 (0.0035) -0.0040 (0.0036)
Toyota Nameplate Light Trucks
4Runner -0.0032 (0.0031) -0.0020 (0.0033) 0.0036 (0.0033)
FJ Cruiser -0.0044 (0.0037) -0.0032 (0.0038)
Highlander 0.0046 (0.0031) -0.0019 (0.0028) 0.0014 (0.0030)
Land Cruiser 0.0073 (0.0159) -0.0144 (0.0143) 0.0038 (0.0175)
RAV4 -0.0009 (0.0032) -0.0013 (0.0024) -0.0049 (0.0022) *
Sequoia 0.0069 (0.0044) -0.0142 (0.0045) * 0.0056 (0.0053)
Sienna -0.0098 (0.0026) * 0.0025 (0.0023) 0.0051 (0.0026) *
Tacoma 0.0062 (0.0027) * 0.0017 (0.0025) 0.0018 (0.0024)
Tundra 0.0093 (0.0038) * -0.0033 (0.0032) -0.0342 (0.0270)
Lexus Nameplate Vehicles
ES 330 -0.0035 (0.0032) 0.1902 (0.0373) *
ES 350 0.0017 (0.0028) -0.0029 (0.0028)
GS 300 0.0016 (0.0052) -0.0039 (0.0133) -0.0621 (0.0387)
GS 350 -0.0041 (0.0056) -0.0054 (0.0060)
GX 470 0.0016 (0.0051) 0.0000 (0.0059) 0.0046 (0.0066)
IS 250 -0.0019 (0.0051) 0.0006 (0.0051) -0.0024 (0.0046)
IS 300 0.1196 (0.0514) *
IS 350 0.0026 (0.0064) 0.0065 (0.0067) 0.0061 (0.0126)
LS 430 -0.0031 (0.0052) -0.0094 (0.0094)
LS 460 -0.0056 (0.0045)
LX 470 -0.0085 (0.0094) -0.0131 (0.0097) 0.0163 (0.0141)
RX 330 -0.0024 (0.0029) 0.0609 (0.0216) * -0.0439 (0.0525)
RX 350 -0.0003 (0.0031) -0.0062 (0.0111)
SC 430 -0.0005 (0.0082) 0.0078 (0.0114) 0.0101 (0.0120)
Scion Nameplate Vehicles
tC 0.0002 (0.0029) 0.0033 (0.0026) 0.0009 (0.0028)
xA 0.0026 (0.0047) -0.0045 (0.0039) -0.0086 (0.0057)
xB 0.0043 (0.0041) -0.0052 (0.0035) 0.0016 (0.0057)
Dependent variable is the log of the incentive adjusted transaction price of a new vehicle.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * Denotes significance at 95% level.
Specification corresponds to column three ("Controls") from Table 6. Regression includes model year / trim level / engine type dummies, vehicle cost, day of 
week dummies, state dummies, end of month dummy, price of gasoline and quadratic vehicle trend.
First Two Weeks Jan 06 v. 
Last Two Weeks Dec 05
Last Two Weeks Sep 06 v. 
Last Two Weeks Oct 06
First Two Weeks Jan 06 v. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.12: Incentive Adjusted Price Change of Priuses Per Dollar of State Tax Incentive
Change
Specification 1 Specification 2




State Fixed Effects X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
N 64,706 64,706
AdjR2 0.25 0.80
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parentheses.
Controls include day of week dummies, dummy for end of the month, quadratic in 
vehicle time and model year and trim level dummies.
Depedent variable is the incentive adjusted transaction price of a new Prius, 
exclusive of tax subsidies.
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Table 2.13: Price Sensitivity of the Prius With and Without a Wait List
Incentive Adjusted Price of Prius
End of Month -8.07
(7.51)
End of Month, No Wait List -108
(22)
Price of Gasoline 1.19
(0.67)
Price of Gasoline, No Wait List 5.78
(1.12)
Weeks on Market -0.35
(0.10)




Model year 2004, 2005 and 2006 Priuses are coded as having a wait list.
Controls include dealer cost, day of week dummies, quadratic in vehicle time 
and model year and trim level dummies.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the incentive adjusted transaction price of a new Prius, 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.15: Price Changes Due to “Economic Savings Bonus” for 2007 Prius
Base $22,175 22,175 0
Package 1 825 825 0
2 1,175 575 600
3 2,555 2,105 450
4 3,180 2,580 600
5 5,080 3,280 1,800
6 6,350 4,550 1,800
Dealer Invoice
Base 20,419 20,419 0
Package 1 659 659 0
2 960 518 442
3 2,018 1,895 123
4 2,518 2,322 196
5 4,133 2,952 1,181





Table 2.16: Dealer Cost Premium in High Tax Period, Within Assigned Options Package
2007 Prius
Adjusted Unadjusted
Options Package Threshold Jan 06 (v. Dec 05) Sep 06 (v. Oct 06) Mar 07 (v. Apr 07) Mar 07 (v. Apr 07)
$25 -8.47 -13.84 -39.34 619.2
(18.60) (22.30) (14.10) (15.40)
50 -17.16 -12 -31.37 625.2
(18.40) (22.00) (14.00) (15.40)
75 -16.98 -12.31 -30.38 624.7
(18.30) (22.10) (13.70) (15.30)
100 -42.62 -13.94 -26.47 629.9
(18.00) (22.10) (13.60) (15.30)
125 -24.6 -12.45 -19.98 637.1
(17.60) (22.10) (13.50) (15.20)
150 -22.19 -13.1 -6.52 651.5
(17.20) (22.10) (13.20) (15.20)
Fixed Effect for Assigned 
Options Packages X X X X
Dependent variable is dealer cost. The reported coefficient is a dummy for the high tax period in each window.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each coefficient is from a separate regression, which assigns each vehicle in the sample an options package if it is greater than the base 
price plus options price minus threshold, but less than the similarly defined cutoff for the next highest options package.
N is approximately 1,330 for column 1, 815 for column 2 and 2,370 for columns 3 and 4. The sample varies slightly because minimum and 
maximum thresholds for censoring vary slightly by the selected threshold.
CHAPTER III
A Cautionary Tale About the Use of Administrative Data:
Evidence from Age of Marriage Laws
3.1 Introduction
This paper presents a cautionary note about the use of administrative data in
empirical work, especially work devoted to assessing the effects of laws. The behav-
ioral changes induced by laws often represent important tests of theory and, because
they are plausibly exogenous, may be exploited to identify various causal effects.
Increasingly, scholars studying the effects of laws, and other empirical questions, rely
on administrative data. These data are drawn from official records, and are thus
thought to provide more reliable information about the behaviors they record than
do general surveys. We argue that this presumption may often be incorrect, with
important implications for the validity of empirical analysis.
When a particular behavior has been outlawed, there will be both people who
modify their behavior as intended by the law and others who attempt to circumvent
the law in various ways. In particular, “non-compliers” can either (a) move to an
area where the behavior is not outlawed and engage in it there; or (b) break the law
where they are. Both these things bias administrative records towards suggesting
larger changes in the behavior addressed by the law than actually occurred.1
1That some agents might migrate to avoid a law to which they would otherwise be subject has been studied in
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In the first case, official records correctly indicate that recorded behavior in an
area conform to the area’s laws, but they miss the fact that some of the people to
whom an area’s law was directed actually behaved as they would have without the
law by moving somewhere else. In the second case, administrative records might not
even accurately reflect behavioral changes within a given area. People who break
the law have an incentive to conceal that fact, and that incentive is likely especially
large when the threat of a sanction is large — as is true in virtually all cases where
administrative data are collected.
These potential problems are rarely discussed in studies using administrative data.
Moreover, because researchers are predisposed to believe that laws affect behavior
in the intended direction, they are unlikely to be vigilant against the possibility
that information from an administrative data source suggests exaggerated effects. In
practice the consequences of this bias in administrative data may be severe, and it
may lead scholars to dramatically incorrect conclusions about a law’s effects. Inter-
estingly, while they have other limitations, data from general surveys may not be
subject to the particular problems of administrative data. Research which combines
data from different sources, or which uses data from one source to assess the validly
of results from another, is thus much more likely to identify parameters of interest
than research using one type of data.
To assess the practical importance of these issues we study how minimum age of
marriage laws, which were designed to reduce early marriage, affected young people’s
marriage behavior. Before the 1970s, adolescents wishing to marry faced minimum
age of marriage restrictions which varied widely across states. These laws converged
dramatically over a short period in the early 1970s, so that by 1975 the minimum
a variety of contexts, including migration for tax-related reasons (Asplund, Friberg and Wilander, 2007; Lovenheim,
2008); migration to obtain legal abortions (Blank, George and London, 1996), or migration to avoid age-of-drinking
laws (Kenkel, 1993).
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permissible age of marriage was identical across almost all states. These legal changes
present an ideal opportunity to study how marriage responds to policy initiatives and
could be exploited in instrumental variables or other approaches to provide estimates
of how early marriage affects various outcomes.
The “gold-standard” data source for studying the effect of marriage laws would
seem to be the official marriage statistics from the National Vital Statistics System.
These data are drawn from a state’s actual marriage certificates, and represent the
official administrative record of marriage collected at the point of marriage. Other
surveys, like the decennial Census, enquire about marriage history, but rely on a
person’s retrospective report about behavior. Surprisingly, we find that for marriages
in the 1950s, the Vital Statistics evidence suggests dramatically larger effects of
minimum age of marriage laws than are found in Census data.
We examine three possibilities for the differences between the two data sources.
First, we show that the discrepancy is not the result of mechanical differences between
the data sets or recall bias in Census records. Second, because the Census reports
marriages by where people live while the Vital Statistics records marriages by where
they occur, the different estimates from the two data sources might actually describe
the same underlying behavior, if people travelled to more permissive states to marry.
We show that while there was some marriage related “migration” among young
people in the relevant cohorts, migration cannot explain the overall discrepancy
between the data sources. The third possible explanation is that young people in
the 1950s actually married at younger ages than legally permitted in their states
but misrepresented their ages on official marriage records. Consistent with this
interpretation, we show that most of the differences between retrospective Census and
Vital Statistics records disappear by 1970, before the convergence in legal marriage
104
ages across states but after documentary evidence of proof of age, such as driver’s
licenses and social security cards, became more common.
Our results suggest that minimum age of marriage laws did lower young marriage
as intended. However, because in the 1950s many young people circumvented the laws
by moving to other states or by misrepresenting their ages on official records, Vital
Statistic records indicate much larger changes in marriage than actually occurred.
More generally, our results illustrate how data quality might be affected by the
incentives that agents face to give misinformation and how that incentive may be
particularly high for administrative records. Standard regression or instrumental
variables estimates of how behavior changed which rely exclusively on administrative
data may thus be very much at variance with changes that actually occurred in the
population.
Below, we review the history of minimum age of marriage laws and describe
available information about marriage in the Vital Statistics and Census. Section
3.3 presents results from these two data sources, showing that the estimated effects
of age of marriage laws differ sharply across them. In Section 3.4 we analyze, in
turn, the importance of mechanical issues and recall bias in Census data, marriage
migration and systematic misrepresentation in the Vital Statistics data for explaining
the discrepancy across the two data sources. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 History of Minimum Age Laws and Data on Early Marriage
In 1950, laws governing minimum ages of marriage varied widely across states
and across genders.2 Over the short period from 1971 to 1975, a burst of legislative
activity led to a dramatic convergence in laws across states and genders.3 In 1980,
2We gathered information on legislative statutes about age of marriage laws in each state by tracing back in time,
through successive amendments, from when most of these laws were initially introduced in the early 1800s.
3These changes were likely occasioned by the constitutional amendment in 1971 making 18 the voting age in
national elections, and by demands from the Women’s Rights movement for legal parity for women in all laws.
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an 18 year old man or woman wishing to marry could do so without parental consent
in all but three states in the country. Merely ten years earlier, in 1970, an 18 year
old man would not have been free to marry without parental consent in more than
40 states. Minimum marriage ages were historically lower for women, but even so
about 10 states prohibited 18 year old marriage without parental consent for young
women in 1970. Table 3.1 shows some of the variation in minimum ages without
parental consent across states and over time.
We study the effects of minimum age of marriage laws in the post-World War
II period on marriage behavior.4 We focus throughout on “non-consent” laws, the
minimum age of marriage not requiring parental consent. Generally, the minimum
ages in these laws are above 16 and are thus likely to “bite”, in the sense that non-
trivial amounts of people may actually wish to marry at these ages. Restrictions on
marriage at ages as young as 12 or 14 (some of the ages in “consent” laws) probably
affected few young people. Furthermore, changes in marriage induced by non-consent
laws have nothing to do with the preferences of a third party, such as a parent. How
these laws affected the marital behavior of young persons across various cohorts can
be investigated with data from two different sources: the National Vital Statistics or
the decennial Census.5 We discuss these in turn.
Vital Statistics marriage data come from information submitted voluntarily by
states from 1940-1995. The data are from the marriage certificates filled out by
couples just prior to marriage and as a requirement to having the marriage legally
4Dahl (2005), who uses laws as an instrument for adult poverty with Census data, is the only other example we
are aware of which exploits minimum age of marriage laws. His work differs from ours in several ways. First, Dahl
focuses exclusively on women and, because he focuses on marriages with parental consent, he analyzes marriages at
much younger ages than we do. Dahl mentions and briefly analyzes the potential for cross-state marriages, but he
suggests that this is evidence that state laws are binding. By contrast, we think the fundamental lesson to be learned
from marriage migration is that it can create large differences between administrative and survey data. Dahl does
not mention the potential for misrepresentation, which is central to our findings.
5Apart from the Census and Vital Statistics, the other systematic data source is the June supplement to the
Current Population Survey, which includes questions about marriage in some years. Relative to the Census, the June
CPS samples are smaller and cover more recent years which are of less interest to us.
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registered. During the years it collected marriage data, Vital Statistics saw a large
increase in the number of states providing information — from less than 20 in 1950 to
virtually all states in 1980. Vital Statistics marriage information is not available for
all states in all years and is, for most years, not available in age-disaggregated form.6
Age-specific information is available for the eighteen reporting states in 1950 (and for
several years in the 1940s), but is not available again until 1968. For the remainder
of the 1950s and 1960s, Vital Statistics only reports information about the number
of marriages for aggregate categories, such as marriages among persons aged 14-19
or 20-24. Because the data are collected at the time of marriage and are official
administrative data, the Vital Statistics is typically considered the authoritative
source of information on marriage in the U.S.
The decennial Censuses represent an alternative source of data about marriage
outcomes for the populations of young people affected by marriage laws. In the
1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses, respondents were asked about the date of their first
marriage and their date of birth. Individuals’ age at marriage can be readily calcu-
lated from these two pieces of retrospective information. The Census contains very
large samples and provides age-disaggregated information about marriage. But ret-
rospective Census information about marriage has the drawback that reports may
be subject to recall error. Further, location information in the Census is limited to
a person’s state of residence and state of birth; hence, where a marriage occurred
is not perfectly known. Their differences notwithstanding, if lower non-consent ages
lowered the likelihood of early marriage, this effect should be evident and of similar
magnitude in both data sources. We examine these patterns in the next section.
6Data on marriages before 1968 are available in published annual reports, available online at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/vsus/vsus.htm. Microdata files for 1968 to 1995 are maintained
by the National Bureau of Economic Research at http://www.nber.org/data/marrdivo.html.
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3.3 Estimates of the Effect of Marriage Laws on Early Marriage from
Vital Statistics and Census Data
We begin with a regression analysis of marriages from 1951-1979. Vital Statistics
information for these years is not age-disaggregated, so we focus on marriage for
the 14-19 age group. We convert the marriage counts reported by Vital Statistics to
marriage rates by estimating the number of 14-19 year olds in each gender/state/year
cell using the decennial Censuses, and either the official inter-censal estimates from
the Census department or linear interpolation when these are not available.
We also use retrospective reports from the 5% IPUMS sample of the 1980 Cen-
sus. To make the results from the two surveys strictly comparable, we collapse
age-disaggregated Census data in the relevant cohorts into the same 14-19 age bin
observed in the Vital Statistics, and limit the Census data to the set of states (using
state of birth) and years for which there is Vital Statistics information.7 Finally,
Census marriage rates for 14-19 year olds are the rate in the IPUMS sample.






















gs(t− k∗t ≥ 4) + Γt + Γs + εgst (3.1)
where Ygst is the marriage rate in the 14-19 age group in year t for persons of gender
g; Γt and Γs are, respectively, vectors of year and state fixed effects; and εgst is a
random error term. The variable k∗l denotes the year in which a particular “non-
consent” age law l was changed (generally lowered) for persons of gender g in state
s. The indicator variables I lgs in equation 3.1, denote, respectively, that the year t is
four or more years before k∗l ; between 1 and 3 years before k
∗
l ; between 1 and 3 years
7Results from the Census sample using all states are similar. We have also estimated related models in which we
use all states and a fully age-disaggregated sample from the Census. These results are qualitatively the same as the
Census results shown here and can be seen in the appendix.
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after k∗l ; or 4 or more years after k
∗
l . The excluded time period in the regressions
is the year in which the law changed, so the estimated coefficients δ represent how,
after accounting for factors peculiar to a state and for general time effects, average
marriage rates for 14-19 year olds in a given period compare to marriage rates in the
year that a law changed.
Table 3.2 reports the results for regression equation 3.1 for women and men sep-
arately across the two surveys. The regressions include treatment variables for all of
the different non-consent laws observed in our data, but the upper panel of the table
only reports coefficient estimates associated with lowering non-consent ages from 21
to 18 for men and women, which is overwhelmingly the most common legal change
in the data. In the lower panel of the table, we present the estimated change in the
rate of marriage rate among 14-19 year olds between the period 1-3 years before the
law to the period 1-3 years after the law (δ̂3 − δ̂2) relative to the average rate of
marriage among 14-19 year olds in the state. We focus on this estimate because, in
our view, only behavioral changes within the six-year period bracketing the change
in a law can plausibly be attributed to the law rather than some other factor.
The results from the Vital Statistics indicate that marriage laws significantly
affected young marriage rates. For young women, the estimates imply that a change
in a state’s female non-consent age from 21 to 18 was associated with a 16.5 percent
increase in the marriage rate of young women aged 14-19. For men, the estimated
effect of a 6.8 percent increase in rates of early marriage is not as large, but is not
at all trivial. These estimates are precisely what we would expect if minimum age
laws strongly affected young people’s marriage decisions.
These patterns differ dramatically from what we find with retrospective Census
data. For women, Census results indicate that marriage laws appear to have had
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little to no effect on the rate of early marriage. The estimates for men are positive,
although they are substantially smaller than Vital Statistics results.8
Recall that in addition to the aggregated information used in Table 3.2, the Vital
Statistics reports age disaggregated marriage data in 1950 and some years after 1968.9
We use this information to graphically examine differences in the impact of marriage
laws across states in 1950 and 1970. To understand the figures, suppose that the
number of women (men) of age a wishing to marry in state s at time t is nast. Let πa
be the share of people who can always get married because of some dispensation like
parental or judicial consent. If âs is the age at which persons within the state can
marry without parental consent, and if marriage laws are binding, then the share of




















Equation 3.2 implies that, barring the unrealistic assumption that every young
person below the state minimum age can receive some exception or dispensation, the
probability density function of ages at marriage should display a discrete jump or
“spike” at a state’s legal non-consent age. These “spikes” should occur at different
ages in different states, depending upon the marriage laws in effect in the state.
Figure 3.1(a) shows the distribution of age at marriage for women in 1950 in
the 15 states where the age of marriage without parental consent was 18, using Vital
Statistics and Census data. The sharp spike in age 18 marriage in the Vital Statistics
is entirely absent from the Census data. Census data also show higher marriage rates
8We have tried several alternative specifications to the ones reported, all of which lead to the same conclusion as
the results in Table 3.2.
9The age disaggregated data from 1950 includes both first marriages and remarriages, and we (necessarily) compare
this to first marriage data from the Census. Including remarriages, which are rare at younger ages, has a predictable
effect of overestimating marriages at older ages. In the appendix, we perform the best available interpolation of first
marriages from the data, and show that, consistent with our expectations, using the remarriage data biases our main
estimates against our findings. We thus report the remarriage inclusive data in our main results because we believe
it is the conservative choice.
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at earlier ages, but from age 19 onward, the two series are quite similar. The six
point discrepancy at age 18 marriage across the two surveys is substantial. Figure
3.1(b) shows a similar comparison for the 4 states in 1950 where the age of marriage
without consent was 21 for women. Again, there is a much higher incidence of early
marriage in 1950 in the Census data. Vital Statistics shows a peak at age 21 which is
totally absent in the Census data. The Census and Vital Statistics also show different
results for men’s marriages in 1950. Figure 3.1(c) shows less of a discrepancy between
data sources in states whose non-consent ages were either 18 or 20. Even so, there
is a spike in the Vital Statistics at 21, and Census data show a higher prevalence of
marriage at younger ages. Figure 3.1(d) plots the distribution of age at first marriage
in states with a non-consent age of 21. The Census data does not show the spike
at age 21 found in the Vital Statistics. Like the women’s data, the Census shows a
higher incidence of younger marriages among all men who marry; for ages greater
than 22, the Census and Vital Statistics data are identical.10
In Figure 3.2 we repeat the exercise above but for marriages in 1970. Strikingly,
the figures show that for both men and women, the differences between the two
surveys found in 1950 marriages are either entirely absent or else are substantially
reduced in 1970. In Table 3.3 we conduct a series of formal tests for the differences
in the probability distributions shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The results strongly
confirm what is clear in the graphs: Census and Vital Statistics age distributions are
statistically different from each other for marriages in 1950, but are statistically the
same for marriages in 1970.11
10As noted above, we have the age of marriage data from Vital Statistics available within states for several years
in the 1940s as well as in 1950. We have compared Census and Vital Statistics for these years and see the same
pattern of discrepancy as are shown here for 1950.
11Treating these age groups as discrete bins, the data on age of marriage in Figure 3.1 may be thought of as a
set of binomial distributions. We report a set of pair wise tests of the equality of proportions across legal regimes in
Table 3.3, for different age bins. Since we have large samples, the binomial distribution is well approximated by the
normal distribution, which implies that the differences are also approximately normal. The difference statistics have
a z distribution.
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3.4 Alternative Explanations for Differences across Data Sources
Before exploring our preferred explanations for the difference across the two sur-
veys, we briefly explore whether mechanical factors, having to do with how the two
data sets are constructed, may account for these discrepancies. The most obvious
difference between Vital Statistics and Census marriage data is that Census informa-
tion about marriage is retrospective. Might recall error associated with these reports
explain the patterns documented above? An argument that recall error in Census
data explains our findings would have to take one of two forms. First, it could be
that when retrospectively reporting their early marriage, Census respondents sys-
tematically report having gotten married at younger ages than they actually did.
But it is not obvious why the tendency to report an earlier marriage should change
discontinuously at particular ages — as would have to be true for the Census and
Vital Statistics to agree at older ages. Moreover, a variety of considerations suggests
that if people do systematically misreport marriage in a particular direction, they
likely retrospectively under report very young marriages in the Census.12
A second and more plausible recall error concern is that people make random
errors when retrospectively reporting their age at marriage. These errors would tend
to flatten the distribution of marriage ages in the Census reports relative to Vital
Statistics. Since we use the 1980 Census for both 1950 and 1970 marriage, the recall
problems, with the attendant flattening, would be worse for those who married in
1950 than those who married in 1970 — possibly leading to the patterns we estimate.
We address this concern in a variety of robustness exercises, the details of which
can be seen in the appendix. Summarizing the results, we find that when we estimate
12These factors include the fact that people: (a) may choose not to report a short duration marriage from their
early life, as the 1980 Census directs them to do for annulled marriages; and (b) erroneously describe the date of
their current marriage, despite clear instructions to discuss their first marriage.
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the 1950 age of marriage distribution using both the 1960 and 1970 Censuses (instead
of 1980) the patterns are graphically very similar to and statistically no different
from those shown in Figure 3.1. Indeed, if anything, the point estimates from these
alternative exercises suggest that using the 1980 Census may actually lead to a slight
underestimate of the difference in early marriages in the Census and Vital Statistics
— probably because people are less likely to report early, unsuccessful marriages as
time passes. Finally, we think the fact that all our analyses reveal that the largest
differences between Census and Vital Statistics data occur exactly at states’ non-
consent ages is persuasive evidence that recall bias does not explain the differences
across the surveys.
A second mechanical concern is that the Census results are faulty because we
have to assume that state of birth is the same as state of marriage.13 If people
moved randomly prior to marriage, the errors we make in assigning people’s state of
marriage would be random, which would tend to smooth the Census data relative to
Vital Statistics data. However, this should have been a larger problem in 1970 than
in 1950, given higher income levels and more mobility in 1970. Instead, we find that
the discrepancies between the two data series vanish rather than increase between
1950 and 1970. Note that we distinguish this point from the systematic migration
to which we devote much attention below.
Two final points about the possible importance of mechanical differences between
the surveys warrant some discussion. In the Census our estimates of people’s age
at marriage are based on their reports about the month and year they married,
rather than the exact day. We assess the sensitivity of our results to any resulting
13We only include people in our Census sample who report being born in the U.S. This excludes U.S. marriages
among those who were born outside the U.S. but immigrate prior to marriage; these immigrant marriages are included
in the Vital Statistics data. We ignore this discrepancy, given the years we are focusing on are years when immigration
into the U.S. is relatively low.
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imprecision in the estimated age of marriage, and find that our results are robust to
these tests.14 The other issue is the possibility of attrition bias in the Census, because
of death or emigration from the U.S. after marriage. Census data contain no marriage
information for these missing persons. Note that the longer the retrospective period
of recall, the greater the attrition this will produce in the Census marriage reports.
Since we are looking at teenage marriages reported no more than 30 years later, we
assume this is not a major problem in our data.
Systematic Marriage Migration
If differences in survey construction do not explain the observed differences in
age of marriage across surveys, what does? We speculate that some young people
systematically evaded the laws — possibly by traveling to more permissive states to
marry. How important a factor is this migration in explaining the patterns shown
above? In 1950 where we find the largest differences across the two data sources,
available Vital Statistics data does not permit a comparison of out-of-state marriage
rates across different age categories. In addition, the set of reporting states is very
limited in the early years of the Vital Statistics. These shortcomings notwithstand-
ing, we can nonetheless provide an intuitively appealing assessment of migration’s
influence.
To see the logic of our approach, consider a state which was a likely destination for
marriage migration in 1950 and suppose that all cross-state marriage is motivated
by legal avoidance. Census records for the state would show the age of marriage
distribution of state residents, while Vitals Stats would show the age of marriage
distribution for residents and in-migrants. But since all in-migrants would be at
14Specifically, we use electronic Vital Statistics records for the 1970s and estimate age of marriage in precisely the
same way as the Census (thereby causing some imprecision in the estimated age). We compare the distribution of
actual age at marriage (which is known precisely in the Vital Statistics) with the less precise Census-like calculation,
and estimate virtually the same age of marriage distribution.
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least as old as the non-consent age in the state, the state’s Vital Statistics marriage
records should show that a discretely larger fraction of marriages in the state occur at
precisely the state’s non-consent age than do Census data, which measure marriages
only for the state’s residents. Consider next a state which is a likely source of
marriage migration. In this case, since some people younger than the state’s non-
consent age leave the state to marry; and since state residents who are at least as old
as the state’s non-consent age have no legal reason to leave the state, the distribution
of age of marriage in the Vital Statistics should again show a discrete jump at the
state’s non-consent age relative to that in the Census. Finally, in states in which
there is neither in- nor out-migration, Census and Vital Statistics the distribution of
age of marriage should be the same across the Census and Vital Statistics.
One indicator of whether a state was, in 1950, a likely in-migration state; an out-
migration state; or neither, is how its laws compare to those of neighboring states.
In the available Vital Statistics data, there are seven states with non-consent ages of
18 which have at least one neighboring state with a higher non-consent age. These
are likely in-migration states. There are eight states with female non-consent ages
of 18, whose neighbors all also have non-consent ages of 18. These states, to a first
approximation, are neither in- nor out-migration states. For men, we can identify 6
states with male non-consent ages of 21 which have at least one neighboring state
with a lower non-consent age. These are likely out-migration states for men. And,
we can identify 8 states with non-consent ages of 21 which are surrounded by only
states whose non-consent ages are also 21. These states are likely neither in- nor
out-migration states.
Figures 3.3 shows the distribution of age of marriage in these different states as
estimated in the Census and Vital Statistics. The results are quite striking. Figures
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3.3(a) and 3.3(b) show that women’s ages of marriage in in-migration states differ
sharply across Census and Vital Statistics in precisely the direction hypothesized, but
there is little difference in the age of marriage distribution for non-migration states.
Similarly, the two data sources reveal the sharp differences outlined above for men
in out-migration states. These differences are totally absent in the non-migration
states. Table 3.4 shows statistical tests that confirm the graphical evidence.
We think the foregoing evidence is strongly suggestive that there was some sys-
tematic marriage migration in 1950.15 However, there are reasons to believe that
migration is not the primary explanation for the differences in the data. In particu-
lar, observe that in Figure 3.1, the Census records, across all types of states and for
both sexes, show significantly more marriages at young ages than the Vital Statistics,
indicating an aggregate difference that cannot be explained by mobility. Addition-
ally, we use disaggregated Vital Statistics records from the period 1968-1971, which
pre-date the convergence of age of marriage laws in the mid-1970s, to measure the
extent of migration. In this time period, cross-state variation in non-consent ages
meant that the incentive to migrate should have been as high as in 1950, whereas
higher incomes and greater mobility should have made it easier to migrate. We find
that only a small share of marriages to young men and women occurred outside of
their state of residence in this later period — a probable upper bound on marriage
related migration in 1950.16 In summary, some factor apart from migration must
explain the 1950 disparity and 1970 convergence in Census and Vital Statistics data.
15The only two references to possible marriage migration that we could find in the literature are an early paper by
Rosenwaike (1967) and Dahl (2005). Dahl indicates that in 1968-1969 data there is evidence of marriage migration,
showing that women who marry out of state are more likely to marry in less-restrictive states. Unfortunately, the
data to do this type of analysis in earlier years is not available.
16See the appendix for details.
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Systematic Age Misrepresentation and Differences Across Data Sources
One important candidate explanation for the difference across the surveys is delib-
erate age misrepresentation. Specifically, we suspect that some young people, intent
on not delaying their marriages to satisfy their state’s minimum age rules, simply
lied about their age when filling out marriage certificates. Thirty years later, facing
no possible sanction from reporting the truth to the Census Bureau, they honestly
reported their actual age at marriage.
The plausibility of an important role for systematic mis-representation of age
depends on how easy it was to misrepresent age on a marriage certificate for this
generation of young persons. Clearly, if a state required that an individual show
a birth certificate, driver’s license, or some other document, it would have been
harder to evade the law. Misrepresentation should have been easiest when age was
self-declared, with no external verification. Common experience today suggests that
lying without forged documents is difficult because proof of age is routinely required
for many things. But was this true in 1950? In earlier decades, a much larger share
of the population did not hold a driver’s license, either because they did not drive
(especially younger women) or because states did not require people to carry licenses.
The use of social security numbers for identification (other than employment) was
relatively uncommon and many younger people did not have a social security number.
Some in the population (especially black Americans in rural areas) did not even have
birth certificates.
We do not have detailed information for 1950, but in 1929 the Russell Sage Foun-
dation commissioned a document detailing marriage regulations in all states in the
late 1920s (May, 1929). The first column of Table 3.5 summarizes the information
in this document. In that year, 15 states indicated that information on the marriage
117
certificate had to be certified by the oath of the parties involved, while another 13
states accepted an affidavit (essentially, a signature). Most of the remaining states
did not specify that any testimony of age be offered, or indicated merely that such
testimony could be requested at the clerk’s discretion. In short, age was self-reported
and certified by the signature or oath of the potential marriage partners.
We collected information on current requirements in all 50 states, and summarize
this information in the second column of Table 3.5. By the mid-2000s, virtually
all states required persons applying for licenses to provide some type of identifica-
tion, usually in the form of social security numbers or birth certificates. Only a few
states still have statutes that require only affidavits, and even these states appear to
enforce standard practices that require marriage license applicants to show identifi-
cation with proof of age.17 We attempted to trace the statutory history of policies
requiring documentary verification of age for a marriage license, but the complex-
ity and thinness of the documentary record made this a prohibitively time intensive
activity to conduct across all states. We therefore selected a set of fourteen geo-
graphically and demographically diverse states and tried to determine when these
states started to require documentary proof of age to grant marriage licenses. In
a few cases we could verify that such requirements were in place before or after a
specified date, but could not find the year they were initially implemented. Column
3 of Table 3.5 provides this information for these 14 states. In all cases except Mas-
sachusetts, these “identifying documents” requirements appeared to have gone into
effect sometime after 1960.
In short, our (admittedly fragmentary) evidence suggests that few states in 1950
appeared to require individuals to do more than swear to their stated age in order
17Our research assistant called a county clerk in each of these states and was told that he would need a driver’s
license or other identification in order to obtain a marriage certificate.
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to receive a marriage license. By 1970, a growing number of states required that
documentary proof of age be presented for a license. Lying about one’s age to a
county clerk almost surely became more difficult over the time period we study.
This evidence is indirect, but when the incentives of young persons wishing to avoid
state laws are taken into account it suggests that much of the difference we observe
between Vital Statistics and Census is the product of young people in earlier cohorts
having misrepresented their ages on official documents.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The results in this paper show the massively different conclusions a researcher
might be led to draw about the actual effect of marriage laws on marriage delay,
depending on the data source used. In particular, we suspect that most researchers
would have expected Vital Statistics data to more accurately reflect the effect of
marriage laws on delayed marriage, but this expectation ignores the much greater
susceptibility of administrative data to problems of systematic avoidance behavior.18
Obviously, our results suggest important cautions for future work on questions about
early marriage, especially if that work uses Vital Statistics data or exploits cross state
variation in marriage rules.19
Our results suggest a broader lesson for all empirical scholars and especially those
wishing to use information about laws as instrumental variables in their analyses.
What we have found in the case of marriage laws is likely true for other behavior
and laws: a law changes behavior among both compliers and non-compliers. Non-
18For instance, O’Connell (1980) benchmarks the accuracy of the retrospective Census data by comparing it to
Vital Statistics data. He notes that the CPS reports a “more youthful distribution of women by age at first marriage”
than the Vital Statistics in the 1940s and 1950s, while the two are more similar in later years, but he does not pursue
this discrepancy.
19A growing literature studies various questions closely related to the issue of early marriage, including the effect
of teenage childbearing on women’s life outcomes, and the incidence of low education, higher levels of criminal
activity, higher poverty and other negative outcomes among persons born to teens. See Ribar (1994), Hoffman
(1998), Klepinger, Lundberg and Plotnick (1999), Hunt (2003), and Dahl (2005).
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compliers — that is, persons whose actual behavior is not changed by the law —
have an incentive to report information to administrative bodies in such a way as
to suggest that it has. The researcher who näıvely assumes that the direct effects
of a law can be readily estimated in administrative data, with little attention paid
to the efforts to evade the law, may obtain deeply misleading estimates of the law’s
actual effect on the targeted behavioral change. Moreover, when avoidance itself is
of interest, researchers can study it by comparing the administrative data to survey
data.
Examples of the use of administrative data abound in empirical economics, and
several previous authors have hinted at some of the concerns raised in this paper.20
When, in general, is the quality of such data and the effects estimated using them
likely to accurately reflect true changes in underlying behavior and when is it not? Of
course, the answer will vary across contexts, but at a minimum it seems reasonable
to argue that administrative data is surely better when it is directly and impartially
observed (such as when height/weight information is directly measured rather than
self-declared), or if information is verified as part of the data collection process (such
as when birth certificates are required along with a declaration of age).
One final point illustrated by our results is that even when administrative data
accurately record behavior or outcomes in a state, the likelihood that individuals may
systematically move across states to avoid particular laws means that the population
within which the behavior is being recorded may differ in important ways from
the population researchers believe themselves to be studying. Administrative data
may indeed be superior to general survey data for answering many questions, but
20For example, differences between reported income and earned income have long been a concern in the study
of taxation. Recognizing some of the issues we discuss here, Slemrod (1992) proposes a hierarchy of responses to
tax policy and emphasizes that both timing and reporting are likely to be more responsive than actual economic
behavior.
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whether this is actually so in a given instance is something the researcher should
carefully assess by considering both types of data and by contemplating the likely
contamination in each generated by agents’ systematic efforts to avoid laws or rules
aimed at preventing them from engaging in particular activities.
3.6 Appendix
Alternative Estimates of the Effect of Legal Restrictions on Age at Marriage Using
the Census
This chapter focuses on the discrepancy between Census and Vital Statistics and
the lessons to be learned for researchers about avoidance. Here, we note some ev-
idence regarding the effect of legal restrictions on the age of marriage using the
preferred data source, retrospective decennial Census data. We provide estimates of
the effect of both non-consent and consent laws. The main text includes information
about variation in non-consent laws. We provide analogous information here regard-
ing consent laws in Table 3.6, which summarizes the variation across states and over
time in consent laws for each sex.
Using data from the 1980 Census, we test for an effect of legal prohibition on
actual age at marriage. We estimate the following equation:
Y igst(a) = β0 + β1Pgst(a) + Γb + Γs + ε
i
gst (3.3)
where g indexes gender, s indexes state, and t denotes birth cohort within the Census.
In equation 3.3, the vectors Γb and Γs are, respectively, birth cohort and state fixed
effects; and εigst is a random error term. The binary outcome variable indicates
whether an individual i of a given gender, state and birth cohort is ever married
by age a; Pgst is a binary variable indicating whether, in a given year and state, the
person was never able to legally marry before turning age a. So, for example, to assess
the impact of non-consent laws on marriage before age 18, Y measures whether the
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individual was ever married by age 17, Pgst equals 1 if there was no time in the years
before they turned 18 that the marriage laws allowed the person to legally marry.
The coefficient β1 measures how much a legal age constraint against marriage lowered
the likelihood of marrying. The inclusion of state and cohort effects in equation 3.3
means that β1 is identified from changes in marriage laws within states and across
cohorts.
Table 3.7 presents the results from estimating equation 3.3. The top panel shows
results for men and the bottom panel shows results for women. The first row of the
top panel shows the estimate of the effect of laws that do not allow men to marry
without parental consent before the age of 21 on the probability of being married by
age 20. The results suggest that there is a significant negative effect of these laws
on the cumulative probability of marriage at a younger age. The magnitude of the
coefficient can be estimated by dividing it by the share of men married by age 20,
which is 0.235 in 1970.21 This suggests that the likelihood of being married by age
20 is reduced by 3.2 percent in a state that has a legal marriage age of 21 (without
consent) versus a state with a lower legal marriage age.
We also look at the effect of changing the age of marriage with parental consent.
For men, a significant number of states reduced this minimum age from 18 to 16
during the time period studied. Hence, we estimate the effect of not being able to
marry without consent before age 18 on the probability of marriage by age 17. The
point estimate is unexpectedly positive, but small and statistically insignificant.
The bottom panel shows similar estimates for women. When the legal age of
marriage without parental consent was 20 or 21 among women, there is a statistically
significant and negative effect on younger marriages. We also look at the effect of
21This is the average including data from all states.
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age limitations on marriage with parental consent for women. The results indicate
that imposing a 16 year old age of consent reduces marriage among women age 15
or younger. Relative to the mean number of marriages at age 15 or younger, our
estimate suggests that the legal restriction is associated with a 15.3 percent decline
in young marriages among women.22 Our estimates suggest that age of marriage laws
did impact the marriage choices of the young adult population, with larger effects on
women than on men. Changes in the age of marriage without parental consent have
a significant but not particularly large effect, with about a 2 to 3 percent change in
the probability of marriage. This is much smaller than the effect of non-consent laws
estimated in the Vital Statistics (with a different specification), as discussed in the
main text.
Our Main Results are Robust to Concerns About Recall Bias
One potential reason for differences between contemporaneous Vital Statistics
data and retrospective Census data is recall bias. We use the 1980 Census in our
main results because a 5% sample is available in that year, whereas earlier samples
are only one-fifth that size. If recall bias is a problem, it is because people’s answers
about their age at first marriage change depending on when you ask them. To
demonstrate that recall bias is not generating our results, we show that data from
the 1960 Census and the 1970 Census are statistically indistinguishable from the
1980 data we use in our main results.
Here, we replicate the measures used in our main analysis for marriages in 1950 in
selected states and compare these across waves of the Census. The results, reported
in Table 3.8, show that (with one exception) the age distributions are statistically
22In this respect, our results agree closely with Dahl (2005), who focuses only on age of marriage with consent laws
for women.
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indistinguishable at the 95% level.23 There are a variety of ways to test the equiv-
alence of two data sets. We chose to report these tests of the equivalence between
waves of the Census because we think that they are most relevant to interpreting the
potential importance of recall bias for the particular tests that we emphasize in the
main text.
Our Main Results are Robust to Concerns About the Inclusion of Remarriages in 1950
Vital Statistics Data
The age disaggregated data in the Vital Statistics in 1950 includes both first mar-
riages and remarriages, and we compare these, out of necessity, to first marriages
from the Census in the main text of the paper. Since there are very few first mar-
riages at the youngest ages, and proportionately more at older ages, the inclusion of
remarriages will have a predictable effect on the distribution; including remarriages
will exaggerate the older ages and undercount the younger ages. The inclusion of re-
marriages, therefore, could potentially explain part of the discrepancy between Vital
Statistics and Census estimates of marriages in 1950.
In this appendix, we perform the best possible interpolation of remarriages us-
ing additional information from the 1950 Vital Statistics to demonstrate that the
inclusion of remarriages, rather than explaining our findings, works against us. The
1950 Vital Statistics records indicate, in a separate table, the rates of first marriage
and remarriage by state for several age categories (14-19, 20-24, etc.). We identify
the set of states that match our sample as closely as possible (there is not perfect
overlap in availability across the tables) and calculate average remarriage rates for
the available age categories. Then, we take the same set of states and calculate the
mean age within each category (e.g., the mean age of women 14-19 who marry in
23The pairwise comparison that we use here is the same that we describe in the text above.
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1950 is not 16.5, it is closer to 19). This provides three pairs of data (each age and
remarriage rate is a data point) for an appropriate set of states in 1950. We then
use these three points to interpolate the estimated remarriage rate at each age.
Table 3.9 repeats the comparison emphasized in the main paper using 1950 Vital
Statistics data, upon which this interpolation has been performed, to the Census
estimates. On the left, the results reported in the main paper, using the original
Vital Statistics data, are included for reference. On the right, we report interpo-
lated estimates using a third degree polynomial to fit the remarriage data function
exactly.24 The interpolation has the expected effects. The adjustment closes the
gap between data sources at younger ages, but only to a very small degree. The
pronounced difference in Census estimates of the youngest marriages remains after
the interpolation. The adjustment has a more significant effect on the spikes at mid-
dle ages in the Vital Statistics, which makes the discrepancy between data sources
look much larger. The adjustment also causes Vital Statistics estimates of marriages
at relatively old ages to shrink, bringing Vital Statistics closer to Census at these
ages, which is consistent with our hypotheses about how the data sets should differ
if individuals avoided restrictive laws.
In sum, the best available adjustment for remarriages in the 1950 data appears
to strengthen the argument made in the main text. We therefore conclude that
the conservative approach is to use the unadjusted data, which also has the added
benefit of not requiring subjective decisions about how to perform an interpolation.
We believe that the true discrepancy between first marriages reported in 1950 is
probably larger than we estimate in the main text.
24We have experimented with other forms of interpolation and found consistent results.
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Additional Information About the Quantity of Marriage Migration
The first type of legal avoidance that we analyze in the main text is the strategic
movement of young people from their state of residence to nearby states with less
restrictive laws, which we have called marriage migration. Here, we provide several
pieces of evidence which suggest that marriage migration was relatively small in later
years using disaggregated Vital Statistics data, which is available starting in 1968.
Estimates of the extent of marriage migration in 1968 to 1971 provide a plausible
upper bound on migration in 1950 because (a) rising incomes likely lowered the
cost of traveling to marry in another state, (b) the pronounced convergence of non-
consent laws had not yet taken place and (c) documentation requirements made age
misrepresentation (a substitute for migration) more costly in 1968-1971, as compared
to 1950. Here, we provide several pieces of evidence that migration was of modest
proportions in this later period, which we interpret as suggesting that some other
factor (age misrepresentation) must have driven the data discrepancy in 1950.
Table 3.10 provides evidence about the extent to which people married outside
their state of residence during the years 1968-71. As the first row indicates, between
1968 and 1971, 15.7 percent of all men and 10.3 percent of all women who marry,
marry outside their state of residence. Men under the age of 21 are those most likely
to be affected by legal age limits. The results show that these men are somewhat less
likely to marry outside their state of residence (13.6 percent), while younger women
marry away from home at about the same rate as all women (10.6 percent). If we
break this down by age, for younger teens we find relatively higher rates of marriage
outside one’s state of residence (at times exceeding 20 percent), and relatively lower
rates among older teens.
Of course, people marry out of their state of residence for many reasons. How
126
many of these young “marriage migrants” might have been seeking to avoid age of
marriage laws? As Table 3.10 indicates, 66.8 percent of young men and 73.7 percent
of young women who marry out of state did so in an adjacent state. Among these
men, 25.8 percent of them were too young to marry without consent in their own
state, but could marry legally in the adjacent state where their marriages actually
took place. Among women, this rate is 19.4 percent. Since these persons were all
too young to marry in their own state but could legally marry in an adjacent state,
it can reasonably be argued that they were all migrating to avoid their home state’s
minimum marriage age. These marriages constitute only 2.4 percent of all marriages
among men under age 21 and only 1.5 percent of all marriages among women under
age 21. While this is only an approximate estimate of marriage-related migration
(some movers could have gone to non-adjacent states; some going to adjacent states
may not have been consciously avoiding the laws, etc.), it suggests that a relatively
small share of those under age 21 are likely to be migrating as a way to avoid age of
marriage laws.
To further explore the importance of marriage migration, we compare migration
in the period before and after age of non-consent laws converge across states. Figure
3.4 looks at these patterns. The solid dark line in Figure 3.4 shows the percentage
of younger male migrants who move from more restrictive to less restrictive states,
as classified by 1968 laws. The denominator is the number of men under age 21
who live in a state where the 1968 age of consent for marriage is 21 but who marry
out of state; this is the number of marriage migrants who are too young to marry
in historically restrictive states. The numerator is the number of these men who
marry in a state where the 1968 age of consent law would have allowed them to
marry legally. The ratio represents the share of younger marriage migrants who
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could plausibly be avoiding the law, if the 1968 laws were still in effect. We show
this percentage for all years from 1968 to 1979, using the 1968 state laws to define
restrictive and less restrictive states. If marriage migration is important, there should
be more movement in the late 1960s between these states (when the restrictions were
actually in place) than in the late 1970s (when almost all states had adopted age 18
as the legal age for marriage without parental consent). The dashed line shows the
same data for women under age 21. Both of these lines decline during the period
when marriage consent laws converge.
As one final check on the extent of marriage migration prior to convergence in age
of marriage laws, we estimate difference-in-difference regressions, which are reported
in Table 3.11. Our sample consists of all marriages among men (women) under age
25 in the periods 1968-71 and 1976-79. The dependent variable is a binary variable
which denotes whether the man (woman) migrates to a state where the male (female)
non-consent law is less than age 21 in 1968. We difference between the early and late
period, and between men younger than age 21 and those ages 21-25. This implicitly
compares changes over time (before and after the laws bind) in migration rates to
states with historically lower non-consent laws among men who are of an age to be
affected by these laws versus changes over time in migration rates among men who
are too old to be affected.
We find that there was a statistically significant 1.8 percent higher incidence of
marriages among younger men in less restrictive states in the early period than in
the late period. This is quite consistent with our estimate of marriage migration in
Table 3.10, suggesting a relatively small (but significant) marriage migration effect
before the laws converge. Similar estimates among women find slightly larger effects.
We estimate a statistically significant 2.9 percent greater rate of marriage among
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younger women in less restrictive states in the earlier period than in the later period.
In short, we find clear evidence of migration to states with less restrictive age
of marriage laws among those who marry before age 21 in the period when there
are significant cross-state differences in these laws. Marriage migration appears to
be regularly used as a way to avoid state age of marriage laws. The magnitude of
this effect is relatively small, however, and seems to have affected only somewhere
between 1 and 3 percent of all younger marriages. Unfortunately, we can say nothing
about the trend over time in legal avoidance through marriage migration before
the late 1960s, but we strongly suspect the ability of teens to go out of state to
avoid marriage laws would have been no greater and probably smaller in earlier
years. If we take our estimate of marriage migration from the 1970s as a maximal
estimate of this phenomenon in 1950, it will explain less than half of the discrepancy
between Census and Vital Statistics data in 1950, suggesting that both migration
and misrepresentation were occurring in this year.
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Table 3.1: Legal Age of Marriage Without Parental Consent in 1950, 1970 and 1980
State Women Men Women Men Women Men
Alabama 18 21 18 21 18 18
Alaska 18 21 18 19 18 18
Arizona 18 21 18 21 18 18
Arkansas 18 21 18 21 18 21
California 18 21 18 21 18 18
Colorado 18 21 18 21 18 18
Connecticut 21 21 21 21 18 18
Delaware 18 21 18 21 18 18
Florida 21 21 21 21 18 18
Georgia 18 21 19 19 18 18
Hawaii 20 20 18 20 18 18
Idaho 18 18 18 21 18 18
Illinois 18 21 18 21 18 18
Indiana 18 21 18 21 18 18
Iowa 18 21 18 21 18 18
Kansas 18 21 18 21 18 18
Kentucky 21 21 18 18 18 18
Louisiana 21 21 21 21 18 18
Maine 18 21 18 20 18 18
Maryland 18 21 18 21 18 18
Massachusetts 18 21 18 21 18 18
Michigan 18 18 18 18 18 18
Minnesota 18 21 18 21 18 18
Mississippi 18 21 15 17 15 17
Missouri 18 21 18 21 18 18
Montana 18 21 18 21 18 18
Nebraska 21 21 20 20 19 19
Nevada 18 21 18 21 18 18
New Hampshire 18 20 18 20 18 18
New Jersey 18 21 18 21 18 18
New Mexico 18 21 18 21 18 18
New York 18 21 18 21 18 18
North Carolina 18 18 18 18 18 18
North Dakota 18 21 18 21 18 18
Ohio 18 21 18 21 18 18
Oklahoma 18 21 18 21 18 18
Oregon 18 21 18 21 18 18
Pennsylvania 21 21 21 21 18 18
Rhode Island 21 21 21 21 18 18
South Carolina 14 18 18 18 18 18
South Dakota 18 21 18 21 18 18
Tennesse 18 18 18 18 18 18
Texas 18 21 18 19 18 18
Utah 18 21 18 21 18 18
Vermont 18 21 18 21 18 18
Virginia 21 21 21 21 18 18
Washington 18 21 18 18 18 18
West Virginia 21 21 21 21 16 18
Wisconsin 18 21 18 21 18 18
Wyoming 18 21 18 21 19 19
authors from state statutes.
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Table 3.3: Statistical Tests of the Equivalence of Marriage Proportions
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.108 0.197 -0.088 0.004 0.145 0.148 -0.003 0.002
18 0.203 0.145 0.058 0.004 0.162 0.142 0.019 0.002
>=19 0.689 0.658 0.030 0.005 0.694 0.710 -0.016 0.002
N 201,564 8,051 121,687 46,480
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=20 0.441 0.535 -0.094 0.012 0.567 0.566 0.001 0.006
21 0.133 0.113 0.020 0.008 0.137 0.137 0.000 0.004
>=22 0.425 0.352 0.074 0.012 0.295 0.297 -0.002 0.005
N 45,623 1,672 24,365 11,691
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.005 0.034 -0.029 0.003 0.038 0.044 -0.006 0.002
18-20 0.218 0.250 -0.032 0.008 0.362 0.330 0.033 0.004
21 0.157 0.132 0.024 0.006 0.137 0.142 -0.005 0.003
>=22 0.621 0.584 0.037 0.009 0.463 0.485 -0.021 0.004
N 71,012 3,059 43,662 17,209
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=20 0.185 0.259 -0.074 0.006 0.310 0.309 0.000 0.003
21 0.192 0.135 0.057 0.005 0.152 0.145 0.007 0.002
>=22 0.623 0.606 0.017 0.007 0.538 0.545 -0.007 0.003
N 196,015 5,263 99,671 36,639
Please see corresponding figures for a list of the states included in each sample.
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 18 (Figures 1a and 2a)
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 21 (Figures 1b and 2b)
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 18 to 20 (Figures 1c and 2c)




The table reports the proportion of marriages that occur in several discrete age bins in each 
year for each sex. 
Each proportion may be thought of as having a binomial distribution, so that a test of the 
equivalence of the distributions across data sets can be done by taking the difference of the 
proportions. This difference will have an approximate z-distribution.
1950 1970
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Table 3.4: Statistical Tests of the Equivalence of Marriage Proportions in 1950 Vital Statistics
Data Across States with Varying Opportunities for Migration
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.103 0.239 -0.135 0.007 0.114 0.147 -0.033 0.006
18-20 0.488 0.417 0.071 0.008 0.431 0.424 0.007 0.008
>=21 0.409 0.344 0.065 0.007 0.455 0.429 0.026 0.008
N 112,550 4,341 89,014 3,710
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.009 0.042 -0.033 0.005 0.007 0.029 -0.022 0.003
18-20 0.150 0.271 -0.121 0.011 0.179 0.206 -0.026 0.007
>=21 0.841 0.687 0.155 0.012 0.814 0.766 0.048 0.007
N 65,068 1,638 87,110 3,625
Please see corresponding figures for a list of the states included in each sample.
The table reports the proportion of marriages that occur in several discrete age bins in each year 
for each sex. 
Each proportion may be thought of as having a binomial distribution, so that a test of the 
equivalence of the distributions across data sets can be done by taking the difference of the 
proportions. This difference will have an approximate z-distribution.
States with high migration potential are those states that have an abutting neighbor with a 
different legal regime. For women, high migration potential states have a neighboring state with a 
non-consent law of 21. For men, high migration potential states have a neighboring sate with a 
non-consent law of 18, 19 or 20. For both sexes, a state has a low migration potential state if all 
of its abutting neighbors have the same law as that state.
States with High Migration Potential States with Low Migration Potential
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 18 (Figures 3a and 3b)
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 21 (Figures 3c and 3d)
States with High Migration Potential States with Low Migration Potential
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Table 3.5: Statutory Provisions for Proof of Age Among Those Applying for a Marriage License
Date of Statutory
Change Requiring
State Late 1920s Current Documentation
  
Alabama Not specified* SSN
Alaska NA SSN 1997
Arizona Oath Affidavit and SSN
Arkansas Affidavit* BC
California Oath may be requested Photo ID Before 1988
Colorado Affidavit "Satisfactory proof" of age
Connecticut Oath SSN
Delaware Oath Affidavit and SSN
Florida Affidavit Affidavit and SSN
Georgia Oath BC, DL, or PP 1975
Hawaii NA SSN
Idaho Affidavit BC 1967
Illinois Affidavit "Satisfactory proof" of age
Indiana Not specified BC or DL
Iowa Affidavit or Certificate of age SSN 1961
Kansas Oath Affidavit
Kentucky Not specified* BC or DL
Louisiana Not specified BC
Maine Not specified Oath and SSN
Maryland Oath Affidavit and SSN
Massachusetts Oath BC, DL, or PP 1931
Michigan Affidavit BC 1968
Minnesota Oath Affidavit
Mississippi Affidavit BC or DL
Missouri Not specified SSN
 
Montana Not specified BC
Nebraska Not specified Photo ID
Nevada Oath may be requested Affidavit
New Hampshire Not specified BC, DL, or PP
New Jersey Oath Oath by witness and SSN
New Mexico Not specified Affidavit
New York Affidavit BC, DL, or PP Before 1974
North Carolina Oath may be requested BC 1957
North Dakota Oath BC 1981
Ohio Oath Affidavit and SSN
Oklahoma Evidence can be requested BC 1961
Oregon Affidavit "Reasonable proof" of age
Pennsylvania Oath Affidavit
Rhode Island Oath  
South Carolina Affidavit BC 1962
 
South Dakota Testimony of witnesses  BC, DL, or PP
Tennessee Not specified* Affidavit
Texas Not specified BC, DL, or PP Before 1997
Utah Affidavit  
Vermont Oath  
 
Virginia Not specified  
Washington Affidavit Affidavit
West Virginia Not specified BC or DL
Wisconsin Oath BC
Wyoming Testimony of witnesses Affidavit
Late 1920 data from May (1929); current data and data on changes in statutes collected by authors.
SSN: Social Security Number;  BC: Birth Certificate;  DL: Driver's License;  PP: Passport
* Financial penalty specified for misinformation.
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Table 3.6: Legal Age of Marriage With Parental Consent in 1950, 1970 and 1980
State Women Men Women Men Women Men
Alabama 14 17 14 17 14 14
Alaska 16 18 16 18 16 16
Arizona 16 18 16 18 16 16
Arkansas 16 18 16 18 16 17
California 16 18 16 18 18 18
Colorado 16 16 16 16 16 16
Connecticut 16 16 16 16 16 16
Delaware 16 18 16 18 18 18
Florida 16 18 16 18 18 16
Georgia 14 17 16 18 17 16
Hawaii 16 18 16 18 18 16
Idaho 15 15 16 18 15 16
Illinois 16 18 16 18 18 16
Indiana 16 18 16 18 18 17
Iowa 14 16 16 18 18 18
Kansas 16 18 18 18 18 18
Kentucky 14 16 16 18 12 12
Louisiana 16 18 16 18 16 18
Maine 16 16 16 16 16 16
Maryland 16 18 16 18 16 16
Massachusetts 16 18 16 18 18 18
Michigan 16 18 16 18 16 18
Minnesota 16 18 16 18 16 16
Mississippi 12 12 15 17 15 17
Missouri 15 15 15 15 15 15
Montana 16 18 16 18 18 18
Nebraska 16 18 16 18 17 17
Nevada 16 18 16 18 16 16
New Hampshire 18 20 18 20 18 18
New Jersey 16 18 16 18 16 16
 
New Mexico 16 18 16 18 16 16
New York 16 16 16 16 16 16
North Carolina 16 16 16 16 16 16
North Dakota 15 18 15 18 16 16
Ohio 16 18 16 18 16 18
Oklahoma 15 18 15 18 16 16
Oregon 15 18 15 18 17 17
Pennsylvania 16 16 16 16 16 16
Rhode Island 16 18 16 18 16 18
South Carolina 14 18 14 16 14 16
South Dakota 15 18 16 18 16 16
Tennesse 12 12 12 12 16 16
Texas 14 16 14 16 14 14
Utah 14 16 14 16 14 14
Vermont 16 18 16 18 16 16
Virginia 16 18 16 18 16 16
Washington 15 12 17 17 17 17
West Virginia 16 18 16 18 16 18
Wisconsin 15 18 16 18 16 16
Wyoming 16 18 16 18 16 16
authors from state statutes.
Data on legal age requirements by state and year collected by the 
1950 1970 1980
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Marriage Laws on the Probability of Marriage before a Specified Age
Marriage law Age 20 Age 17
Never able to marry without consent before age 21 -0.0075
(0.0024)
Never able to marry with consent before age 18 0.0004
(0.0003)
Cohort fixed effects X X
State fixed effects X X
Birth cohorts included in regression 1930-1962 1930-1962
Number of observations 1,868,463 2,149,555
Share of men married by age 20 in 1970 = 0.235
Share of men married by age 17 in 1970 = 0.021
Marriage law Age 18 Age 15
Never able to marry without consent before age 19 -0.0088
(0.0030)
Never able to marry with consent before age 16 -0.0036
(0.0005)
Cohort fixed effects X X
State fixed effects X X
Birth cohorts included in regression 1930-1962 1930-1962
Number of observations 2,145,866 2,238,084
Share of women married by age 18 in 1970 = 0.245
Share of women married by age 15 in 1970 = 0.024
Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by cohort.
Data are from the 1980 Census, including all 50 states (but not Washington, D.C.)
Percent effect of marriage laws limiting marriage without parental consent 
                                       before age 21 (coefficient/1970 share)  = -3.19%
                                       before age 18 (coefficient/1970 share)  =  2.03%
Percent effect of marriage laws limiting marriage without parental consent 
Part b:  Women
Dependent Variable:  Probability of 
marriage by
                                       before age 19 (coefficient/1970 share)  =  -3.58%
                                       before age 15 (coefficient/1970 share)  =  -15.32%
Percent effect of marriage laws limiting marriage with parental consent
Dependent Variable:  Probability of 
marriage by
Part a:  Men
Percent effect of marriage laws limiting marriage with parental consent
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<=17 0.205 0.197 0.008 0.011 0.210 0.197 0.014 0.011
18 0.136 0.145 -0.008 0.009 0.151 0.145 0.006 0.010
>=19 0.659 0.658 0.000 0.013 0.639 0.658 -0.020 0.013










<=20 0.556 0.535 0.020 0.030 0.567 0.535 0.031 0.029
21 0.090 0.113 -0.023 0.017 0.128 0.113 0.015 0.019
>=22 0.354 0.352 0.002 0.028 0.306 0.352 -0.046 0.027










<=17 0.005 0.034 -0.029 0.003 0.050 0.034 0.016 0.009
18-20 0.218 0.250 -0.032 0.008 0.253 0.250 0.003 0.019
21 0.157 0.132 0.024 0.006 0.146 0.132 0.013 0.015
>=22 0.621 0.584 0.037 0.009 0.552 0.584 -0.032 0.021










<=20 0.185 0.259 -0.074 0.006 0.276 0.259 0.017 0.014
21 0.192 0.135 0.057 0.005 0.119 0.135 -0.016 0.011
>=22 0.623 0.606 0.017 0.007 0.605 0.606 -0.001 0.016
N 196,015 5,263 1,153 5,263
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 18
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 21
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 18 to 20
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 21
1980 Census v. 1960 Census 1980 Census v. 1970 Census
1980 Census v. 1960 Census 1980 Census v. 1970 Census
1980 Census v. 1960 Census 1980 Census v. 1970 Census
The table reports the proportion of marriages that occur in several discrete age bins in each 
year for each sex. 
Each proportion may be thought of as having a binomial distribution, so that a test of the 
equivalence of the distributions across data sets can be done by taking the difference of the 
proportions. This difference will have an approximate z-distribution.
1980 Census v. 1960 Census 1980 Census v. 1970 Census
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Table 3.9: Statistical Tests of the Equivalence of Marriage Proportion in 1950: Comparison
Between Unadjusted and Remarriage Adjusted Vital Statistics
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.108 0.197 -0.088 0.004 0.119 0.197 -0.078 0.004
18 0.203 0.145 0.058 0.004 0.221 0.145 0.077 0.004
>=19 0.689 0.658 0.030 0.005 0.660 0.658 0.001 0.005
N 201,564 8,051 201,564 8,051
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=20 0.441 0.535 -0.094 0.012 0.493 0.535 -0.042 0.012
21 0.133 0.113 0.020 0.008 0.141 0.113 0.027 0.008
>=22 0.425 0.352 0.074 0.012 0.366 0.352 0.015 0.012
N 45,623 1,672 45,623 1,672
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=17 0.005 0.034 -0.029 0.003 0.005 0.034 -0.029 0.003
18-20 0.218 0.250 -0.032 0.008 0.233 0.250 -0.017 0.008
21 0.157 0.132 0.024 0.006 0.165 0.132 0.032 0.006
>=22 0.621 0.584 0.037 0.009 0.597 0.584 0.013 0.009
N 71,012 3,059 71,012 3,059
Age Group Vital Stats Census Difference SE Vital Stats Census Difference SE
<=20 0.185 0.259 -0.074 0.006 0.198 0.259 -0.061 0.006
21 0.192 0.135 0.057 0.005 0.203 0.135 0.068 0.005
>=22 0.623 0.606 0.017 0.007 0.600 0.606 -0.007 0.007
N 196,015 5,263 196,015 5,263
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 18
Women: States with Non-Consent Age of 21
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 18 to 20
Men: States with Non-Consent Age of 21
Unadjusted Vital Stats Remarriage Adjusted Vital Stats
Unadjusted Vital Stats Remarriage Adjusted Vital Stats
Unadjusted Vital Stats Remarriage Adjusted Vital Stats
The table reports the proportion of marriages that occur in several discrete age bins in each 
year for each sex. 
Each proportion may be thought of as having a binomial distribution, so that a test of the 
equivalence of the distributions across data sets can be done by taking the difference of the 
proportions. This difference will have an approximate z-distribution.
The unadjusted Vital Statistics numbers match the estimates reported in the main paper and 
reflect all marriages reported in Vital Statistics. The remarriage adjusted Vital Statistics 
numbers reflect the estimated number of first marriages in each category, based on a 
polynomial interpolation of remarriage rates.
Unadjusted Vital Stats Remarriage Adjusted Vital Stats
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Table 3.10: Incidence of First Marriage Outside State of Residence Among Youth
Males Females
Among those who marry, percent
marrying outside state of residence:
    All Ages 15.7% 10.3%
    Ages < 21 13.6% 10.6%
    By age:
        Age 14 13.4% 21.6%
        Age 15 17.4% 20.1%
        Age 16 19.5% 13.2%
        Age 17 20.1% 9.6%
        Age 18 13.7% 11.9%
        Age 19 12.8% 10.0%
        Age 20 13.2% 8.7%
  % marrying in an adjacent state 66.8% 73.7%
  % younger than own state's no-consent law 25.8% 19.4%
  but above no-consent law in marriage state
Assuming all marriages in the previous row are 2.4% 1.5%
  due to marriage avoidance, % of marriages
  among those < age 21 who avoid state law
  by marrying outside of home state
Note:  All statistics are for first marriages. Data based on Vital Statistics records from 1968-
1971, weighted by Vital Statistics sample weights. Data come from all 47 states with 
information reported during this time period.
Among those < age 21 who marry outside state of residence:
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































On the Optimal Allocation of Students and Resources in a
System of Higher Education
4.1 Introduction
Approximately 77% of college students in the United States attend public insti-
tutions, where total annual expenditures now exceed $190 billion (NCES, 2005a,b).
Despite the magnitude of public involvement in higher education, and despite the
enormous body of research on the economics of education, economists have not es-
tablished a normative model of how students and resources should be allocated in
a system of public higher education. The aim of this paper is to provide a simple
and tractable framework for the analysis of this issue and to derive several intuitive
results regarding the optimal allocation of students and resources.
Given a distribution of student ability and a limited pool of resources for higher
education, we model the social planner’s decision to establish schools and populate
them with students and resources. Our model is driven by two simple assumptions:
(1) that there is complementarity between resources and student ability in producing
educational outcomes; and (2) that there is a fixed cost to establishing a school.
We show that these assumptions produce a tiered structure that sorts students by
skill and results in discontinuous spending and educational output per student for
essentially identical students at the margin between schools.
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The existence of a fixed cost creates economies of scale, both for individual schools
and for the whole system. Because they can tailor educational spending more closely
to student quality, university systems serving a larger population produce more out-
put per student, holding constant total resources per student. Improved tailoring
raises aggregate social welfare, but it does not benefit all students (i.e., it is not
Pareto improving). In particular, the lowest ability students at each school will
lose when an additional school is introduced into the system, because they will be
dropped into a lower tier. Larger systems with more schools will provide a college
education to a larger fraction of the population, and they will feature a wealthier
and more selective flagship school, at the optimum.
The principal contribution of this paper is that these results, which are broadly
consistent with observed stylized facts, can be derived from a very simple model.
Most states have a hierarchy of postsecondary institutions exhibiting markedly dif-
ferent levels of resources. The most obvious example is California, where the state’s
Master Plan for Higher Education clearly lays out a three tier structure comprised of
the University of California system, the California State University system, and the
California Community Colleges. Even without an explicit plan, most states have a
flagship public university, some number of other four year institutions, and a system
of local community colleges. Students are distributed among these schools largely
on the basis of their measured academic ability, and discontinuous levels of public
spending per student in each tier are strongly and positively associated with aver-
age ability. On average across the country, instructional expenditure per student in
public universities that grant doctorates is more than twice that in community col-
leges. The difference in total expenditures directly relevant to education is higher.1
1Based on authors’ calculations of 2004 data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
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Further, Winston (1999) shows that spending per student and subsidy per student
are generally increasing in student quality in the U.S across all universities.
Our paper is closely related to existing work on systems of educational provision
at the elementary and secondary level, as well as earlier work on competitive (as
distinct from planned) systems of higher education. All of the earlier work that we
are aware of contains explicit consideration of peer effects. Arnott and Rowse (1987)
study an elementary and secondary system from a planning perspective similar to
ours. They consider the allocation of students to various classes within a school,
where students vary in ability and classrooms have a level of resources per student
that applies to all students in the class. Their principal finding is that any type of
partition is possible, depending on the strength of peer effects.2
Peer effects are a central feature of other related work. Rothschild and White
(1995) analyze competitive outcomes in higher education with peer effects and demon-
strate the potential for efficient private provision. Epple and Romano (1998) con-
struct a model of private and public secondary schools in order to analyze the effects
of voucher reforms. Epple, Romano and Sieg (2003) and Epple, Romano and Sieg
(2006) consider a model of higher education in which universities compete on quality
and university differentiation is driven by exogenous endowment differences.
The driving force in our model is complementarity in production. The notion that
complementarity leads to positive assortative matching (tiers, in this case) is hardly
new. This is the underlying mechanism in the marriage market model of Becker
(1973), for example. In the education literature, Arnott and Rowse (1987), Bénabou
(1996), Epple and Romano (1998), Epple et al. (2003) and Epple et al. (2006) all
2Effinger and Polborn (1999) work with a model that, on the surface, appears similar to ours. They begin,
however, by assuming that there are two different schools and that some students are innately better served at the
“lower” school. They then solve an allocation problem, under the assumption that attendance at one school versus
the other affects wages in a market with imperfect information.
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derive at least some results that resemble our tiered structure.3 In addition to assum-
ing complementarity between resources and ability, this earlier work considers peer
effects, and, in most cases, outcomes are influenced by the distribution of income.
Our model can be interpreted as a simplified case of much of this earlier work. As
is often the case, simplification yields both benefits and costs. We show that it takes
only two strong (but not unreasonable) assumptions to generate an optimal system
that is broadly consistent with the stylized facts of state higher education systems.
By eliminating peer effects, we demonstrate that complementarity, along with fixed
costs, is sufficient to make a tiered system optimal. Our simple model also allows us
to consider some issues that do not appear in the prior literature. In particular, our
results on resource discontinuities, our analysis of the optimal number of universities,
and our discussion of the selectivity of schools are new, even as they are latent in
earlier work.
We cannot, however, claim to have captured everything that might be impor-
tant in our simple model. As indicated by previous research, markets, peer effects
and associations between income and ability are important in higher education sys-
tems. Transportation costs (and therefore spatial considerations) and the political
economy of education finance are also surely influential. Abstracting from these con-
cerns enables us to isolate the role of complementarity and to build intuition, but
it also eliminates consideration of the ways in which these factors may reinforce or
counteract our findings.
We also believe that our emphasis on a planner’s perspective is of value. In Epple
and Romano (1998), Epple et al. (2003) and Epple et al. (2006), schools compete
with each other by maximizing quality. While this is a reasonable approach, we think
3A strand of the literature that studies continuous optimization problems has touched on the implications of
complementarity between student ability and student quality. Fernandéz and Gaĺı (1999) is an example. That paper
differs significantly from our analysis by considering a continuum of pre-existing schools of exogenous quality.
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that for the case of public universities in state systems, it is more natural to consider
the planner’s problem of maximizing total output across a set of schools. While both
approaches lead to similar mathematical results on sorting, we think that framing
the problem from a planner’s perspective is of heuristic value.
We build up our model incrementally throughout the remainder of the paper.
In section 2, we introduce the key elements of the model. Section 3 describes the
solution when the optimal number of schools is fixed. Section 4 extends the analysis
to consider the optimal number of schools. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
4.2 A Description of the Model
We model a social planner’s problem. The planner takes as given the distribution
of students, the amount of resources available, the education production function,
and the fixed cost of establishing a school. The planner chooses the number of
universities, selects which students attend each university, and decides how many
resources to give each university.
We model educational output as a function of student ability and resources per
student at the student’s school. We assume that ability and resources are comple-
mentary. Our assumptions about the distribution of students will be innocuous, but
our assumptions about the curvature of the education production function are key
to our results.
We believe a planner’s problem is attractive both because it is relatively simple
and because it is a good approximation to the real world, where the vast majority of
students attend public institutions. In our model, students are not explicitly decision-
makers. If they were, however, they would all have unanimous preferences to attend
150
schools with higher resources per student, because this is the only dimension along
which universities vary. The planner can therefore use selective admissions to produce
the desired allocation. In other words, a planner with control over admissions policy
can satisfy all incentive constraints.
We consider a utilitarian social welfare function, so that the social planner seeks
to maximize the aggregate level of educational output. Distributional considerations
could be modeled by giving the social planner a preference for equality of outcomes
(e.g., a concave social welfare function), equality of expenditure (e.g., a loss function
for school quality disparities), or equality of access (e.g., a loss function for selec-
tive admissions). Courant, McPherson and Resch (2006) argue that distributional
considerations may affect the design of higher education because higher education
may be a useful instrument for smoothing preexisting differences in welfare. We ac-
knowledge that distributional concerns are interesting, but we focus on the utilitarian
case to maintain simplicity and because we believe it is a good characterization of
higher education (as opposed to primary and secondary education), where selective
admissions prevail and there is typically no presumption of education for all.4
We do not consider peer effects. They are not needed to obtain any of our results,
and omitting them simplifies the model and makes the mechanics more transparent.
Previous research has included both peer effects and expenditures per student as
inputs to education (Arnott and Rowse, 1987; Epple and Romano, 1998; Effinger
and Polborn, 1999; Epple et al., 2003), clouding the issue of what drives the model.
Our results show that complementarity is sufficient for educational sorting.
The education produced by an individual student is denoted by h(x, r), where x
4There is a class of concave social welfare functions that we could employ without changing any qualitative
results. This leads to limited additional insight, at the cost of significant additional notation. A sufficient condition
for our results to hold is that the transformation U(h(·)) be supermodular and concave, where h(·) is the education
production function and U(·) is the social welfare function. The conditions on U(·) and h(·) that ensure this have
no obvious economic interpretation.
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is that student’s ability and r is the resources per student at the student’s school.
Ability follows a continuous, differentiable cumulative distribution, F (x), with a
probability density function denoted by f(x) and a finite support bounded by x and
x.5
To establish a school, the planner pays a fixed cost, θ, and then purchases the
variable input into education. We assume that all students at a school receive the
same resources per student. In effect, educational resources at the school are a
congestible public good. For any level of total resources that a school provides, the
level of resources per student depends only on the number of students in the school.
We assume that the education production function, h(x, r), is continuous, twice
differentiable, and increasing and concave in each argument. Logically, output should
be increasing in ability and resources. We also suppose that it is concave in each
element. As a normalization, we assume that students with zero resources produce
zero output, and we restrict the domain of h to weakly positive values of resources.
Finally, we assume that the education output function exhibits complementarity.
This may also be called supermodularity, and it is equivalent to a positive cross
partial derivative.
h = h(x, r)
h1 > 0 h11 < 0
h2 > 0 h22 < 0
h12 > 0 h(x, 0) = 0
Only complementarity should be a controversial assumption. Complementarity means
that, at any given level of resources per student, higher ability students produce more
when given a marginal increase in resources. While it is not obvious that this is true
in all cases, we find it to be a plausible assumption. We note also that it is pervasive
5A finite support is not necessary generally, but it will be required when we later assume a uniform distribution.
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in the literature (Arnott and Rowse, 1987; Epple et al., 2003).
The planner will choose to set up K universities, indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. The
planner must pay θK in fixed costs from the total available resources T . What
remains, R, the resources net of the fixed costs, is partitioned among the schools.
We denote the proportion of R allocated to school k as ρk. The planner must also
partition the distribution F (x) between schools. For each value of x, the planner
allocates a proportion of the distribution to each school, denoted by pk(x). The total
measure of students is denoted by S. The measure of students at a school is denoted
by sk and is equal to S
∫
pk(x)f(x)dx. Thus, the resources per student at a school,




The planner simultaneously chooses the number of universities and the partition
of students and resources. It is useful, however, to write the planner’s problem when
the number of schools is fixed as a sub-problem. We denote the global value function
as V , and the value function when K is fixed as W :
V (T, S, θ) = max
K
W (T, S, θ,K), where






















s.t. θK +R ≤ T
K∑
k=1
ρk ≤ 1 (P1)
ρk ≥ 0 ∀ k
K∑
k=1
pk(x) ≤ 1 ∀ x
pk(x) ≥ 0 ∀ k, x
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Each integral of program P1 represents a school. The output of a school is the
integral of individual student outputs with resources equal to rk, integrated over
pk(x)f(x), the distribution of students assigned to the school.
The first and second constraints are the planner’s budget constraint. The third
disallows “negatively funded” schools. The fourth and fifth restrict the planner’s par-
tition, disallowing negative assignments, while permitting the planner to not educate
some students.
In choosing the optimal number of schools, the planner balances the burden of
paying the additional fixed costs for more schools against the inefficiency of sending
very different types of students to the same school. The planner allocates students
and resources, which implicitly sets the resources per student at each school.
First order conditions for this problem can, at least in principle, be established
using variational methods. In the interest of clarity, we shall instead demonstrate
that the problem can be reduced to a more tractable form.
4.3 The Optimal Allocation When the Number of Universities is Fixed
We begin by isolating the allocation decision, taking the number of schools as
fixed. With a fixed number of universities, the planner’s solution is a mapping from
the set of students and resources into universities. One class of partitions of the
type space involves grouping the highest ability types together in one school, then
grouping the next highest ability types in a second school, and so on. We call this a
monotonic partition.
Definition 1. A partition is monotonic if and only if, for least and greatest elements
xk and xk in each school, a student x is assigned to school k if and only if xk ≤ x ≤
xk.
6
6Alternatively, this could be stated as, for least and greatest elements xk and xk in each school, pk(x) = 0 if
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Any partition that results in one school having both higher and lower ability
students than another school cannot be monotonic. Any partition that puts two stu-
dents of the same type into different schools cannot be monotonic. Supermodularity
(complementarity) of the underlying education production function is a sufficient
condition to make the optimal partition monotonic.
Proposition IV.1. If h(x, r) is complementary (supermodular), then the optimal
partition of students is monotonic.7
Supermodularity is sufficient to generate educational sorting, even when there are
no peer effects. Imagine, instead, a non-monotonic partition between two schools.
The allocation can be improved by replacing a lower ability student with a higher
ability student in the school with more resources per student.
Corollary 1. In any optimal monotonic partition, any school that has higher ability
students than another school will also have higher resources per student.
Resources and ability are complements. This immediately leads to the conclusion
that universities with higher ability students should have more resources per student.
Proposition IV.1 tells us the shape of the optimal solution, allowing us to rewrite
program P1. The planner sets an admissions policy by determining the lowest ability
type admitted to each school.8 We denote the highest type assigned to school k by
x < xk or x > xk and pk(x) = 1 if xk < x < xk.
7All proofs are in the appendix.
8There will be no gaps between the lowest type in one school and the highest type in the next school; otherwise
total output could be increased by giving a higher ability student the place of a student at the lower school.
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ak, with a0 denoting the lowest type at the lowest school.
9
V (T, S, θ) = max
K
W (T, S, θ,K), where






















s.t. θK +R ≤ T (P2)




ρk ≥ 0 ∀ k
Program P2 has one fewer constraint than program P1, and the suboptimization
problem for W is a standard static optimization problem. One can easily construct a
Lagrangean and characterize the first-order conditions for any given K. In principle,
the planner can find the optimal allocation for each value of K that is feasible, then
choose the best among these.
We find significant heuristic value in further simplifying the problem. First, we
assume that the distribution of student ability is uniform on [0, 1]. This simplifies
notation, but does not substantively affect any interpretations. Second, we normalize
S to 1. Third, for the remainder of this section only, we assume that the number of
schools is fixed at two. Again, this substantially clarifies the tension in the model,
and all of the following results are easily translatable to other values of K.
Under these additional assumptions, the planner chooses one value of ρ, the pro-
portion of resources to be allocated to the lower school, and two cut-off conditions,
the lowest ability type admitted to the lower school, a, and the lowest ability type
9I.e., pk(x) = 1 for x ∈ [ak−1, ak] and pk(x) = 0 otherwise.
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admitted to the higher school, b.
max
a,b,ρ



















s.t. 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 (P3)
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
First-order necessary conditions for an interior solution follow from the unconstrained
optimization problem. At an interior optimum, the Lagrange multipliers on the












































































dx = 0 (4.3)












h2 (x, r2) dx = 0 (4.1b)





h2 (x, r1) dx = 0 (4.2b)










h2 (x, r2) dx = 0 (4.3b)
Equation 4.1 states that the full marginal output of a dollar spent at either school
must be the same in equilibrium. Educational production per student depends not
10The other inequality constraints, a = b, b = 1, ρ = 0, and ρ = 1 all imply that one university is empty and
unused. This cannot be optimal. Whenever the fixed cost has been paid, the optimal allocation uses all available
schools to tailor resources per student. In the Cobb-Douglas case, which we explore in detail below, with x = 0,
a = 0 will not bind because the lowest student produces zero.
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only on the total budget of a school, but also on the number of students over which
this budget is spread; the key metric is resources per student. The price of an



























Marginal Effect of r2
Marginal Effect of r1
Equation 4.2 describes the condition for the lowest ability person who receives edu-
cation. The first term represents the contribution to education made by the marginal
person when he or she is admitted. The second term represents the reduction in edu-
cation of those already at the school, due to congestion, when an additional student
is added. When the marginal person is added to the school, holding the school’s
total resources fixed, the level of resources per student falls (at a rate of ρR
(b−a)2 ), and
this causes a decrease (in the amount of h2(x, ρR/(b − a))) in production for each
student in the school. Thus, at the optimum, the direct contribution of the marginal
student just offsets the reduction that student causes by congesting resources.
Equation 4.3 describes a similar condition for the marginal student between
schools. Suppose the decision is made to send the best person from the lower school
to the upper school. Their direct contribution rises by the amount h(b, (1−ρ)R
1−b ) −
h(b, ρR
b−a), as a result of attending a school with higher resources per student (recall
from corollary 1 that the higher school will have more resources per student at the
optimum). This gain is exactly equal to the net crowding effect. The other two terms
in 4.3 are the combined marginal benefit in the lower school of moving the student
and the combined marginal loss to the students at the upper school from increased
congestion.
This marginal student faces a discontinuity. He or she would produce discretely
more at the upper school. Because of the complementarity between resources and
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student ability, the students at the better school enjoy more resources per student.
The top person in the lower tier is almost exactly the same as the lowest person in
the upper tier in terms of ability, but there is a discrete gap in their educational
outcomes.
4.4 The Optimal Number of Universities
The above analysis characterized the optimal allocation, taking the number of
schools as fixed. The planner must also choose the optimal number of schools. This
analysis is less straightforward because the problem is discrete.11 We can develop
some intuition by looking at the case where θ = 0, which again allows the use of
standard calculus. When there is no fixed cost, the optimal solution is to tailor the
resources per student to each ability type, with the resources per student rising in
student ability.
Proposition IV.2. If there are no fixed costs (θ = 0), the optimal solution features
a unique level of funding (a unique school) for each student ability that is funded at
a positive level. The optimal amount of resources per student, r(x), is an increasing
function with r′(x) = −h21(x,r(x))
h22(x,r(x))
> 0.
When there are no fixed costs, the planner tailors education quality specifically
for each ability level. The proof of proposition IV.2 solves a basic control problem.
The solution demonstrates that resources will be rising in student ability, and that
the rate of this increase will depend on the curvature of h. Greater complementarity
increases the slope of resources as ability rises. Greater concavity in the value of
resources will dampen the relationship.
11One may wish to appeal to discrete optimization tools such as integer programming to solve such a problem.
Unfortunately, integer programming techniques, such as cutting plane methods, are not applicable because they
require first solving the case where variables are not constrained to be integers. This will not work here because the
objective function is not defined for non-integer values of K.
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When there are fixed costs, the planner can provide only finite tailoring, which
implies that almost all ability types will receive resources different from the infinite
school optimum. This creates both winners and losers. Figure 4.1 shows a hypothet-
ical resources per student function for the no fixed cost case and the same function
when K = 2. For K = ∞, r(x) must be increasing. The area trapped by r(x)
will represent the net resources available, R, when the distribution of ability is uni-
form and measure 1. It is possible, but not necessary, that all students receive some
education in this system.
Suppose that K = 2 is the constrained optimum (which will be the case for some
values of θ). Some measure of students at the bottom may receive no education in
the constrained case. Students between a and b attend the lower tier school, and
students above b attend the upper tier school. The lowest ability students at each
school receive more funding than they would in the case with perfect tailoring. In
general, an increase in the ability to tailor resources will increase total educational
output, but it will not be Pareto improving. The lowest students at each school will
lose if the number of schools increases.
When there are fixed costs, the planner must balance the benefits of tailoring
against the costs of setting up new universities. A graphical representation of the
planner’s global choice provides further intuition. Figure 4.2 shows several hypothet-
ical curves in total resources versus total educational production space. These curves
are the W (T, S, θ,K) value functions from program P2, for several values of K, with
S and θ held constant. Each curve shows how total output changes as total resources
rises, holding fixed the number of schools, and the measure and distribution of stu-
dents. These curves are increasing and concave. The global optimum, V (T, S, θ), is
the upper envelope of these curves.
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A number of comparative statics can be visualized as the expansion or compression
of figure 4.2. Holding T constant, a fall in θ compresses the graph. Each W curve
shifts horizontally to the left, and curves at a higher K shift more. As a consequence,
systems with lower θ will be more productive.
Proposition IV.3. The average product of resources, V
T
, of the optimal system is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
The second part of proposition IV.3 is rather obvious. Average productivity rises
when more resources are available for education and fewer are required for paying
the fixed cost. The first part follows from the implied economies of scale. Larger
systems will spread the fixed cost over more students, allowing more money to be
used as an input.
Figure 4.2 also provides insight into how the optimal number of universities is
chosen. For the given value of T , the planner will choose the highest curve. Each W
curve begins on the T -axis at T = θK. For T above that point, W is increasing and
concave. If each W satisfies the single-crossing property, then the optimal number
of schools must be rising in T . Currently, we are unable to prove (or disprove) that
the single-crossing property is satisfied without any additional assumptions, though
our intuition is that the property will hold for a fairly broad class of functions. This
property holds in the Cobb-Douglas case, and we can prove several further results
with this functional form.12
Proposition IV.4. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, with 0 < α, β < 1, then the optimal number
of schools, K∗, is weakly rising in total resources, T .
12The assumption of Cobb-Douglas can be slightly relaxed to an assumption that h(x, r) = αrβg(x) without
changing the proof used. We suspect that this property is true for a broader set of h functions, but the current proof
uses the multiplicative separability of Cobb-Douglas, which is a relatively strong assumption.
161
Proposition IV.4 implies that richer systems should have more schools, thereby
achieving better tailoring. Note, again, that better tailoring does not mean that all
students benefit. Within each school, there are students who receive more resources
than they would if perfect tailoring were feasible. Thus, there will be losers from
an increase in total system resources if the addition of resources causes a rise in the
number of schools. In particular, some portion of the lowest ability students at any
given school will experience a decrease in educational quality when K rises. Increases
in T are not, therefore, necessarily Pareto-improving, even if resources are dropped
exogenously into the system.
Proposition IV.4 is closely tied to two additional comparative static results, which
relate the optimal number of schools to the fixed cost of establishing a school and to
the size of a system.
Proposition IV.5. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the optimal number of schools, K∗, is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
The intuition behind proposition IV.5 is clear from figure 4.2. A reduction in θ
shifts all the curves to the left. Curves with higher K values shift more. Thus, the
diagram is contracted, and the cut-off points all move to the left. Holding T constant,
K∗ must weakly rise as a result. Raising the measure of students, while keeping total
resources per student constant, has the same effect on the cut-off points.
University systems that serve a larger population, therefore, should be superior
in several ways. Even if they are not richer per student, they should have more
universities. They should do a better job of tailoring educational quality to students,
and they should produce more per dollar of resources and more per student.
Larger university systems will also serve a greater fraction of the ability distribu-
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tion, and they will feature more selective flagship universities.
Conjecture 1. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the selectivity of the top university will be
rising in K, holding R constant.
This remains a conjecture, because we have been unable to prove this for the
general case, but there are reasons to believe that the claim is true. First, it is
clearly true in the limit. As the number of schools approaches infinity, the top school
will become arbitrarily selective. Second, we have investigated this claim numerically,
assuming that ability is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Our assumptions require that
0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1. We performed a grid search over these intervals with a
.1 width, for K = 1 through K = 5.13 For each α, β pair we numerically located the
optimal cut points for each value of K and checked that the selectivity of the top
school is rising in K. This procedure revealed no counterexamples. These examples,
of course, do not prove the conjecture. Note, however, that even if there is some set
of values for α, β and K that generate a counterexample to the claim, the predicted
relationship will likely still emerge in the real world. A similar result about the low
end of the distribution holds in simulations. Systems with more universities will
serve a larger fraction of the distribution.14
We selected additional parameter values and extended the search up to K = 10.
Two examples are provided in figure 4.3 for illustration. When K = 1, the lowest
type admitted to the top school is the same as the lowest type admitted to the
bottom school. As K rises, the lowest type admitted to the top school (AK) also
rises. The limiting argument suggests that as K → ∞, AK → 1, giving a sense
13The numerically estimated solution is very sensitive to starting values when the parameters are near 0 or 1,
which necessitates an extra layer of search. We checked many values close to 0 and 1, and we performed a finer grid
search over the middle of the parameter space (from .2 to .8) where starting value sensitivity is reduced.
14An alternative approach is to calibrate the model. We prefer the grid search primarily because we do not believe
there is a reliable way to calibrate α and β. Since we find no contradictions to our claim throughout the entire
parameter space, we feel that the grid search is more comprehensive than a calibrated example, which would focus
on a single pair of α and β.
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of how these curves would project forward. A corresponding shape exists for the
lowest student admitted to the bottom school, with this value approaching 0 in the
limit. The corresponding curves have a similar shape for each of the large number
of parameter value pairs that we have examined.
These results suggest that schools in states with a larger number of universities
should have more selective flagships. Descriptive data from the Integrated Postsec-
ondary Education Data System on university characteristics in 2001 support this
hypothesis.15 Figure 4.4 plots the 75th percentile of the combined SAT scores for
students at each state’s flagship university against the number of two- and four-year
public universities in that state. It is clear from the graph that states which have
more institutions (better tailoring) feature a more selective flagship university. Fig-
ure 4.5 plots the percentage of applicants admitted by the flagship university against
the number of public universities in that state. The data again suggest that larger
university systems have more selective flagships.
4.5 Extensions and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for analyzing the optimal
allocation of students and resources within a system of higher education. Our hope
is that future research will enrich the model and test its implications.
Our model does not include tuition.16 At the optimum, the social cost of moving
a student from their assigned university to a better one is the change in their educa-
tional output minus the net crowding effect. If individuals experience a private gain
from educational output, there will be some measure of students at any university
for whom the private gain from a university upgrade will outweigh the total social
15These data are available at http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/.
16The existing literature primarily considers tuition policies that enable ability screening for schools maximizing
quality (e.g., Epple and Romano (1998); Epple et al. (2003, 2006)).
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cost. This suggests that there are gains to be made by allowing students to pay for
an upgrade.
Similarly, students might be willing to pay a premium to attend a university out
of state. If the social planner’s objective function includes only the education of
in-state residents, the optimal tuition policy will be to admit out-of-state students
as long as their tuition, at the margin, exceeds the current resources per student at
a school. In general, the introduction of tuition policy will make the total amount
of system resources an endogenous variable.
Our model also makes empirical predictions about the relationship between the
number of universities in a system and the selectivity of its flagship university and
about the effects of introducing an additional university to a system. When new
universities are introduced, our model suggests that some types of students will
experience a reduction in educational quality, while others will experience an increase.
At the same time, overall educational output, and the marginal value of additional
revenue, should rise with the introduction of a new university. Our hope is that
future research will utilize variation in the fixed cost (e.g., land grants, changes in
federal support) and the size of the population (e.g., migration, the Baby-Boom) to
test and further refine our findings.
In this paper, we focused on a deliberately simple model. Nevertheless, it cap-
tures a number of key features about the provision of public higher education. In
particular, our model offers a normative explanation for a tiered university system,
within which higher ability students receive more resources. It highlights the tradeoff
inherent in tailoring education quality to student ability. It also provides a model for
understanding the optimal number of universities in a system, and makes suggestions
about how university systems should vary.
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4.6 Appendix
Proposition IV.1. If h(x, r) is complementary (supermodular), then the optimal
partition of students is monotonic.
Proof: Fix the number of schools and the resources in each school.17 Suppose the
optimal partition is not monotonic. Call the two schools that violate monotonicity 1
and 2, and, without loss of generality, assume 1 has the higher resources per student.
If monotonicity fails, then ∃ y ∈ 1 < z ∈ 2. The proposed solution produces
h(y, r1) + h(z, r2). Switching the two students yields h(y, r2) + h(z, r1). And,
h(y, r2) + h(z, r1) > h(y, r1) + h(z, r2)⇔
h(z, r1)− h(z, r2) > h(y, r1)− h(y, r2)
which is a definition of supermodularity, since z > y and r1 > r2. QED.
Corollary 1. In any optimal monotonic partition, any school that has higher ability
students than another school will also have higher resources per student.
Proof: Suppose that the optimal partition is monotonic, with students in 1 being
higher ability than students in 2, but with r2 > r1. By supermodularity, swapping
any two students between schools raises output. QED.
Proposition IV.2. If there are no fixed costs (θ = 0), the optimal solution features
a unique level of funding (a unique school) for each student ability that is funded at
a positive level. The optimal amount of resources per student, r(x), is an increasing
function with r′(x) = −h21(x,r(x))
h22(x,r(x))
> 0.
Proof: Part I: Suppose that there is a school with positive resources and two or
more distinct ability types. Then there exists some school with both y and z with
17Clearly, if any two schools provide the same resources per student, there would be economies of scale gains to
merging the schools. Thus, we can proceed as if the resources per student differs at each school.
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z > y. Let s denote the total measure of students at the school. Without loss of
generality, suppose that the measure of each type is the same, s/2. Then, the output




















where ε = 0 and total funding at the school is ρR. We show that it is optimal to set
















The last inequality follows directly from supermodularity and contradicts the opti-
mality of the proposed solution.










It can easily be shown that the Hamiltonian leads to a degenerate solution with
h2(x, r(x)) = β ∈ R. This is an implicit function, and the conditions of the implicit
function theorem are satisfied because h22(·) 6= 0. The implicit function theorem







Proposition IV.3. The average product of resources, V
T
, of the optimal system is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
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Proof: Fix T and S. Lowering θ relaxes the resource constraint for any value of K.
V (T, S, θ) must therefore rise. Since T is fixed, V
T
must rise.
A rise in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant
means that S rises but T
S
is fixed. We can write this as a γ proportional change,
with γ > 1. Denote the value function as W (T, S, θ,K). For any value of K, output
per dollar of total resources can be written:
















































W (T, S, θ,K)
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The second equality uses the envelope theorem, which tells us that the optimal
cut-points will not change when the parameters are varied in small amounts. The






> 0. Since this is true of any K, it
must be true for the optimal K. QED.
Proposition IV.4. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, with 0 < α, β < 1, then the optimal number
of schools, K∗, is weakly rising in total resources, T .
Proof: Define W (T, S, θ,K) to be the constrained solution, when the number of
universities is fixed at K, and denote the derivative of W (·) with respect to T by
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WT . In the Cobb-Douglas case, we can relate W and WT :























































The vector of ρ and a values that maximize the objective function will also maximize
the marginal value of resources, WT , since WT is an affine transformation of W :
WT (T, S, θ,K) =
β
T−θKW (T, S, θ,K). Now, consider any two numbers of universities,
with K > K̂:
WT (T, S, θ,K) =
β
T − θK








W (T, S, θ, K̂)
= WT (T, S, θ, K̂)
Since the derivative of W with respect to T is higher the higher is K, the family of W
functions will satisfy the single crossing property in the T−W plane. For eachK > K̂
and T > T̂ , W (T̂ , S, θ,K) > W (T̂ , S, θ, K̂) ⇒ W (T, S, θ,K) > W (T, S, θ, K̂). As
is illustrated in figure 4.2, W will be zero up until T = θK. So, W functions with
higher K values start rising at a later point.
V (T, S, θ), the optimum when K is a choice variable, is the upper envelope of
the family of W functions in figure 4.2. Because of the single crossing property, this
upper envelope must lie on a W for a weakly higher K as T rises. Thus, K∗ is rising
in T . QED.
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Proposition IV.5. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the optimal number of schools, K∗, is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
Proof: Define T ∗(i, j) as the T that solves W (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i) = W (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, j),










dx. For the Cobb-
Douglas case, as is shown in the proof of proposition IV.4, W (T, S, θ,K) = S1−β(T −
θK)βQ(K). Therefore, T ∗(i, j), which will be unique if it exists by the single-crossing
property from proposition IV.4, solves
S1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)βQ(i) = S1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j) (4.5)
Without loss of generality, assume i < j. Totally differentiate equation 4.5 with
respect to T and θ:
(dT ∗(i, j)− idθ)βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)





jβS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j)− iβS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)
βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j)− βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)
=
jWT (T
∗(i, j), S, θ, j)− iWT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i)
WT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, j)−WT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i)
> 0
The last two steps follow directly from the analysis in the proof of proposition IV.4.
This shows that all cut-off points rise when θ rises. This implies that, when T is held
constant, a rise in θ must weakly decrease the number of cut-off points passed with
total resources T , which is equivalent to a weakly falling K∗.
For the size result, note that W (γT, γS, θ,K) = (γS)1−β(γT − γ θ
γ
K)βQ(K) =
γW (T, S, θ
γ
, K). Since γ does not depend on any of the parameters, the cut-off
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points for the γW (T, S, θ
γ
, K) system are equivalent to the cut-off points for the
W (T, S, θ
γ
, K) system. Thus, an increase in the measure of students, holding constant
total resources per student, which is equivalent to choosing γ > 1, is equivalent in
its effect on K∗ to a reduction of θ to θ
γ
. Since K∗ was proved above to be weakly
falling in θ, it must be weakly rising in the measure of students. QED.
4.7 Figures
Figure 4.1: Resources per Student as a Function of Student Ability
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Figure 4.2: Total Output versus Total Resources for Several Values of K
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Data include all 36 states with available SAT scores from the 2001 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. A
regression of 75th Percentile SAT scores at the state flagship on the number of colleges in a state yields the following
estimates: SAT = 1213 (14) + 1.52 (.29) * Number of Schools + error, where standard errors are in parentheses.
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Data include all 45 states with available admissions data from the 2001 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
A regression of fraction admitted to the flagship on the number of colleges in a state yields the following estimates: Fraction
Admitted = 107 (15) * -1.00 (.20) Number of Schools + error, where standard errors are in parentheses.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, the three essays in this dissertation are independent
of one another. All provide an analysis of public policy by applying the tools of public
economics. The substantive conclusions of each essay, however, are largely unrelated.
The first essay demonstrates that tax incentives favoring hybrid vehicles have largely
benefited consumers, not manufacturers. This finding suggests broader lessons for
the economics of taxation, including situations where the economic incidence of a
tax depends on statutory incidence. The second essay cautions future researchers
against an instinctive faith in administrative data and demonstrates the importance
of assessing how laws may be avoided by economic actors. The third essay provides
a normative justification for a correlation between student ability and resources in
higher education systems, which is consistent with what we observe in reality. It also
provides basic intuition regarding the trade-offs in resource allocation in managing
a system of schools. My hope is that all or some of this will aid in the future design
and evaluation of public policy.
174
Bibliography
Alson, Jeff, Benjamin Ellies, and David Ganss, “Interim Report: New Power-
train Technologies and Their Projected Costs,” October 2005. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, EPA420-R-05-012.
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, “New Light-Duty Hybrid
and Diesel Tax Credits for Consumers Estimated by ACEEE,” August 12, 2005.
http://www.aceee.org/press/0508hybridtaxcr.htm.
Arnott, Richard and John Rowse, “Peer Group Effects and Educational Attain-
ment,” Journal of Public Economics, April 1987, 32 (3), 287–305.
Asplund, Marcus, Richard Friberg, and Fredrik Wilander, “Demand and
Distance: Evidence on Cross-Border Shopping,” Journal of Public Economics,
February 2007, 91 (1-2), 141–157.
Associated Press, “Tax Credits for Some Hybrid Cars Halved,” USA Today,
September 21, 2006.
Automotive News, “Customer and Dealer Incentives,” Automotive News, 2005 -
2007, Various Issues (December 12, 2005 to May 7, 2007).
Bailey, David, “Toyota Sees Big ’07 U.S. Sales Jump for Prius,” Reuters, February
7, 2007.
Becker, Gary S., “A Theory of Marriage: Part 1,” Journal of Political Economy,
July - August 1973, 91 (4), 813–846.
Bénabou, Roland, “Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The
Local Connection,” The Review of Economic Studies, April 1996, 63 (2), 237–264.
Benton, Joe, “Prius Supplies Will Remain Tight Through 2006,” ConsumerAf-
fairs.com, December 16, 2005.
Blank, Rebecca M., Christine C. George, and Rebecca M. London, “State
Abortion Rates: The Impact of Policies, Providers, Politics, Demographics, and
Economic Environment,” Journal of Health Economics, October 1996, 15 (5), 513–
553.
Busse, Meghan, Jorge Silva-Risso, and Florian Zettelmeyer, “$1,000 Cash
Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions,” American Economic
Review, September 2006, 96 (4), 1253–1270.
175
176
Busse, Meghan R., Duncan Simester, and Florian Zettelmeyer, “‘The Best
Price You’ll Ever Get’: The 2005 Employee Discount Pricing Promotions in the
U.S. Automobile Industry,” May 2007. NBER Working Paper no. 13140.
Campbell, Margaret C., “Perceptions of Price Unfairness: Antecedents and Con-
sequences,” Journal of Marketing Research, May 1999, 36 (2), 187–199.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, “Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence,” August 2007. NBER Working Paper no. 13330.
CNW Research, “Hybrid Vehicles – Private Personal Use,” 2007. Document Num-
ber 481.
Copeland, Adam, Wendy Dunn, and George Hall, “Prices, Production and
Inventories over the Automotive Model Year,” March 2005. Federal Reserve Board:
Finance and Economics Dicussion Series: Working Paper 2005-25.
Corrado, Carol, Wendy Dunn, and Maria Otoo, “Incentives and Prices for
Motor Vehicles: What Has Been Happening in Recent Years?,” January 2006.
Federal Reserve Board: Finance and Economics Dicussion Series: Working Paper
2006-09.
Courant, Paul N., Michael McPherson, and Alexandra M. Resch, “The
Public Role in Higher Education,” National Tax Journal, June 2006, 59 (2), 291–
318.
Dahl, Gordon B., “Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty,” April 2005. NBER
Working Paper no. 11328.
Effinger, Matthias R. and Mattias K. Polborn, “A Model of Vertically Differ-
entiated Education,” Journal of Economics, February 1999, 69 (1), 53–69.
Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions and Sinks: 1990-2005, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007.
EPA430-R-07-002.
Epple, Dennis and Richard E. Romano, “Competition between Private and
Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic Review,
March 1998, 88 (1), 33–62.
, Richard Romano, and Holger Sieg, “Peer Effects, Financial Aid and Selec-
tion of Students into Colleges and Universities: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal
of Applied Econometrics, September - October 2003, 18 (5), 501–525.
, , and , “Admission, Tuition, and Financial Aid Policies in the Market for
Higher Education,” Econometrica, July 2006, 74 (4), 885–928.
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